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In troc:uc t ion 
:cart cme 
The 2pecific Problems ~)preached in the Study 
li 
ij 
.Jith the horld currently on the brink of a ?hird 'Jorld . ii 'Jar 'I 
:! 
the relative _positions of the democratic governments in ;<:urope 
become more perilous with ecch passing day. On the contirwnt 
:i 
especially do we find disorder, a frightened people and 
'I 
'Norried !i 
:I 
;I 
:j 
ii li politicians. Communism controls half the continent and has 
made ;:;ubstcmtial inroads in several other ·;estern :Suropean coun#-
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\1 
ries to the extent that it is altogether a powerful political f~rce 
,, 
i! 
to be reckoned ~ith. At the same time we find from the 9ast 
th~t democracy is not elways able to effectively meet serious 
e;nergenc ies without resort in:=, to a seni-au t!1ori te.riunimn s:1d q II 
I! 
h&s left in its 'dake a pattern of toto li tc:,ria!'l structures i) 
il 
ii c·2rt.::.in :_;rou;_;c in our societies desire to co:1trol. ,.,he 
serious vrobleus that faced Jeoocrocy and are f2cing it 
d i! 
today 
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are bound up in the continuous stru?gle between the forces of 
il 
the Right and the Left vvhich assu:nes increasing force as one o:b[J 
il 
the other of the contestants temporarily gains the U]Jper hand. ii 
II 
I 
·,;e have these three forces represented in the political 
forces in conte:nporary "?ranee and vve vvill atte::1pt to search outjJ 
.,,;hat causes and needs there are '.Jhich ir'lplement the progress, il 
!I 
'i 
or at any rate, the presence of one or the other of these forcew 
II 
" ;i 
ii 
in power at any one At the sa~e time institutions and 
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Ill II II traditions will be explored along vJi th the trends in political 11 
II 0o·,jer, the ability of democracy, or the 'T'hird Force, to meet II 
II ~ j1 
II 
,I 
! 
the nc. tions needs and the general te:'lperment of the people, to ,i 
!I 
!1
1 
see ~;vha t justification there is supporting the present govern- lj 
i I· ~mentL contention that republicanism is as strong as ever in ~ran~e. 
:1 1: 
!1 r.rhen, although we are presently standing on a perilous brink in !i 
11 . 11 
1
11
1 
:)rediction with nearly five years :oaf>sed since there has been a 1! 
- - 'i'l i: II 
\i nationsl election, \Je nay be able to drmv sone tentative conclu-.
1
11
1 il 
i ;.;ions Ds to t~w fate of the three ;!OliticGl forces in the a0:oro.::Jbh-
l - ~ Jl 
I in.:; elections. or, -,·vhat could possibly be the next step in the l\ 
lr
!lfi wesving of the pattern of political forces in contemporary "'ranci~? 
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Introduction 
""Part Two 
An Attempt to Define 
some of the Larger ~~rld nroblems Currently 
· +he Present State of the Fourth Republic Bearlng upon v 
II 
\I 
i 
!! 
! 
q 
The Third Republic v·Jas lnrc::~ely discredited before World 
~ar II and the feeling merely given conviction when the 
German invasion marked tho collapse of democre.cy in "Wre.nce in il !i 
ii 
1940. The Fourth Republic, but little different f'rc)'4 ~ t'"' p· -... ed- €1 1 
- ... ,L >:.) .L r 
' 
cessor in practice, is nm;; on trial. 3o far tl:ere hes been ciiq~ 
" 
played an uncertainty, an inadequacy, a lack of ability on . I! tne 11 
II 
11 part of the govern;rrent coalition to cope ·,vi th the probler:1s 
!i 
con-I! 
!I II I 
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! 
fronting it. 3cme of the forces et -~:ork on the scene 
re~>~Jonsible for tlli;:.; c\cos Ltre the rcturnin'~, :ml tiple ~)brty 
te~ and inst2bility in pc:r1i.s::·1ent. So::18 i~t)ortant inc5 irect 
;i 
i\ 
causes sre tl1e f<.,c;t tl"_;_st the econony is i11-used and sickly, re~ 
t: 
construction ~-:cs bitten deeply into the resources of the nation\~ 
!i 
and now another force appears in the form of the ~ar effort--th~ 
II 
I' needed recruitment and mobilization of the nations depletPd re-' 
,/ 
sources if it \'Jants to combe t Com.r1unism. 
1 
'!ith the size of the world situation in nind, it m.ay 'tJell 
1
j 
II,;:. 1,~.-. be thet representative ;,;overn·1ent vlill 9,0 on trial with the 
:\ 
'i 
Fourth Republic. It nay be that France ccn only hope to coubat!
1
'1' 
1
,1' 'i 
the world situation, Co .. ,munisra in its ovm ranks, and instabilitS' 
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of her govern:.1ent by permitting the introduction of de Gaulle uw-
on tl1e scene. 'rhe c;uestion rer1ains E<S to vvhether the t move 
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!I spells disaster to de:r10cracy. Is the trend towsrd ,state Soc ia~~sr:1 
it [! 
II' in Europe too great for :?ranee to support her present insti tu- il 
I - II 
I
I tions in the face of it? Dewocracy nay be breaking down in ii 
II 1i II France--it ~nay have been too severely da::1aged through several il 
!1\ :i decades of disintegration to be any longer ~orkable. De ~aull~; 
li II 
!J certainly desires the removal of Communism froCl public life--rna/~ 
II lf 
\I he not want the removal, successively, of the other parties tod~ 
·:1!1' tl' li 
, The problem of democracy in France is a complex one. The il 
day seems to have brought ~ith it some conditions of its own 
·which must be met by each old institution before they can pass 
the test and stand on their own. Government is no longer gov-
II 
,I 
ernment in the accepted sense, but must be vievJed instead in ii 
I j, 
!! the light of certain de~-,~anding and nearly irarJ.ovable external 
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forces vvhich cen nake or break all govern:.:1ents as ;;e knm·} then 
today. It raay be indeed, a point in ti:'le ~,;;ten the world is 
breaking out into a new class o: structures of order in which 
the v.orld empire will form an apex. Totalitarian systems are 
not the transient and sporadic structure they at first appear 
be. The United States cannot pursue a course of mobiliaation 
twenty years or ~ore without certain definite changes taking 
place both in the form of sooe of her institutions and in the 
The United States is now thinking of her people and leaders. 
!i 
same thing i i asking the vvhole '!estern 'rorld to do precisely that 
!! 
obvious necessity is seen for such action in the Kremli~rs as the 
like determination to undertake an extended period of rnobilizaJ~on. 
:I 
\'ar machines are not build. to endure the in an inc.us-l! 
A 
-· 
il 
il ,, 
ji 
:I 
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··-·· .... -......... . ... It 
trial society. ':'hey nust be destroyed so 
1[ 
thst ne~ sachines ca1 
succou1b to the in- )J ge built--or else exganded factories ,, ill 
evitable deflationary pressures following the :irst rapid 
,, 
ste~~l 
" 
of developoent. It is hard to view the present situation tl then,li 
jl 
ii ' 
11 '<jithout recognizing the fact thst ultimately there vJill be the ii 
il I! 
;; Third ',!orld ;.:er and tl::.e destruction of one syster:1 or the other .!1 
i! 
H ~iliether either systen ~ill be destroyed during the process fro~ 
if 
its own internal reaction to the transitions or whether it wil~J 
survive until the. day of bettle is c' moot question--and seer:1-
ingly supportable by existing evidence both weys. 
!i Our problem here, first, will be to inquire into the actu~~ 
il 
effect upon the thinking of the world's leaders of some poli t icial, 
li 
" [, il social, and religious developments of the last hundred yesrs or1 
il so, end of the effect of the various reactions r.>ade in the facei 
:i I! of these developments. An attempt vvill be made to determine, !: 
. ti 
then, soute psychical reasons for the pattern of political forcelp 
i! !: 
il li 
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I 
in contemporary France. 
There are a good many inconsistencies in the world today 
between what is purported to be theoretically sound and what 
practically possible--also between what we profess to be our 
theoretical action basis, ~Jhat our action really is, and what 
• i 
lSi! 
., 
1: II 
,I 
!I our action should be, which is too often far removed from both 11 
of the former. The vvorld is constructed of a number of little 
topographical patches \dth frontiers and bo,mdaries, ·who all 
1.1' 
!I 
!\ 
II ,, 
are actively participating in what has become a nassive struggl~ 
'I 
of international jockying for positions of national enhancerJ.entil 
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li 
which we call the system of power )eli tics, but which is ;11ore 11 
li often ::.:elled by us all, "international reloticns.tt Striding I 
h · - t' 1 · .... · 1 1 +- • ;:J t · 1 t · · . . I .eslae "'~ese po ltJlCa re Bulons an-., ac lVe y par lClpntlng lnil 
t , - . . . th _._. t 11 d . · · 1· II ne alscusslons lS ano er pn0l y ca e econo::nc lm.perla lsm, i\ 
!i 
often called "·,vorld trade," or "internetional econor1ics." UndEt' 
' 
the stimulus of severDl, possibly ":Jorthy influences, ··restern 
industry and trade have expanded al:o-1ost beyond our 
and with the expansion has case the obvious factor 
li 
conprehensiqp, 
L 
of the now \'i il 
i.·l q 
, in ticlete relations bet-vveen politics cEld econonics, VJ~lich so fart~ 
I! I'!· ii 
'i due pro~ably to inertia or something, we refuse to accept in a~l 
It H 
l! i; 
;
1
1 its obvious c!:wracteristics. 
1
1 
11 i! 
'I There sre four things largely res})om'>ible for this, for ji 
1,_1 'I what is a lack of unity of purnose in internctional affairs, a~~ 
lj II 
!1 :Jt tir:1es, a lack of any action at all: the nation-stGte syste~~ 
I! 
II 
I! 
!l 
,I 
lj 
I' 
II 
liberalisQ; either religion or seculariza~ion--or both; ana rna~ 
'I 
>:::he growing conflict bet-.:een poli t icn 1 end econooic ideolqt-
li !i 
:::;ies in our "tv:o ·-::orld_s 11 has literally precluded eny practical !I 
I' 
\1 attempts to follow pre-existing patterns of development along il 
il 
!! ;! II 
!\ 
!j 
it p 
<I li 
!! 
the lines of this nation-state systen, but the letter i~ clung i! 
i! 
I' to tenaciously, particularly in the ~est. The only cor.J.endable l'l 
- I 
thing co~ing fran this condition is that any ~holessle destruc~l 
-:-'··or, ··.·,•l"+r~ +.'t-,-18 ,..,_·,c''"•+ c:+.Jl il tion of mankind is temporarily detained, - -v- u. ·-- u - v~ 
!I il 
1
1
1
1 
devoting its ettenticns to s)ree.(~in:?, tte Cc;·lr.'lunist cioctrine anc.j\j 
II ex~>andin3 their resources, -..ve fin( the T.:estern nc.tions c'.hildish!L
1
• y 
:1 -
I[ I; 
I! battling it out with each other over questions of nat ionel selft 
!I 
I li 
'I /. 
I' 
J! 
interest, which leaves this group in a state of confusion over 
',_) . 
purpose and neans to effect any purpose. 
ij 
l\ 
ll 
il 
''!hat there is to be done about tbe nation-state . ~~~ system ls ! 
obvious, yet al~ost impossible. The very nature of the struc- if 
;I 
ture itself, the institutions it has given birth to snd nur- II 
'I 
li ,, tured, the attitudes it has developed and fosters, r:mke it a 
ii self-sustainints entity, and only by a painfully slov1 process q 
I' 
of enlightened evolution will it ever be relinquished--and tha~'s 
too slow for the pace the sa~ system has set for itself in it1 
inter-group relations--the pace that is carrying the world aloq~ 
1: 
on top of the wave of power. ll 
\i 
In Europe, the geographical area where the system develop1f' 
there is more confusion arising fror.1 it than anywhere else. j! 
II 
:Half <bf Europe is consciously controlled in the Fast and the '1\ 
l! 
•' 
other half, conprising a lar~e and important segnent of the 
II 
• I! 
"free viOr ld," owes its allegiance to half a dozen different ln-
1
1 
terests. Here there is the conscious compulsion to maintain tl~b 
\I .I 
11 st2tus-quo, progress econonically, naintain a disintegrated in-!\ 
I ~ il 
:r !I i ternational economic structure and effectively unite ther~1selvPS·I: 
il I il to sonehovJ acconplish tl1e ·whole thing in the face of the threatl
1
-
1 II 
li II !j from the :Sast. r::rere the evils of tl-le nation-state systen ore .I 
!I 1, !I I' enhanced, e.nc; give us a splendid exa'1ple of the results of the 
i system effecting the •,;orld. ThO'.lgh its defects_ are ~wen ancl. e.tl\ 
II 11 
II leust hDlf 8f~1rccL tet~ hy .·w::.:.rly cJl e3rne::::t Clu:~o_pecn leacters, 1\ 
ii 1: il they cannot bresk cX.'i~.~' :::':-o~: it. for c'·;e reasons ·.:e have Glready 11 
II 
,I 
ii 
II 
:i 
ll 
noted. ~hey live in the mortcl, national fear that were they 
to do so they ~ight fall prey to t~e lc:;r;;;er a.a tions in the grou~ 
'! 
ry 
' . 
and becoue ::1ere satellites. At the se.me ti.'lle there is still 
II 
i! 
i! !! 
d 
II 
<! 
il 
II 
.,1 . 
le~s 
'r 
[I potency in conc~pts of internationc:l expediencies opposed to i! ii II 
:I il 
II 
il 
II ii 
I 
fl 
!' 
,! 
II il 
II 
purely national ones in the minds of these leaders adherents, 
sys~ehl )rovides by far the best ~eans of getting the 
various individual peoples bet;.ind the ncc!eded netional tasks--a1 
even the international tasks. ?he continued pror:10tion of the iJ 
lj concepts of patriotism and nationalism are born also of the fa~~~~~ 
I! 
:: that there is often a conflict betvveen the two needs of inter- 11
1
1 
!l 
1'.• il tl national versus nstional development. So v.re are going to go 11 
II eheaci us v1e l"' ve before with t!' is nonster, and it is hoped the ,i 
il '.;ith a little luck and the feet that v.e are so far advGnced in~!,. 
II I 
/I duotrially, v:e '<'Jill be able to ·.iectl~er tLe st10rm. :Gut we nust II 
'I li 
11 rec.li:ze tb::it t~1e ::."~uropean nation-st.ste s~Tstc:l, its pE;rticuler II 
ij II 
,i brtmd, is 30 in.; to rs ise the odds on us. 
1
j 
li 
Our superior industr 1 cl.evelop;·1e;1t is in lsrge part due ll 
to the ;;.,_ co;·1c' f~1ctor suffel'in~:s our condermc.tion, liberalisrr1. 'i 
Liberolism v.cs a philosophy which particulary suited the psy- I! 
li 
chological needs of a particular group, na~ely the mi~dle clasdi 
--after this class becaoe a distinct division of society. lj ~he II 
best 'vvay in l'<'hich tlle member of the niddle class could realize I! 
his status, a position and po~er, was to have all institutions i 
reduced to a ninimum in their restraint upon individual action 
.. An ino.ivic~ual held b::;ck for centuries IJBnted to arise, and he 
c,id and brought 'id th hi:n a stupendous 
ll 
industry, exll'' 
liberal brou, t 
q 
colossus of 
ploitation and development. ... ~.t the same time the 
forth a universalistic philosophy, not alien to the universal 
,, 
'I 
II 
Q 
"--~ . 
:: 
ri 
[, 
II 
I 
I! 
i\ 
1: 
u 
characteristics of the current;hristian phil~-s~-~~~-,- but ~;pos~d 
to it for the s ir.1p le reason that two un i vera a ls are hard to re1 
cone ile with eecll other in terr:J.s of pro:-,1irl8nce and power. /i 
'l1be liberal attempted a secularization of everthing but II 
II 
the Church and he was responsible for the partial secularizati~ 
ll 
of even that (ns for as the Cenuncietion of the ritual and mys~ 
!: 
tique of P.o'Jlan Catholicism by the Protestc_:nt was concerned). 
II 
~he liberal took a negative view of politics--negation in term~ 
I 
'[ 
of its effect upon the econony. Liberalism ·,~i th this, con- i' 
i! 
I' 
structed one of ti1e nost pronounced ideologies of im ividualisr.~ 
t.he vmrld has seen and a system of econo:'lics, which, \;hen fois~ied 
II 
on the already existing nation-state system, developed the latlJ 
I! 
ter into an intensely individualistic internetional pattern. I! 
Then the world began to blow up in the liberal's face--only 
slowly at first, but gathering in frequency with each passing 
il 
Ji 
I' li 
I• 
decade. 'rhe liberal, as do we all, projected the failure of f[ 
his systen into the vJOrkings of the very adverse forces he hic1J\ 
II 
self partielly created-- eo··1r.'lunism, .fascism, sta tisr:1, End power !I 
1
/ ) 0 1 it i c s • 
! 1-
'-:.':'he liberel ''l:J(te so ::,;,C.ll1J ::dstct:es th,:;t it is only by rRE:- :1 
li 
II 30n of the productivity of his new t~-~.n t ii 
II 
stave off disaster as lo~g GS he did--Which is partly the reasor 
for his felt sense oi' security in his belief that he is novJise !! 
II 
responsible for it Gll. ~.,rhen he seculerized the bulk of the 11 
existing social structure he did away with many of the timelessj) 
1\ 
checks 1vhich society had ee.rly inposed upon the 'tlB sses to recon~ 
i, 
il 
iJ 
I 
c 
., . 
" 'I il 
!i ii 
'I 
li 
,r 
II 
!I' I, 
II 
"' 1[---
i! 
cile their social position to them in the li~ht of existin~ I; 
~ ~ 1: 
ij 
class distinctions. · .-hct he gc:ve to the mc:;sses by ~.·my of uni- I! 
II 
I' 
versals to tske the place of the other myths sounded fine enou1h 
on ;wper, hut each of the liberal's universals hac1 a loeicaloutl 
co~ne too readily forseable by the believers in them--nore read~ly 
q 
forse:;blc as tine rJent on. The liberal's Protestantism held out! 
I• 
ll 
a nice after-life for everyone--so long as the individual seek~l 
I' ,I 
ing it proved his vvorthiness for it by certain successes on II 
II 
,! 
earth--unfortunately the least of which vms inter-personal mo- 1\ 
rality. (Of course the liberal also brought to society that 
''great" new force, known in liberal literature as "active 
Cconscience strickenJ humanity, n but which was only a recon-
struction d.nd revi tnlization of the doc~~rine of stewardship.) 
The liberal hsd protected his own philosophy vvherever he 
became entrenched by this secularization, this under~ining of 
~he old universals, but he sowed the seeds of his own destruc-
tion by so doing it--he left the masses with the universals of 
liberalism which were not universals at all. 
~ilien it came time to harvest the crop the liberal found 
II 
ij 
!; 
!: 
li 
" 
il !· 
the masses in the fields, as it should be, but to his utter 
:; 
;: amazeGJ.ent he found thc~t not ell the foremen vJere of ~sood liber ii 
~~~ 
!r 
:I 
.I 
II 
i) 
II 
I 
II 
II j, 
II 
\1 
I! 
I' 
!I 
'I II 
If II 
1: 
stock--indeed--some were risen from the ~n.asses themselves. 
haps one of the causes for this was that not only were the 
Per-
i 
liberal's concepts not true universals, but in the ninds of thell 
!l li 
liberals themselves they were never meant to be universal in •I 
practice--no more than did Constantine intend for the Christian!! 
p 
10. 
II 
II I. 
!i 
li 
it- universals to be just that when the 0hurch made its terms ,:~th~ 
II 
the Em.pire. In the first place t.be liberal had brought forth, 11 
- I 
as one of tis more r:;li ttering generr.:'<li ties, the concept of 11 ,, i 
'I II 
i\ 
i· 
II 
•I 
:I 
h ,, 
il 
I' 
!I 
I• ,. 
I! 
d 
equality. This equality was useful so long as certain classes li 
li 
I! 
re~ained less aware of the logical conclusion of such a conc~p~ 
!i 
put into practice. 'lith it, the liberal r..'lade good his attacks I! 
against the older aristocracy by stirring the masses to his 
sup_port, but a universal of this connotation is dangerous to 
any porticulc.r that sdopts it, hoviever, snd the uasse.s 
became more and more a~are of its prectical i~plications the 
~ore cognizant did they beco~e of their true position in the 
liberal's society. The liberal hed educated the masses in 
ji 
i! 
I' II 
II 
lj 
I! 
I! 
li 
!, 
II li !I 
II 
secularized schools, raised them slowly to the level of politi~j 
II 
!] 
cal consciousness, and in many ways increased the potentiality 11 
of the masses as a political force in themselves. 
If the ~asses were destined to sooner or later revolt tt 
II 
II I. 
li ji 
jl 
can be blamed to the liberal for greatly speeaing the process. 11 
II 
'!hat did result, rerjsrdless of ·· . .:hst may 11Pve been destire d, T,vas111! 
it 
1\ that the nesrly ind es t!'uct ib le seeds of s social revolut ion--n~' 
I' 
\\ only ir:. tl·le little )etty insurrections er1d civil c isorders, but\ 
in every ]hase of life in every nation in one de~ree or snother~ 
1: 
--produced a revolt tl::c:.t has per:.1eatec, politics, religion, the '11'
1 
l\ 
'II, • • h I' , schools, Lo~::e, cor:-rauni ty, :'-116. nm; 'iHShes to tle .t~1e vJuole r~on- 1 
i\ I 
il ster the state beca:1e unoer-- in BD i te of--liberc.l tu te 1::: :1..e into,
1
1
1, 
1\ 
II I 
• o• +-" "" •+-t +' • -· ·~ 1 - ., + ' I! one nc..ssl ve O.lrec ul.ve ::.: orce •.:lui: .... ~:.e lllC.l VlCUW rectucec ,Jo E. •: 
:: 
1 " -~ l.. 
II 
'
1 mere 1: ~)0 1 it ica l rui t--::.~nO. c: 11 t llis fror::t an individualistic univet~al. 
r! 
Ji I, 
II 
\( 
!I 
il 
il 
\I 
i! 
li 
ll 
\\ 
jl 
:I 
II 
II 
\\ 
ft j! 
As soon so revolutions becaue no lon2er G purely hour~eoi~ 
i! 
8.ffs.ir t.~:e liberel err: ',;::'l:J over. ~'or t 1 'C libcr~·l is oElY a 'i 
- 1: j; 
rich :.wn ',,J:'l t s:mll. T~1e ~1anner in which he is able to ncquir11 
\'Jhst he does requires E\ certain freF·G.o:·.l anc 11 liberclity11 for 1l 
q 
hi:nself fro~ governr1ent, but ',c.:hen t.be possiruity that he ':iill 11 
lose nuch of ',;het l~e hc.·:3 on( ol~~o the institutions he t.as con-I\ 
:I 
str·ueted ,,.,hicll hel_9ed him to attain it , he becones, in a sense~~ 
i/,rit lercjer in his ··.ealth. ~his eeuses hirn to either 8G.opt t:191 
stricter cance]tS of authority necesssry for the oainteftcnce o~ 
li II 
li, ruling class ~;ith the inereasec politic~l consciousness of the 
sr:1oll ruli:J.S eld.:;f:o,ss--for he has lon8 since becone e ''s::mll~' 
masses--or he will accept the outcome of his universals and 
adopt the new religion of the t:lusses. In r:1any instances, hmJ-
~e will ~ore than likely adopt the former alternative-- !i 
ii 
he tc.l:.esJ! 
der.10crac1v 
I. 
:· 
as has lcr;oly been the case so far--but either oourse 
seeCJ.s to result in the destruction of vJhatever form of 
formerly held sway. By the very ~ature of the social en~ JOli~~ 
" :! 
cal structure the libcrsl built for hit:Iself r·wkes it t.ord for hj~!l 
:i 
I' 
to accept the situation re~uiring prompt action in the fzce of ·
1
,\ 
·' il the :-:H.:s.se3 encroaclncnts cr1til it i;::; too lc:te fer t::e c(option I' 
of enythin~ less bersh tl~.cr1 so~e forn of 2tste Cocialisn or II ,. 
'?as c j_;::;r2--·:•hicll, by t~~e very n: ture of the structures it builds,\\ 
' It 
II II 
1: tends to cleD troy liberal er;u2li ty, incH vidueli ty, end 'Nhr: t had ,1. 
I! 
II 
ji 
II 
'I 
i\ 
developed into popul2r sovereignty. Put the fact remains that \il 
1 • • H the liberal is at ~)resent foced v1ith the decision to al.1.lgn hlriljr 
self ~ith one of the two extreme canps--his own institutions 
,, 
1\ ]I 
II 
II 
ii p 
!I 
II 
j 
ii 
I 
~ i 
li 
\j 
!i 
l\ 
! 
r ,I 
II 
II 
(1 
'f 
hsve bccone largely insdequate in oeeting -the -~~~~l~tion. 11 
~hat dc~ocracy is st present threatened ~ith disintegrati~n 
surpc ss ing t?'le lL~i ts of its mm r:~raclual c1 is integration--must II 
II 
be concefed. ~he threats to it now, both intrinsic and extrin~fu, 
are bound up in t~e nature of the systeo itself snd the extern~l 
,I 
conditions it lles y:rt.ly fostered. Democracy is sccused of in~ 
d 
ef:f'ect:.ve sction when feced VJith funda;::wntal problens, e lack lj 
of authority, and that it fosters disorder. Its naturally borj c~·nserv;,)_tiscl ,;skes ~:_t (~C~>ell(cent :::'or its life only so lono """ -] 
one of ito o~n inventions, dictotoro~ip, con be used to :t::e I 
off snd internel I! ji 
insurrection. 2 • The conservctis~ bred into de~ocracy, pertly b~l'j 
I conscious intent as far as the liberal hBS concerned, is the !i 
I' 
\!.- ll" "' '1'1 
13. 
principul J~C:;Ctor :1aking the claims against the syster:1 c l.. t, 
',ii t' • " • 11 t ., • t ., 1 :-"•, ~ __ ,cr: l• t;c,< t\11 'I In .als ·,,:.;y aemocrr::.cy contlnua y con rec lC s Dnc; y: or~\.S c.~-' . u~ 
:1 1l 
It t:-1e oythicD 1 but so::1cti1:1es impractical bs sis of its existence, ,_1'
1
.,1 
I 
il 
:: \Jhich is the ogreement amone; its citizens as to the neture of '\, 
il 
II 
the State, of nan in relation to the State, add of the complex ~~-
. 1: ~ of social institutions which any given society will endorse or ~ 
II 
tolerate at any given time. It thus ensures the liberal of I II, 
negative eovernment and slow evolution toward whatever obnoxiou 
goa 1 s governments eva 1 v ed toward , but at the s arne time "'ie a kens I 
the gover~ments in critical periods the liberal perhaps didn't ~r-
see. It produced the stagnation of action to the point that 
----------------
2. ',,'alter ?arrell, 
froc, sa vs l. n "l' on~ sm \l..:J u J -'- ..I. .._,.~..~ H ' 
inii L 
li 
I' 
li ,, 
il 
II l!o. 
- -----.. --·--- -- ~ 
many de:nocracies today there is virtually no action--and when !1 
I' I! 
a crisis arises sene ciict~:torial pm·iers r:mr,:t be i:'lnec~iately e.r''J.~! 
'I ,, 
ployec;.. n:his has been used as one of tte cardinal argur'lents !i 
:i 
aguinst de:::10cracy in ter!ns of its seemingl:1 nL;tmrel tendency t91 
I· 
destroy itself in our coop lex \·vorld--s ince dictatorship, by it~! 
!i 
own nature, tends to c'i.estro;>7 previously existing institutions 
othervdse alien to it, and vvhich threaten the basis of the 
dictatorship itself. 
Before giving consideration to our fourth problem, man, 
let us survey this heritage to our present society left to us 
by the liberal--and frantically supported by his children. 
First, there has been born out of the depths of obscurity a 
nev; religion and a nmv rlovver, Connunism. It stands ready to 
!I 
pass judgement on every act of every nation opposed to it as 1t' 
_._ !; 
II 
oyer::: tes from the center in T!oscow. It stands ready by its ovv1 
professed aios to hring destruction to the existing orders in 
:i 
all states and unify the whole that is left into a world com-
li 
11 
II 
21unist order. In each nc;.tion there are the growing seec.s of t1'i3 
thing, bothering the state, the institutions and the social 1; 
order, it poses a threat froo all sides 2nd a kind of o threat \I 
"". eans O.L.p con ...... rol ~~~· which does not readily submit to de!.'1ocratic ~- _ 
and ~ssuasion. Then ue hove democracy, staunchly surging for-
I 
ward toward so:::ething and fumbling vvi th the sociol problem eac 
step of the way. It hasn't solved the social problem--v;hich i 
1
1, 
itself, in part created in its present form by naking elements I 
II 
of its society aware there existed a social problem--and shows li 
!i 
I 
~ 
II 
II 
!I 
II 13. 
1: 
i ji 
no sign, visibly, of being able to solve it in time to stave ii 
off the threat that has given in to power concepts of its own \1 
\1 
and no longer chooses to ¥vait for Cieliberated solutions. Our 
'i 
I> 
I' 
I 
state has becone L1.rnense in the mean tine, our \Wrld econor:1y is !i 
!! 
now top-heavy, rebellious to control arbitrarily applied, un-
willing to cooperete in the realization of action contrary to 
its own philosophy--but action needed by the democracy if it 
hOI)es to compete '.Ji th the new rel,igion. 
;! 
'I II j! 
il 
In the r:1iclclle of all this, of course, there stands our f!la4!· 
, Fe is so~1ehow responsible for everything end. yet he cLn' t be, 11 
II 
Fe, man, the peopl~~ 
has becorrJ.e confused by :-:1uch of his external surroundings c:mcl tr~j3 
since he is largely irresponsible hinself. 
' 
form they have taken, and he has risen up to the task in three !: 
- I! 
'' patterns. ~he first sroup, of course, sre the lib8rals the~-
j ~ 
selves--and a ~hole lot of people -;,,ho hsve been con(J i tj_oned 11 
i! 
" philosop~~Y to the point thst they ere no~ 
!I 
,.,hese ii 
!I 
uble to rec:son ou.t tl1e efficacy of other philosophies. 
thre~' tened, and depending upon 
~~ere and to what extent the threat has ~ained a foothold, are 
' !i 
i' ,I 
rising to support their posttions. The second group is the maffi*s, 
!; 
wbose position a~d role is readily discernible. ~hat is left ~ 
areis;nall group of people; some intellectuals, and the nationalists 
II 
or Royalists, or the old ruling class by any other name, the \I 
i' I 
people who largely have a considerable stake in their society o* 
:! 
,: 
who think they should have but haven't. This group is perhaps !! 
" ;: 
:aore intel~_igent vvi th more imagination than the other two so t.hqlt 
1\ 
\\ 
,I 
:I 
!i 
\I 
II 
II 
I! 
:j 
d ,, 
11 li ,, 
11 
i! 
:! ii !I 
!l I! 
I 
when they are in power the results are at least dynamic, if no~ 
lj 
al'.vays 
groups 
lesting. In our considenltion of man in these three 
it is 
)i 
II 
or the ~I 
see :;1 to [) e e10 r e 
II 
il 
\! 
I! 
• • • • • • 1 • I; 
r\:cith ~.n tllelr lnstltutlon.s, tltelr m.ytilS, S'1c'. the .:;)(-oople t'laln-\1 
lr 
I 
·tuining t:1.eu. :rhe conte~t betvJCen t: e tln·r::'2: srol.l:JS :i.s not onl~ 
.I 
,·- 'Y'I 
Cl..!l atte~~t by esch to introduce or maintain a II 
li 
certain system of soch:l order, but in each sroup itself, i.e.,\\ 
r: in civilization, there is occurring a transition fror'l old value•!s 
?he resultent social trc-Ju:rra is l! 
I' 
\\ 
li 
II 
ond institutions to new ones. 
due to the partial collapse of old faiths where there are no 
ones to take their place. readily 8Cceptable Our reason new 
for vvorld unrest seems to be nore readily discernible in the 1j 
1! 
'I light of conteraporary thinking under the impact of current eve~~s, 
li 
and under the inpact of nore or less valic, or seemingly valid ,!i 
\\ 
assumptions as to the f' e te of' mankind , the trencls in the d eve lo ~-
ment of these assu~.1ptions to date, ancl the confusion of variow !,r, 
!I 
alternative aethods to sonehow correct the world's problems. il 
!I 
~e can view briefly now several forces presently at work-tt 
·,vork over the lest two hundred years--which llave brought about 1\ 
II 
:i the basis for the chaotic condition of contemporary politics an ft 
II'. II 
1.1 
ill!, 't\ political world power) was bound to produce the idea of the 
il !! 
\t master ~nan as a logical reaction. n 4 • A seemingly irresistsble \.\ 
international disorder. w~he revolt of the masses (the new 
It 
4. Herman T?.auschning, Redemption of De"nocrB c y, 1941, p. 67. 
p 
i\ li 
!/ I. q 
ll 
II 
;'. 
tl).e ~~.1 force in the progression tmvard a mediocrity of the mind, .
II 
II 
!i 
development of herd-like characteristics, was likewise bound 
to produce an intellectual revolution--seen first effectively ~ 
in ~ietzsche. ~1e can also ~say w~th confidence that the spiri~ 
,[ 
tual outcor:J.e of secularism \Vi th its tistoricism end relati visc:sil 
5. 
'iJas bound to be nihilism.." This secularism also brought on 
c:; seennng collapse of all the checks upon the masses, intro-
i-
ll 
li 
il ii 
\I, 
ducing the latter into the political sphere which in turn, in !i 
the last tvvo decades, brought about the collepse of farner 
I II 
rj 
II 
political valuations--whether those put into their place ~ere ~~ 
worthy or not. These forces gave rise to Nietzsche's ideas--a: 
; 
the spiritual disintegr~tion in Europe in the nineteenth cent,,y 
progressed so swiftly and left no adequate substitution outsid1 
6 I' 
religion. • 1.'1hat has arisen fro:·a the iapact of these forces 11 
I,'. I' has been, of course, Comnunism and the recent totali t8rian re-
gL1es in :?:urope e:il1cl the :!i'asc ist upr is inzs in :.•wny ot:1er coun-
.1.. • 
vi'l6S. 
?he reaction to Cor::tcmnism t~1reatens to o estroy de::1ocracy 
as we knov1 it today--possibly for the introduction of plebis-
cite democracy, or it will corrupt itself from ~ithin to the 
'1 I: 
II 
II p 
.I I. 
II 
II 
II d 
I! 
[I 
point that ~oLrl[nunism cdll realize its aim of vvorlc1 donination. tl 
II 
·.;e have tte threat present, we heve it present in all nations 
in t!:1e and not an idle threat, intellectually, by any 
cr1eans. prompted seemingly serious scholars to adopt 
5. :·~lfred ',Ieber, 1948, p. 137. 
I• 
:I 
li 
i! 
., 
il 
!r 
11 
·I 
I 
,, u. I.oc. Cit. 
!I 
I! 
il 
II 
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17. 
r-:ational Jocialism in Germany--and others to adopt rascism in ;I 
Tta ly? To be sure , CJany of t lw s e fine CJ.en w i thdre\1 their sup-11 
port fr'o~1 the c1ovement as each order became incoherent in ter, 
of existing vimJS of its intentions, yet socte others re:>ained II 
to the dey the tvJo orders fell. Should this idea of nihilism 11 
I J spread, any dictatorship--such as might be instituted by a 
nation by de:1ocratic ::1eans to combat a particularly pressing II !I 
internal or external crisis--might then have the seeds of 
r1 
"National Socialism" in :it. It r:light become the purely realist~~c, 
non-ideological order such as so~e of those we have already ext 
1: perienced. Vie te.::1d to forget that this age has constructed II 
!I 
something new. There up pear to be no criteria and no precedent!~ 
11 
for the new revolution of reaction of the twentieth century. J! 
li The revolutionary dictctor is a new type, in its cynicgl, un- :1 
\t 
)rincipled ~olicy of violence--a revolution of reaction that 11 
,\ 
makes no bones Etbout a6opting the ;;1ost povJerful of either ex- II 
isting po~er group, the one it is reacting against or the one7 ~~ 
r:1ost interested in reaction itself, to put itself into povver. ji 
d 
I'ihilism, under its recent interpretctions by ?ascist lea1~rs, 
is a total rejection of any sort of doctrine end must of neces~l 
II 8 ,. 
sity, by its own logic, develop into a despotism. • People use~1 
to say that any policy of bportonce always needs justificetio, 
by a great idea. Tllat rnw intellectual generalizing. It assurio-
tha t there are still ideas in '\Ihich nen believe. 
9 
• So ·.1e have ii, 
-------- p. 20. II 
I! 
ii 
7. Revolution of ·u•h•l•"' '- ,, L:_J.:__~' 
8. Ibid., p. 50. 
I 111. 
II 
a 
_Ibid, ~ p. 24. ~ . 
lE?·. 
II 
,I 
i\ 
o.nd v;e have its co;_mter-port, the COfll[!lUnist ~lOvenent, 
L:s.ve de:-10cracy. ':hioh order \!ill prove victorious c::mcl :3overn 
t~1e ~,.,orld ',';e ':ill be able to sec in our ovvn lifetime perheps, 
an c. by virtue, t~at winning power, of forces l2rgely beyond th~i 
bounds of any &nd all controls ~e can set up to th\vart it--a 
d 
:I 
ii 
d 
I breeding of itself, a nihilistic attitude in the people i! 
attempting to control nihilism. 
~ithout soing into the details of the Fihilist 
" 
" !! 
!I 
:I 
I~ 
"'1evolu t ior1 ,\ 
!I 
si nee it ~ .. ill serve us no ~)urpos e, it VJill hoviever, C! "'I'Ve> UC' tri' 
..... '-'- '~-' v """]! 
review the scene in ~ranee today and offer : n introduction to a: 1 
i ~ 
recoc;ni tion of so:~1e of ~t:ce re·luisi te forces necesss.ry to reeli:=:e 
eit:l·:~r of the three :re:3i:-1es "v:e hsvE~ considered in fs.ct cs they 
exist in ?ranee. ~e have spent a sres.t deal of ti~e outlining 
i 
the forces that operate to the enhancement of totalitarian regi~es, 
' • - :i w~ich are but the forces operating to tto uetrl~ent of aemocract 
in the libers.l sense. This has been done with the idea that 
,, 
I, 
Co:.lm.unism it:Jelf is on the dovmgrec"ie in ?rc:nce, that the strugg~e 
:: 
for )Over i~ being contested pri~arily bet~een the forces of re~ 
I 
action anC. the forces clesiring a bettel~ seobls.nce of orc1er in 
t.he French sovern::1en t 
Con:u:mnisn is still 
tl1i3 ',;ork, 
:i 
econo~y against the forces of decocra~y. 
I\ 
s vital force, end fo::- the )urpose of !I il 
its li 
" 
its potential nor slic;t~ted E~s to 
ii 
s.~ility to take cation in t~e government. re1he cocmunist strike# 
iJ.re still a big threu. t 2 ~ld c ~Jowerful one--the ccncition of the 
economy is still ~~wintuining those requisites 
,, 
ii 
:i 
)i 
quot: tion on comrmnis t stock--and. the .'Jomnuniots still holcc H~3: 
I 
I 
II 
19. 
fi 
" 
II 
.I 
li 
II ,, 
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seats in the existine l'Tational Asseubly. l-5ut at the sao.e ticne I, 
!I ~I 
1! 
lj f, 
I· 
what trenfs \~e can see give rise to the contention that the 
C021:'::1Unists have had. their day e.nd that the fielo_ '.'JE<S lost to 
them, ls.r1.:;ely by dint of populer ' .. ·estern reaction to the r.1ove- :1 
II 
mont e..nd the fact that in the bulk of the ~estern nations the i! II il 
il Co::lr:1Unists lwve not sufficient voice in fue ,-·overnr1ent~o to off-~et 
;I 
. ,, 
the 6.a::1s.::;e these ::;overnr:1ents can do to tl:.e ;-:1oven:ent in the ~.um~s 
of tl1e )eople as the · .. orld progresses tm.ard 2 \Wr 
il Co~T·.runicn end t1"Le ··:e~'t. !n :~ranee, the Corl:lunists l&c~c this !i 
!i 
lesal control so that as far as the osttern of ~oliticcl force~ 
,I 
is concerne~ t~ey are not new il 11 li 
!1. -
:?.epublic st.:::rtec1 in 19L1G. In ot:"cer spheres of c.ctivi ty the~r s~jll.!.. 
'I 
pose a b is ~Jrobleel to t l·ie eJ::ictir:.fj 1---eC')l··.1e. Sonlr1t.1.IliGLl itself i~j 
II q 
not a dead issue but its ~olitical 90~er h~s been consi6erably i! 
I! 
curbe6.. i! ii 
!I 
De Gaulle' 3 .E'orces sre another' ns tter. !I' I' !"Tot onl~y l·~.b s :1is . 
II 
JJ.ove::1ent zrovm in stc.tu.re but at the sa21e tine tl1e very nature lj 
of parties of reaction, their methods, ~~ke his group a constaJ~1 u threat to de~ocracy no JJ.atter ho~ small they night be ct any I II 
time. Con( it ions in ?r~_nce 90in t to the preni se tlle t the fore~~ 
II 
of lib~ralism ~oult coalesce with de Gaulle before they ',;ould lj 
I. 
ever cv:e to terns · .. i th tte "~oscmv :::;roup--anc:. this is one r1or e II 
reason, essentially, ·,;hy the C0'1':J.U.'1ists have lost out--any pol~~i-
l! 
cal coup in Frs.nce •,dll have to cone via the political deal (a~1: I 
least up until the next election) and though the Co~unists 
tactics of power are as ruthless as that of reaction there is 
II 
l! 
I' ,, 
'I !! 
20. 
ii 
;I 
II 
il 
!I 
il 
it 
not present t.t.e inclination to cooperate vJi th com.rnunisn snong !I 
;I 
t~,e other e;roups, that vmuld give the Comr.mnis ts any chance at if 
II 
all. 
ll.t the se.me ti::1e democracy in :?ranee is in the process of 
decay de:Dicted earlier--end seems to disintegrete at the sane 
rate of speed that the events in the world becooe larger and 
i[ 
I! 
\\ 
:i 
ii 
I' [! 
:I jl 
:l 
(ilQl' e co:::;:Jlex. C::he libur::.1ls hcve .b. a C. i! to bri::1g into their fold 1 
II 
a II the forces of socislisn in order to make libc::ral c,overnm.ent 
po~~sibility. situation, in some ' .. 'uys peculiar to 
conditions existing in ~renee and its historicel bsckground, 
theli 
i\ 
:! li 
li 
il 
il The liberal era is :1 
I: 
~hich cannot be reconciled any other way. 
II 
'I 
dravving to a close in ~ranee if no effective terms can be ree.ched 
'I 
hetvieen the liberals and the Socialists end it is this factor 
-,;hich makes de Gaulle's stock so potentially high--there are 
as ·1115:ny liberals 'cJilling to sacrifice democracy as there are 
those \Jilling to sacrifice liberalism for socialism. This, 
coupled 1dth the fact thcJt de r;aulle 'v·:c:mts tor:. hange the form. 
I 
:1! 
" II I, 
of the Fourth ~epublic radicolly, gives to the scene the air of~ 
tl !I 
the macabre. il 
il 
r;;ha t remains for us now is to review the history of the li 
![ 
Fourth Republic from the time of liberation and its conception iJ 
1\ 
to the present day, and analyze the condition of the three II 
li 
lj political forces as they develop ther'lselves alone the way. A II 
li 
close look at this history is essential since it is our conten-i' 
,. 
tion that the situation in "fiTrance is precarious enough that one \i 
event one way or the other can at any time spell disaster to on~ 
I 
li 
I• 
il 
II 
•• 
Chapter One 
An Analysis of the Irr1ediate 
Political and ~conooic background from the Inter-war 
Period to the Establishment of the ~ourth n_epublic 
France lost heavily in the First 'forld 'iar in both man-pm·,'ej:r' 
and resonrces. ::he ir:1~·ledietely devoted Ci consicte:r.'3ble cnount of'i 
ti~e and enPrsy to re-buildin~ BnC enhonciru~ 
,' 
~:1ostly to tl~E? c;_etJ:i~··1e~:_:_t o~~ r:,er~nar1y'~:3 [Jbilit:.r to pH;' l"c)TI it. -r:)11-b' 
...!-- ' .•• 
. ..:.. '.) \} -- ( 
Oj_)U }."j ... -;"~· 0 !.:.t • ---1-, ,_, 
o:· tl1e ;o;Jmunh,ts, ;_)ocieliEJts 8.IL~ '"ec:ic.sls bor.l out of -:,}le lat-
ters resliz~tion t~at the Left was too s~ron~ to stall off any 
longer ana that tlle 0.~1e l,.c;y to beat the eneay lay in cooperatio~ 
; 
over a common pro::;re:n--but no 0 \Vi tllout serious re:c;erva tions tc 
tl13t. ~he ~o)ular ~ront ~as ?ble to bring sone successes out of 
t~1P ::.'ic.:nc ic.:l d isor<::.er but \;as not ~~ blc: to sti::mle te the 171rench 
ii 
II 
ll ,, 
il 
'I 
II 
II 
II ii I ~~~~-~-~-:~o-nomy su~ficie:>tly to off-set the advrtnces filSde by the steppe~~ 
,, 
up Gernan econorny. To mobilize the nation in the face of the jJ 
<:;ro'iJL1;~ fear t~'lat ~overned 90litics to tlle collapse of the ~·ove~b­
·1 
I :;wnt in 1940 per::1itted soc1e tnity in the T'opular :~'ront, but not ,, 
:I 
ell necessary in the face of the existing needs. !I !I 
l1 
.:hst st<:!le:mted complete unity is better seen in the idea 11 
of the sociel revolution lon;; in rising in "ranee one: just reecl~ing 
its semi-cliLl8X in tJ:1e ·?opular Front. T:apic'ily occuring events / 
' led inevi tsbly to s stre.ngtLening of the tracle union raevement I 
I. 
li 
,, 
and the r.:..se 
expan::cdon of 
of a truly .,;orker proletariet due to the hurried 
industry in an other\;ise agriculture economy. r::'he i/ 
I: 
pel'iod ;,lCJ.rkec) :; more definate swing to the I.eft II II 
the rift bet~Pen the ~ight end the Left leaving the conserve~, i v~ 
!I 
elefuents, naturally, bounJ to try and forestall the acJ ve ilt of i/ 
il 
lj 
~t 
i! 
II 
il 
:i 
'""i ' ~ , • J._ ~ • • ~ .,!._ ( ---- .-· • •• :- '::') -i. _L J J..O.(;rL. l)~~ t3l10LL.~{l ~)0' .. 81"~ -' ... ll_~J.~j_.i_l -s>~e ::r--·ou_~J L.~,J ,:lc.,.\.t.. ..... u~ 
p 
f'f·ct goverl1nent. I.iberal eleme.ats resorte, to to f1111ke up 
i' 
the n c-
. ! 
cs.s::;.ry ;;o~cli-uion Ln.ajority tlJ.us hell: a stronger position reL::.tlv 
to its size than \Jould nor:tmlly have been the case. At any rat 
the lac~ of cohesion in the face of growi~g needs resulted in 
" ii 
en i ~creased use of ener,::;ency pmvers--decrets-lois--to ,:ceet tl1eiJ 
~ ~t~18. ~iOi.1. r;:'~;.e s e extrs -c;_e:.lO era tic dE'V :~ c e :c; llao. been useu in in-/i 
'I 
9 rz. 
,....._ ~ j • 
''The record s:1ows t:1at decree-la'."J govc:r:1!:J.ent in "Prsnce 
\JSS fa tel to free ,~;overnc:1ent. As tlle v lume o~: such lev:s 
L1cre:'l~,eu th<:' "'rench institutions and o:::ulionent declin"·d. :: ~ ,, 
~he nmlti:)lc~ party system rna} nske a crisis v;here no crisiS! 
otl:Pr ise e::dsts, <mci therefore is e major factor in the ~~ 
i,~bility of deuocrecy to cope with its ~robleos and need 
uictnto~s~ip at stated intervals."* 
Tile ·,>.'hole period was n.ar~"\:ed by a realization of the inability 
of ~rench institu~ions to copw with euergenciPs--which seened 
0o bave beco.ILe a per:11B~1ent part of life. 'I'hese tv'lO forces, em-
d 
ergenc;y pov;ers a~l1:1 L1stability, made it easy for the "Petain dic1j 
ta torship to assume control in l 940. ':'he parlicwle :1t merely a b-
ticated in favor of the dictatorshio with only 80 nega0ions outt: 
I 
i! 
of 928 parlia:l8ntarians. The Geroan victory see:1ed for awhile !I 
,! 
.. b + l ,.,., .. f'"" btl . q 
·uo e nov on y a successiu.L lnvaslon o .::•rRnce, u a so an 1n- q 
vasion of de~ocr2cy itself. 
is faced \d t~i. some of t21e se:ne pj~oble,1s. Con-+l 
i\ 
I!mnis :1 ancl have taken the place of ~itler upon the scene~ 
I 
but as :f'ar as the • - 1' t • • , • I[ lS concernect lS lf anyt;lnng :1 
:I 
in worse CO"~dition then Bfter ';orld '~'or rne. ~he Left movement': 
;: 
is no1:.: s-::.ronger ~:::nCl more deeply entrenched vl'llicll makes economic 1i 
.D • • .p • • t' - t . t . -" l . . . l i1 OL more Slgnli.lC~H1ce 1n 11e ae erm1:1a 10n 01.· po 101ca il 
action. The plight of the -vvorker ict:L.1le0.ie:;tely cdter the lest ·.,a~ 
:i 
and up to the present is a condition ~hich has gained new impor~ 
tance as far government is corrcerned. 
* John 'ihi tten, 'I'he TJse of Ji:merl!~ency 
bl . ' " -- --.nr-7---r;"r::; unp~. lSnea paper, pp. Go-G~. 
in T,lrance 
u 
r"i-erniny, 
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11 
ii 
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.1~ny discussion of post-vn~r politics in Fr~;nce must give 
a.:l)le .stte11tion to tt1e "proC:igious fi':'J.re of 'i.eneral Charles 
1. 
de Gaulle'' ) just as any such discussion of the same topic 
'i 
:I I, 
'I 
i\ 
,, 
il 
d 
d 
during the period of the "thirties" had to take seriously into i! 
!! 
account the figure of General de la Rocque--though neither men!! 
t: 
actively participated in the French government during the bulk IJ 
of either period, de la Rocque having never been a member of t1e 
il preT.var governments and de Gaulle was, of course, only the head !t 
i: 
of the provisional governments during and for a short time aft~~r 
the last war. The rather openly fascist demarcation attached II 
il 
li 
to the croix-de-Fev: a ;.d to its leader, r',eneral de la ~ocque, :: 
il :~arras sed 9rewar governments but the nemesis never atts inecJ the, pro-
!1 ,, 
portions of t"1e prese'.l.t potentiality of the RP~. De la Tiocque 11 
lost :'1any opportunities--end his lee.dership lecked nuch of the 
spontaniety or the vitality needed for auch ventures to be C'U (> ' 
u ~~!i 
I 
cesful. At any rate, the one big bid the novenent made, tte 
February 6th riots in 1934, resulted in naught but a reor~aniz~~ 
tion of the existin:; gover21m.ent e.~1.d a triuc1ph for de''locrecy •. :: 
I' 
:I 
J)e Gaulle, on the ottccr hand, exists tod<::.y k~- th not in cons id.er-11 
II I 
a:Jle s tren~th even in tL,es of the 'i1r ... ird ?urce' s br~.r;htes t hou:rils, 
- !I 
and exists in this strength so fer by reason of exclusive reso~~ 
:[ 
d 
'i 
1. :~:tatecl8nt &ttribntecl ·~~o t;.eor.'es TliC::.:::mlt (::J.1r) y;hen tL'Le lsttE~;:' 
purporteclly e:~1Jressec~ a C:\esire to coalesce tlJ.e "J."P? and :~P. · 
Ti:ne, :::ove~rrber 21, 1949. 
i! ~~ 6. 
!/ -
!) 
· -- :::- - :~~ :-·· -- c:c·.c.~:.- .. ~.=o=c:-.- .. :·-:.:.··:..==::-:··::::·co:· :===..:.::=:= ==:·:=-====~-:.:=-..-::c-.=...-=-~~=~-====T· 
to the institutions of the republican government under INhich it :1 
II 
operates. •! 
De Gaulle has frec_uently intimated, however, during period~ 
f · · ·th· h · · II o crlSlS Wl "ln t" e exlstln[ govern''1ent, that the "imoect of il 
- ~I 
, events" might bring the ==t.T':!i' into control of the governm.ent, pre~ 
i 
i 
'I 
sumably meaning thBt Lis novenent vvould take conmand id thout re-il 
0 ;I 
"'.,) • 1/ 
sorting to the official elections legalizing his clairas. ?his :! 
!\ 
lutter t~n'eat he publici~ed throughlbut the year 1949 as the ~?"?[I 
!I 
had t~en experienced its.most striking victorie~ in loc~l elect~ons, 
but now the threat has dled out, pro 1Jably even ln the rrnnd of tl~e 
l! 
s,eneral hb1self due to the increased display of strength by the;! 
d 
government coalition parties. 
The general himself is novJ 60 years old, active and 
li 
r! 
'I 
I! 
supremEJily 
/1 
)atriotic. He was born at Lille in 1919, of a fauily in the i! 
scholarly tradition and developed early the aabition to become ~~ 
soldier. Fe entered the acaderay at St. Syr and there his Emin 
i 
cultural interest, significantly enough, was history, esoeciall~ 
- -'!i 
:I 
the career of !~clpoleon. Ye obviously :m:de a good general in thEt 
!t 
:I 
2odern sense, his intelligence being of h high sort and he ~as ~he 
of the first in Dr2nce to advocote mechanization in warfare. 
5th ~r~y in Ic~r0inc us ~ brigadier 
Co ~ps ~orr0 ~~l.Oll fo~ +he ~rc~~k .J.. ~'- ..... ,_ u .... u ....... ..._., ..._ _ ,_, 1..1.. '-'if·_ 
se:let·el. '.l'ter· the :lnf<c·t II 
r.T .. ·n .a~ er .0 )ec .... etary of ·II 2.y;)Qi~tteo ~ .  J i . 
:,l s·'-c-,te ""or , .. ,,~r :. LJ,_~ J.. -~ct • 
II 
l 
:j 
., 
:1 2. 
i 
.=:: =~.:_c_·--· ·'if . 
!I 1: 
'I 
~'e brol{e imuediately vd th retain snd ',/eyt;encl c::nd on June 
~revv York Times, October 2, 1948. 
====-=-~--·-
:i 
\i 
1! 
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\1 18, the day following the }rrench req_uest for ermistice, he 
1\ arriiec~ 
I, 
i; 
in Ens,land and 3. set about or~enizing the Free French. ii 
i 
The brief history of de Gaulle is significant to us \\'hen tl~e 
:; 
resistnnce movement itself is eonsidered along 'vitll the tenor o~i 
li Vichy, the op]ortunists, and France itself durinc the war. The 
H 
French rulin~ class, most of whom throu~hout 
ufre id of 8o_ ~:1U~1ism than of the '}er~:lan.s (for 
in t.Le introc"luction), rieoided to collarllDl'Dte 
to t.he :~ilt. It C·id not kke t:1e peol'lc lone; to re:J.lize ·t.:~at n11t 
!· 
Cil:Ly Luu tl1ey .I'CCf:ivcc1 c~1e of t'-c 'K';::;t :~r1cs.:nine defet:ts in t\ei~ 
!I 
·. L~ tory, b;).t t]J.E;ir ~~overn::wnt had also been liquified by s leic;;htJ-
·: 
of-hand end replaced by this new regi~e, Vichy, set up to cover~ 
I• 
'i 
''unoccupied" France,_ with the bourgeois and most of the forner li 
d 
fi par lia:ne ntsrians cooperet ing with it--along vvi th the Catholic 1 
4. 
hierarchy. 
'i 
'I'he resistance L'lOVeL1ent had to Glel::e its 1vay largely 1.dthout}l 
ii the benefit of sound leadership--other than in the ranks of the :1 
d 
COi1ffiunist oartv v1hich lwd i:nrnediately been uutlcnved by Petain, !I 
- ... !I 
' but even here many of the lEJaders had been arrested or othervlis~l 
ll 
forced into cor1plete is ole. tion--so that during the eerly C1.e.ys a~ter 
(J.efeat there V·Jss a felt neeq/for top level assistance in handling 
!I 
I' d 
:r 
il 
the affairs of the n~,ree French.'' 
.I 
3. Geoffrey C. Cook, De Gaulle and the ~PF, Pol. Sci. Quart., 336, 
11
!,'. 
Sept. 1950; and Padover, 9P· Cit. pp. 29-31. 
11 
4. Claude Bourclet, '!:he Battle for Post-wc;r Fr;.::nce, Harpers, Ap~il 
1948' pp. 319-320. :1 
28. 
~·······-~ dl~ ~~~~;1:6~-·~::,a·:::~~e::~::-~:d: ::··organize the more pa t:::~t--~ 
n French behind him, his move vms welcomed by the common people i!' 
II 
II 
11 throughout France with open arms. It remains a matter of recor 
;:, !I 
:1 that throughout the history of the resistance movenent de G-aull~i.' 
11 II 
gave the cause the ablest sort of leadership and direction, a i\ 
li 
II 
ii 
'I truly gree: t pe triot. 
II 
~rom this position he built for himself ii !I j; 
~rhaps a bit unconsciously, a tremendous political potential: 
"For four years, the French non-Communist under-
ground had looked upon General de ·J.aulle as a kind of 
democratic Socialist, and as their future leader in 
post-war political battles. '11he CoDlrnunists knew his 
prestige was so great that not a word could be said 
against him even in their own troops. Indeed, in 
1944 de Gaulle could have--as many hoped and feared 
he '.vould--re:~wdeled "'ranee as thoroughly as Lenin 
had remodeled Russia, but in a bloodless way. He 
could have brushed aw'Jy Communist influence by tak-
ing himself, the lead in a non-Russian revolutionary 
movement, and taking the place of the Communists in 
the hearts of the working class.n5. 
There vms little thought of political allegiance in the res is-
tance :novement through the WEJr--with the possible exception of 
the Communist forces--but it came out of the war the idol of 
every frenchman patriotic enough to feel sympathetic with the 
d 
II 
'I 
II 
:I 
ji 
:I 
II II I, 
II 
II 
II 
!I 
!! 
!I 
II 
I 
II 
,1 underground--a majority certainly in France--and for 
ll 
all practia~l 
I 
;: 
'i purposes 
,, 
i! oower. ii -
they did have the basis for the exertion of political ii II 
II 
But there ·:,as not hi ns revo lu t io ner :1 in 0 e '}a ulle--not even i] 
:\of the '~lild sort of revol'J.U.Oi1 spoken cf. r~e ',.cs the son of tt,c\~ 
~: intellectual rd::"~O.le cL:.s~: c,nc1 s:1all :::ri::Jtocrccy -~;ho, for t'·e U're~ch 
I lj 
il 
li 
:I 5. p. 320. 
=t~·=== 
II 
II 
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!, !I 
:1 'I 
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\i 
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:I 
\1 
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1~ k~inss of :,rol~e .-~_:lt~ of our \-- . li ab\lle 
c},Jc~'S 1Jeen the bsckbone of the sjute an( C 1 ·:ef contributors to t 
t:·e ~"rr1y' s lenders t:l8t defended it. Pe Gaulle is pctriotic, 
certainly, but vJi th no sense ·,ih')tever of tl:e desires e.nd neecs ot the 
;I 
COT1011 ]801Jle in Y'runce •:::; • !Te never really realized \1Jhct the nnrier-
·' 
that its ways had deeDer and qore vi~bl 
il 
~earring in ?rench history than any nere insurrection a~ainst an 
op)ortunist autJ:writy in the present. 
Tlta t t:!ere ' .. '8 s nothing revolutionary about de r'raulle :'leans 
. that he cherished. no ic5.ec.s of a class disestablishment--no iclea 
of the :~rxist class struggle tempo, indeed, he felt the latter 
:I 
• to be £3 needless vv:aste of time. O::J. the other hand his vievvs too~ 
on seriously revolutionary characteristics in terms of the type 
1: 
of order he wished to establish over the old--in terms of the eco-
!i 
nomic-political organization of the state and his theory of the !) 
;, function of the state itself. ?e was never reedy to achieve any
1
r 
1[ reform by a resort to the enhancement of one class--no rna tter ho~1 II 
,, 
· r:1a 1 treated it i'lay h3ve been--over the degredation of any other c[J..ass 
:\ 
q 
in his society. But, at the same time, he V'Jas all too aware of i\ 
:i 
1 the serious discrepency in his former French society, the lack of 
social justice, l~ck of vit0lity in industry, tendency toward th~ 
II 
pro-~cotion r~c;tl~er t);_c=m <iiscour2:::enent of trusts, t1nd wantecl to ch~nge 
or:;;cnicslly :';nc1 spiritually these facets into ,,,iorkable tools 'Sor:l 
ii 
the 9romotion of the Y-ielfare of the s tE:: L;e as a v;hole. Fe vvantedi\ 
: it to be done through the 
i6. Ibid., p. 321. 
I• 
i' hands of the logically, to him, leoderlf' 
I 
of his society--rather giving birth to o new spirit in 
~inds than b~ neRns of the introduction of new, untried 
or leading class. 
l/ 
il 
H 
:i i! r70 li 0 • 
I 
li 
\\ 
.·-+=·--~==--co.=--=' 
:i 
these i: 
li 
leaders[~ 
~Then ~e 0aulle at the end of the war was busy re-establish~ng 
tile ole order (soc iol) na ther than cl'.s nging it, '.d th \<lw teve r VJ~ s 
do~e by ~ay of socialization appearing to be reluctantly grante4 
l! 
to the '.vhi~:J.s of the iTlasses rather than cor'ling as a result of r; !i 
. :! 
,' 
sharing of ideas betvveen the people and their chief, it resulte<lj. 
in alienating the Left from hi~--perhaps forever. 'Tlwt seem.eci_ ~ 
contracliction bet•,;een lis -.;cr statenents and r.is 
:i 
v.;es ::1erel~r the :Lirn conviction of de '5-aulJ.e that order f:irst rm~t 
be rE~tored befcre changes could be affected. ?his, cou)led ~:~lh 
il 
tl--...e fu.ct tL:::t he ;:.;mJ no roor1 in J:_is ord0r for a bunch of noisy i! 
;! 
. d , . b . !! anerchists such s ~-:; the commun:::..sts seem.e to nlLn. to e, :'lacl.e hlLn. 
1
:, 
'\ <.vant to do a-vvay c.vi th this threat os t'lUCh as possible before any 1' 
"unilateral" action took plece. 
,j 
':2he contrast bet1veen vvhat the Ieft--for:-ling the bulk of thei 
I 
resistence--thought de f"}eulle 's views to be and \vhat they actua¥ly 
~ere is not readily discernible from. available evidence, but th~[ 
" ebove enal:rsis sewns jtwtified on the s·tre:nr';th of uhat Cell he rr1bd 
i! 
. . I 
fro::1, snd to s o.::e e::te :lt in to, the s neec 'le~-J the ""-enercl 01sde C 1.1J1ii:;.:;· 
and s~ter the ~ar. rowever, whet he.said during ~~e ~cr to i~c~~e­
!1 
:i entln.lsiEJ3::1 :nC. pctriotisr1 in the lTII::iSS of the undersrouncl can be \
1
,l 
:I 
: largely disulis.'-:>ed as ue re pro~Jasande. The :'-eneral is by no meaq, 
!I ,, 
:JeT'eft oi'"' lJOli ticLtl c;,cuit:r ·t,}-j_()Llc;ll ct tir1es lle ~1i~-<Jlt see~1 tc) be, !! 
=~·="cc==..-=c.c.o ... -c;r-~co -~~=.o.===c~c=-=~==-=:·_ 
II 
:: 
:! 
i! 
:i con;:::)isteJ:l(·;y i.r} ii 
II 
-Tis vie·:Js c;n :::oci &1 ::-:nc! cconc.~ic :rc:f'or:·l lie "0'1'"'"· 1·'""'1'~ 'he-'-,.,""Jr· n !i - J V_L..LI:::"-:;,".'..1.'··' c kJ ,t_.,,.i\....'"111 
1,! ~ (')l,"i ·• '\ (''· 1•,·:-l, +, -·, 'J 1. ('i. "'l •.-
/ 
,__ I · r)1 ·:-.r---,_+v"'· :::,·ocl"P.li,.:----~.~-'"'1 P.-.r_~ .. 1·-~--- ~· .. {._' (""eEJ'l 1"r1 ~-~'71. ~e ' 1
1
- · ~ --~--,~ -·· ~- • V- ~·- ------~- ·-- ~., ,,.,n) ,, '" - "cj~ ~~-.rr18l1Y:!· 
" li 
'I ' '1lethe.,., t 1'' ~ s l. c< r)roo-"' of '-1·" .D. - l. "- 1 . t . ' l t .: 1: ., •. ~ _._ ~'J. "' -" 1. L ,_, 1. sse _s u ~e.:~.n1n ··:s or no lS narc o 11 
!I ,, 
·1 'I 11 say. '11he fact re~.1e:~ins the.t Le :1dheres es,c;C)ntic:lly tod.ay to the il 
l1 '1 
)'1' vie·;.;:::; he held during tLe \'!8.1' on these themes. Tr1: 1 edi•>telv <=>""'tFrl'/ 
-· --··~ u u ,_, . .L .. '!I 
the v:ar he epperently disreg;:::rdecl tLese idee.s ·:,nd went :;-,::Jout :> dj~ffr·r­
ll 
t ' -'- , +- • • 1 " t . t' t ., . 1 • !l en cour.:.:e, ;)U.u ';j.cl-::;,, lEo e·::s1 -:/ :cor•::;o ten lEi ·n·~· C<11r1ng t.1e t1:•1eji of 
o,q "· 1-o 1 ''-•···c~ o-" "-:--,e Pro'rl· c-~~)nn'' his 
-:;...1.--.-J 'J..Ll -' l.tuC• ~ ~..:... U.!..J.. . \i ,__;J...!rJ.._(,_ 
ij 
•J-overn:1ent end not hct:c1 of the new T'rench stete-to-be, Clnd he :ym~t 
surely l~sve been reticent in f'is E1ove:-.1ents due to his feeling tl;.~t 
il 
I before 1-:.is iCieal could ever be realized_ it m1st first heve the ,j I' II 
:c: ti,ilulus of a government::1l order co21.pe.t ible .'i th it. 1/{i thou t a II 
!I 
·.vl:wlly nmv political order it is hard to visuc.l ize de ~aulle as q 
\i !; 
being able, '.lithin himself, to resiJond to t-,nytl--;.ing he .:11ight haveil 
said about social reform. Fis idees viere strictly for the new ]I 
;! 
;I 
:?ranee G:K'i. the co~l::J.lmists, s.nd indeed all parties, see::J.ed to be 
"tb.e rec,lizatiun of ~hat he thought to be a good 
to ' . t Cl.l._ln.:c:e 1 , 
tlle rec: lizo t ion ol' 
i:::: t::cnce Jlovc.nent clieCi_ O'J_t in ~~r8.nc e, <:~ t leE) s t -:~he 
1:out .uro;)e. J',t C::YlY r~;te, ss vve epl)roccb nove' the c;overnr1entc::l 
history of t~w libere::tion 2.nd ]ost- sr periodo \.'e finc1 that tl~e 
=+-=-~·~0 ''=-o--~=---=c.. 
il 
I 
'I 
\I 
!I 
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II 
'=+====== 
11 movement, in pr: rts, ' . ..Ja s to form the nucleus o:::' so:.w i . .1portan t :I 
il 1: 
c:-111e Qarties--thouGh not to the extent tl~.::: t 
Left ~~s already or~anized in the tvio pc:-1rties, the 
Qo_ :;~~U.l1iS t S ~ac1 the (3ocialists, '=nd the Left for::wc_ t!:e bulk of 
the sctive resist~nce. 
t~le ':,·c:: r UHHl tlle y heel ever been vreviously. 
~;~~~-011 Dc~.lc\c:cc·~iclues ct ~:ocicli;_;~s C.tl :?.es:l.stc~.nce, a ll-,l.; oi~ c;·r c.~ev~i 
- _. .... ..J.. .1-..l. .) .L r...J ~i 
d 
~ ~ • ., • .., ... , I Sl'ul s·w.ll rf=:siste:1ce Toups. :r:otn of '.:: lCh \ere uec1ce.Ly I.ef- 11 
1: li 
.,..u· l. ,•::,1- u" .1 T.'l. I'l·~ -u-1le ,_ .. ,_,,. C•"'l.- non+i l'lUl. rl.a coo +'or <} lOl'lG t..~..~r ... e +he·,,eofte....li 
...__ v .A--- __ . - •V-A.J.. -.-<J_ ·- ' • .' _.._~,..;__ ..1.. C) U ... L t.. f_-~1 ~J. .1 V~~ ..1.. C... ..Lj:) 
i 
:J 
but the lack of e cr"c·dited. party for the -u.c:ht a -:.d ce'1ter is !I 
- -' li 
., 
li lar~;ely resr>onsible for "che ler·.eness of the T'::?.P, und, indeed, li 
i! 
the enerr~enee s t cJ ll, of so:~1e of the res:.s tance crouy.:; !'} s pm:el'~l 
II 
1\ 
! 
34-. 
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il Eistory of the I.ibere.tion 
reriod 
il 
'· 
!I 
., 
\I 
'\ The -::.e;:mblic t s collapse in 1940 nullified the constitution )
1 !, 
of 1875, discredited the bulk of the political parties snd nost 11 
!\ 
of the parliaoentary leaders associated ~ith them. ~or many · 
reasons the people -,Jere disgusted with the Third Hepublic and :\ 
' the post-vmr authority v;as expected to pave the <.Jay tov.rerd some j! 
:1 
onswers to these ins is tent voices. 'J:'he Ncttio~l.al Co:1mi ttee for 
Liberation and its Assembly Ct\me bGck to France calling itself 
the Provisional Government, ~ith de ~aulle still at its head. 
It set tr1e uachinery in :-:lotion for the election of an ;'\.sseElbly, 
tt.at ·.,ould either draft a nm1 constitution, or ect as the ~"'atio:qc:J 
j, 
Asse;nb ly under the 187 5 cons ti tu tion sl10uld the neoDle so des ir' :I 
"" .~.- .t.: o-rl 
nate in ::-c.e referoncJuc1. mwuld the r)eople co:lplcetely reject the 
'' letter possibility, then they ·,,ere to c\esign<:te ·.;hat povvers the~ 
p 
".:unted the constituent asse:nbly to exercise during the drcfting \i 
II 
of the new constitution. ::eamvhile, de Gaulle had inaugurated \i 
a "non-political" regir.1e '..hich tende6. toward a conservative out~ 
rl 
look in the extra-legal legislation it effected. This brought 11 
the entire Left down on his neck, olong ~ith increasing the ten~ 
sion arising over the proposed election bill--which had all the~ 
earmarks of a de Gaulle plebiscite.
7
" This served to hasten the~ 
!i 
election and the constant opposition of the CorJ.munists ',;ith the il 
ij 
', 7. Foreign Policy ~eport, April 15, 1946, p. 28; and A Consti- l! 
,1 tuti'O'Ilforthe Fourth Renublic, (Anony:nous), Introduction. :1 li ---- ~ [i 4=.· 
partial support of the Socialists forced a compro8ise election 
bill that ',,as finally put before the provisional government. 
The people went to the polls on October 31, 1945. The election 
syste~1J., ·,;hich used e. proportional represel1tr::-cion for each de-
~~artment, e.rouseCt soae C:l iscontcnt in the left, but the results 
'' )roved to be 2 s;,tasl::.in3 victory for those forces--Co:1munisr1, 
; 
. tl~le ~ .. r.over."ent PoD_Ulal·re n __ ehubll.C2l·n.:.i,_ Sociallsm and the new party, . u _ _ ~ y 
I 
" 
!I .!hat groups from some of the older Right and Center parties tha~l 
,: did oush tlle ir v;ay into the election under the old banners lost ,; 
,I - 1  
fi most of the votes they received dueto a lack of inter-department\~! 
II 
,J equalization of votes being allowed. This factor enhanced the II 
':left's Dosi tion even more--they obtained nearly 759~ of the total11 
;i ~ 1 •. 1 \i 
·· seats in the new Assembly VJhile the T-?.ight and Center held the " 
_rest with over 100 of this going to a center grouping, the Ras-
1 semb lement des Gauches =~epublica ins, a coalition of the Radice.l-;; 
c;ocialists anc:i other Center parties. rflhe Left wes further 
strengthened by the feet thet they hod almost exclusively denounp.ed 
;i 
,> 
·.the Third Republic's Colu:;titution '<'ihile the 'l.adicol<::ocialists, i: 
one other group which stowed any strength before the electio~, 
along ,;i th 
retain the 
96~.; of the 
~orne other Right groups had asked its supporters 
old ciocuuent. ~he people rejected this proposal 
8 
voters resporH~in8 in the negat:i.,ve. • 
seo.ts, 
il 
to I' 
:[ 
i ~ 
... l•t h'l 
vi li 
il 
'I II 
i' 
!I 
I! 
but li q !I 
:! i: 
8 F.. 0 r.l·t 
. ~. . lner, _2 • .::::..._. , p. 336; Foreign Poli~z ~eoort, April 15, 19~0, 
. p. 28. 
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in this tota 1 vva s the TillS;:( {tTnion Deo.ocra tiques et Socialists 
de Resistance) which had GBined 500,000 votes and had alligned 
itself with the Socialists for election purposes, but then 
drifted further to the Right when the latter showed signs of 
coalescing vvith the Cor.1Llmnists over the question of ~naking a 
i' 
:I 
,~co==== 
!! ,, 
It 
'I L ;I 
'I I, 
I' 
11 
d 
'I 
govern.:aent. This forced the Left to cor:18 to terr.1s ',:i th the HR.P Jl 
which, due to the lstter' s distaste i'or the Co~munist~, resul te1 
in the re-introcLUction of instability 'iJi th the first c1tteo.pt at il 
if 
li governo.ent in the post-war scene. 
II 
'Ihs. t is significant ir:lrnec1ia tely is that de n-aulle '.VB s e lec~ed 
president of the Constituent Assembly with only one P.ightist abi 
staining. He was still the idol of the average Frenchman and li il 
II 
!I obviously held. considerable po·.ver among the representatives of 
q these avera~-~e l1'renchmen. rrhe overvvhe lming support 
YJSnt to set up his ovm cabinet vlithout the help of 
but the Communists violently opposed this move clue 
!! 
lec1 him to i! 
II 
party leader~, 
\\ 
to de Gaulle ~;s 
" lj 
'I 
open ontipathy toward them as a group and a political deadlock lj 
ensued. De ·'J.aulle returned his mandate to the Assembly which \1 
II 
prom_ptly returned it to hin 400 to 163--the Conmunists solidly 1 
.. ii 
II 
opposing hirn. 9 • He then formed a cabinet, but upon the advice o~ ,, 
II 
party lesders he allov1el1 f'i ve Co";ltnunists into it. TTe c~1ose men 11 
fror:1 the I'E;nt:s of other po.rties for tl:.e key j)OSitions, ho-.:ever, 1! 
II 
bc:c8.u.)e Le felt t::,_;t .,..,rc.~~1ce -";;;cr· .:.:.1\0~llc', C:;::osn·;c; a positj_on he.lf- 11 
ii 
' .. c:~y bet\,·een -::ll:Jsia c:J:C. ~~~-:.e 'Tn:LteC.. :,;t:~"te.:; EUiC', ·,Jc.,ntec!. to ~E'C:fl t~1e II 
,, 
"]c .:.lu:c:Lsts out of lJo:::;ts clcc1ling w:ith the levers of foreigh poliqiY· 
1: 
9. ?oreign F'olicy o:~eport, Op. Cit., p. :32. 
if 
,I 
Ji ~, I 
ll 
II 
'I 
~~=~-~o,_·:cc~~--~~ ~=~·='-'=-" --=-~~~=~--~=: ·==-c==-=====~jf=--o'-'.-·:~co-~~-~=-,c =~ 
:::he constent bickerint', c:nc:. luck of uni tv in concurrence on his If 
~ I! 
proposels led him :f'inelly to resign from. the ~:-;over1L1ent in II !I 
li 
January, 1946--yo.rtly due to his comolete dis taste for the co~~ jj 
' census of opinion over what the new constitution should contsin~ 
rrl:ce Assembly set up a cebinet under -::felix 0ouin, e. lec_1ding 
~;ocioli:::;t, ·.;ho "ISS lJ,c:::cked h~.' t:;l-~e three ::ejor ~l~_·rties in a con-
l -
• :....' l_ .... , • ....... ~ _..n ;'-:-"";·"}·,· . 1 ,- ..... 1-~...l· -· . ., 8 ~' ~~. _)l'O~.::lse---u __ -~8 :~C-vt:E~J- ~~~l~_"ufl t·1. u..._..L. .c.:...:.. G .....;'1 • ii 
II 
1'l1e ;.s;c."?, i'ol:t t:.cE :lroccec c:d ·.;:Lth tJ.1.e t:_,s;-~ ~~''"t cut ~or it :>4=~ 
I 
:·,.n ::;:J' · .. ·me c;f Jl'.'U .. li:<1t cv•::r · · t J~:~c '~::·' .. c:::J'.:..:Jci t::tio:l ·.,.::...:> '::.o !I 
I 
ff"':llc co .. ::11111ists 
stronz 011e, tl-1e 
se:·ilb ly '>ill ile the >.TI' snc1 the ~ightist e lef:len ts ·.ere interested 
in curbing the pmvers of the J\s::;embly ;=;net introducing n senste 
I 
o:~in. A draft was finolly prepared snd presented to the peop~! 
in the referen~u~ of l~y 5, 1946. It ~es the sorry result of 
ill-conceived co:1;)ronice [o:1C '.v::s c.lenounced by the voters by a 
12. 
bare ~larcin--10,584,000 a;<dnst it to 9,454,000 for it. L 
il 
,,f-- ~~ ·" e t.l· ('n o.'o" -i c ,, ~-. l" !I' 
-- · • t; J '-' '-<--- ' • V ....._ ' -A.,._, t.i ~ 
1: 
,--1·l.L! ,- ll \T OV'"'"_l-.., l onl...r:::..A: 
_1.._._ v_L(1_._--'-- • .;' t.J.L -....._, '../-),.' . .;\...f+ 
i1 
fc.:ctor- L~. )O:J:Jibl:' t:-:.e generel L:c~c of faith in the represent;Jt~ves 
II 
!i 
10. The constitu-cionol issue centered eround de Gaulle's favoriljl.g 
a strong eyecutive ~ith enlarged powers over the executive of t\e 
Third -r:ermblic. Tlle CoDmunists 1vsnted no executive separated 11 
:from pt::r liament c:nd eny executive for t 1-:.em had to be 'Neak. 7he il 
Socic,lists and :~P, Ul1~~ortunately, ·.:ere inconsiste;lt in their a:lbs. 
;I 
ll . .,-· ... 
.l_ b lQ ' ~ .9. 32-03. 
1~~. I.oc. Cit. 
;; 
il 
,. ,..., 
OCJ • 
1f=~,~= 
il by the people represented, coupled \Vi tll s ~:eneral aura of ,, 
c:; is-grantle;:le:::lt 
li 
'i sub~ 
si<iinc;. ~"·,t the same tirr1e Liberation had 'n.eant certain definiteil 
-- I' 
II 
things to the people. ~here was a clamor by not just the ~··orke~s, 
il 
but a substantial portion of the· bourgeois, to effect surle v;ork~ 
il 
able transition fro~ capitalism to E planned, social economy--c~n­
!i 
II 
fiscate the collaboroti0nist's holdings and nationalize these a~ 
long ~ith some of the basic industry of the nation. '!;his feeli~c, 
Govern~wnt, in 
conCi i tions 
!l 
!: 
II 
II ,, 
in -.,;he 1110. jori ty, r>le8.1Wihile, ~.:;he Provision.sl 
terms of auoptin{'; >:wasures to cope ','Jith the inte~-
' II 
of t:~e country '>'hih: phms · .. ere beinrz ,:c<"le :L'or tl~e 
h 
...L l-. .. ..;.... t., o ~ r Q l,... ':t :-l tL ~ 
·.,_' v c.c.~C .•. L.r,·,EC ~l·li 
H 
'·e rcrnlla -l.-,llO'"eC' ll 
- . . -- -~~ -· _ _,- - ~ . II 
tt.e \~,ar. 
cagey cbout sponsoring c 
left )Olicy ' ith sn eye to . . .. . . . 13. 1ts 1nternet1onal 1mpl1cat1ons. 
'lhstever his reasons v.;ere, he apparently started in motion a 
conservative governmental policy than the bulk of the voters 
sired. 
The referendum of ~ay 5, constituted a slight loss of 
strength for the Left. The Socialists had mildly endorsed the 
----------------------------
:I 
\! 
'I L 
I 
I, 
li 
il I, 
13. This is the view of the Foreign Policy ~eporter, for June l~i 
1945. The efficacy of the iBplicBtion will perhaps forever re- !' 
main obscured, yet there must have been some nore dynat::tic reaso1js 
f'or the strange 'oerwvior of the French electorate during the d 
first post-vJar years than has yet been uncovered. r;eybe it lieEi 
in t~le Lt:>sty attempt to emancipate the French vJoman. 
·I 
I' 
·-#-[I 
II 
II 
ii 
li 
!: 
!i 
i: 3 S1. 
,, .I 
'I 1! 
.... ·:c=oo··.if.c.c· ... --~.--====--=--===--=--===-=-.--=-o:=.= c~==~~~==""o· .. =c.="···-·· rf==-•· .. 
draft constitution but were openly grudging about it. The II 
il 
Communists, on the other hand, stood firmly behind it while the j[ 
·i 
-qadicals, the 1IDS:S: anc. the >TR.P opposed its passage along with 11 
\I 
the bulk of the Catholic clergy. The Socialists considered the'/ 
I. 
election a defeat for the Communists because of this and based ii 
,, 
il 
tlleir csmpaign for elections to the next Constituent Assembly o~ 
ii 
t:.1at e.ssur.1ption--turning anti-Cocununist. ::;'rom this point on 
1
: 
II 
there -.vas no longer any hope of a coalition between the two Lef~ 
groups. 1
tl 
II 
rl'he Socialists lost part of their suppo:·t to both the :1 II 
II CJomrnunists aad to the :::RP in the election of June 2, 1940. '71l:e l/ 
I. 
I!?..P gained ner3rly e. :;.illion no~e votu'l c:ncl tll.e C:o:-lf'J.Unists re;;i~;~ 
d ,, 
tered e. net c-3 L1 o:t' over 140,000. T'Art of t~J ese increAses can II 
'I II 
, be rc;:z:)lained by the fc.ct thtJt t.:lere v.ere so:1e 700,000 :11ore vali~ 
li 
I! 
t _,_ • t' • 1 -'- • -'-1 • -'· \ ' • . ri • t ~ IJO VO es CBS v ll1 lllS eJ..t= C ul0l1 LJ l8l1 ln uclC preVlOUS one, en...._ l f.lc;llfes 
i' 
. 1 1 . 1 1 a distinction over a _ooss1b e trsnsferrA of support exceed1ng ~ 
" - - l 
I. 
shaky. '.!hat is s;lpare~:t, hmvever, is the fact that the mh~_ci.le i' 
and so~e ~ightist ele8ents ~ere gainin~ confidence in 
tl:is ne1.v party, tlJe :'TIP, ",,hich had been shovJing sir:,ns of 
divorcing itself froM its foruer Leftist tendencies. 14 • 
li 
defini~ely 
i! 
II jl 
After this election the parties vvere better able to t2-1ke II 
I! 
stock of tteir sup-::)Qrt since definite stends had lJeen :nade over jl 
,I 
the constitution 2nd_ lnter usecl as 
(:enter sroups 
:1:.:;.rkeci. 
l i.L. ~. 'D' 0 c. ' "''1ner, ..1!.' ~·, p. 336. 
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a basis for t~e ca~0ai~ns. 
reGoinee stationery in the 
II 
II 
., 
i! 
II 
!1 
II 
:i 
li 
.I 
·I 
i' 
:I 
i. 
I! 
' ==-o_-,,"-'-'--~=- -rr=--"-= ~' 
',JJ-licl1, couiJled ·.:it~1 Jc~-:.e fc:_;ct t~1ct the ':R.T' lsc' '~ lr..:rc~e end stron$ 
',iln;, 'wde the position of t'1e Left cwre precerious then ~~ 
::::':cis f·:re::: ter inner c:1llir:;nment of the parties result eG. in l1 
! 
'S:i ;h t 
ever. 
turning tl1e drcfting of the new ccnstitution into a ~efinitely 
i! 
j ~ 
~)arty co:1flict -.:ith no concerted parlia:,lentary sction to be hop~d 
1: 
for. 
,. 
?::--.e .:.wciclists' losses ~1ade them '.Ji thCraw from the res'lo.n::::;i-!1 
- H 
,, 
bility of cabinEt le~:dership, end the I~P IJUt forvwrd Georges li I! 
d 
Bidc.;,ult, n leader of the C:esisk;n~;e, ' .. ho. os elected heed of tl~~ 
15. 
::;ove:r.n;lont on June 1 g, 1946. rarty governc1ent came into its 
0'.!11 again \'Jhile the rAla-cive equality of the three major groups \i 
il 
in the Assembly, coupled vJi th their size, began to give the bod~ 
all the ecn;_J.arks of the Third. T-ee public Assemblies 1vi th condi tioJs, 
·: 
if anything, aggravated. The compror;1ise ctocument that eventuall~ 
ca::n.e out of it all was later called a constitution and put befo:rJie i! 
the people in the of October 13, 1946. As bare a 
I 
·! 
majority accepted this draft as had rejected the last vvhile nea~ly 
B willian voters, or one third of the electorate, stayed home. 
Tl1e lffiP and the Socialists sponsored tl:--~is drc::'t as did the 
L 
C . ""' f'"n" 1 ly \'lleil Cl··e ""''Ul"e toolr hl"c· c'r.o"";n-i+e S.._..,,,-4 a.--,.--"nri\t ,0.1fl1.U"llf:: G.:; l"_Cl ~ i_ ' '· ,-cl J.. '- "' .:.:> •." _L ..L" • .c. v ~ ' vu.Ll;. Cli..>G J.. "i 
its Eodopt ion. If it h;36_ not be en for the Co:wmnists belated enJ) 
J, 
6orse:-_lent the "ti'ourth Ttepublic' s Constitution ni :;ht not have pas~\ed. 
Tl:e elections to the I~irst :'Tetional Assetlbly under the new)\ 
ii 
Constitution may be quickly dispDtched for the moment. 'Tihe 
I 
'I 
positions of the Hight, r,eft and center re~a ined essentially thdi 
---------
15. ?oreign Policy ;~eports, JAnUFJ:r·y 15, 1949, p. 206. 
40. 
sane. ?u t .s ie:;.:1ificunt tr:cmsferrels OCCLlrcd '.!here the Socialist~ 
lost considerel')ly to bot:~ the Go:lfaunists snc_ the ~J!.P, ·;-,·tile tre 
lstter lost so~e probehly to both the ~i~ht and the left--at th~ 
se.~:1e tL:~e rete.ininr:; its po3ition in ter:1s of cects obtLinec~ ct 
t:~e ~:aY1s of & ne\V electoro.l syste:~1 perr:1i ttin,::; a better cci_r1inis .... 
tr~tion of vote tot3ls, )lus the f2ct thct its overall totcl 
',,~; s cu:Jhicned c.1ne to the dual transfer of votes. ., ]r c' ' • l~ ,_) 
in u better )OSition then forrae-"ly, a~3SUC:1ing for the rl.Or:lellt the 
Right as represented by those ~roups outside the two left partiAs, 
·~cd .Jsete the Left look to its oversees C:epartnentr:l SU.'}port to 
,, 
~o~cl Ieft su~~ort in ~ctropolitcn rrance ~ss slightly under 5oi. 
-!lhe :·Jcjority on t~1e ri~ht of t~:cse t'.vo :;rotP)S ere ineffectL.wl 
.ich ca~e fro~ the Catholic trade unions of predouinently leftist 
tenc'.encies. ::ash grou1J~::, :rmny pro::lir:ent in -:~~1e 'nhird TJepublic, ,, 
,, 
co2e forth c:oin lS evirtenced by this election 
vac~ll~tins b2c~ 2nu forth bet~een the ~i~ht and Teft • 
..,.,i;e c;oc iol h~ ts ; cc1. co<1e to en interne l ~::r tLY' of the -.;r ys 
ith the devclo:)-~lent of c' strons :;:_,eft v;i 1g formed in fever of 
•+ i·:..- u c.ie .o ·' ::.e tL:1e even the '.<in~, 
)rJcticed ststes~en fro~ the ~ocislists rPnks, ~.oul~ not think 
of .such n coeli tion ·.:it:l the Connuni;3ts, however, ~>ho:;"'t of cl 
n~tional 6issster. 
J\ t sny rote, ;~ood or b::::c1, t~·tis \ins t::.1e CO,l)lexion of the 
first :·~:~'tiom:l 1\sse:nbly. .·~.s \ve leave the nevvbcrn '1epublic nm.1 
t-1--, 0 
v. !.<,-:, two :~arxist D·3rties on even • • . f' " ' t . 1 "" 'I ~1aer rl~~ oe ~een ~1e 1orces 
II' 
new ?e1u~lic 2ppe~rs to be l 
.,ll ir d "?.e- :\ 
:I 
:.wre iilstE:bili ty. Tri)ertisme, -!-' -1· -'--tl -une COC:. l '-'-1+0~1 
:! 
new coalition born out of its ruins. ~he fsll of tripartisme 
i! 
her2lded the appro2ch of the al.~st insoluble problem the ?rrnc~ 
l:u: .. ve lie.d to cope · .. i tl". ~cl.~_-_·_.r_· .• ~•.i·. ·-•-irr·e ·f·1lc 1-,~I'tll (lf' '~P'Il''Oll.C"'nr'c,rl ~r;l ~""'- ... -...., u_ . ..__ ... J...,., · ._~ ..... "-" -..-..L ~ !. --'j;· ~ U ..i. w,_,, __._ ... fi 
i ,, 
ctifferent ideolo::ie;::; in'!::.o e \.orl~-of' :ic: e 
~oday t~e (ifferences o~ 09inion that \1 li 
d 
" 
:.·,ntl• 0'1 :-' ... l i·'•"'P t'.r',P '~ro•·,c}·, ,· n '"' 'lO'Y-" "~r'C' . .,..l.[! 
....... '-' ! - ............... '-.,/ ...,_ ......... -- '-·- J..... J.. '- ...J..,!. .L" (...i. : ) ..!... 0 _ _::) _._ ':- <...~. i.. . .ttl-
t! 
\! 
of worlcl events. 'I I ,, 
~2J~.e em.bryo s ::;~, :;e of ~JO:Jt-\iCr )~rtz.r .90litics Lad ps.cosec, ,;itl1i 
t_~·l.e r:~'lec·tinllS -~o t~·le :_11 il··ut !Tstionc~l ~s~-~e~~lbl:l ar1d~ \·,:e 110""~t'J finO tllE~I-
- il . 
il 
vC:,rious :_J[ortie~> c:IlO r:roU})in.zs :3ufficiently rebuilt or nev;ly cor~-; 
II 
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~==--====--=-+~=,=--= 
struc tecl so tlw t .:e cen nov: look E t these structures ::aore closet 7 
li"' 
in the next chapter. I Te jor forces, ill~'! de up of groups of partie~, 
II I! li d are not yet cle8rly visible but i':ith the udvent of the "RFr, 
~e Gaulle's own party, thrPe forces quickly ap)ear in the pictuje t1 
essentially re;1c:;ins toCi.ey on the scene, the ?i~sllt !i II 
il 
vvith de Gaulle; the center groupr3 c.,ith the I'fRP, Eao_icel-Sociali~ts 
TJDS-:1 ~:;:1d, strangely enough, the .;.;ociallsts; end on the extrerne 
Left, the Jo;.lf'lunists. A close a)p:rc:nsal of tLese t)lree :t'orcez; 
is next in order. 
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Chapter ~ 
The Political Parties, A Brief History and 
Description 
Some institutions were introduced, or re-introduced, into 
the Fourth Republic that merely aggravated the tempo of the 
multi-party system. '!vith elections now based on a system of 
proportional representation and the fact that the trend toward 
the Left accentuated in post-war France was split in half, 
coupled with an equally wide split between the Center and the 
Right, has given to the new Republic's government a more purely.' 
1. factional domination than was previously the case. At the 
same time the introduction onto the scene of the device known 
·· ·as the "Third Force," which has been slowly orienting itself to+ 
;: 
ward the Right, has enhanced the positions of the S!.'laller Centet 
parties and has tended to break up the larger coalition parties!! 
into opposing wings. 
The French still make the bulk of their political compro-
nises after the election, and maintain the support of doctrinal 
considerations over the heeding of their immediate expediencies!~ 
There are the same countless groups of individuals both inside 
1. This factor, as far as its negative effect upon governmental'! 
action, is partially offset by another current characteristic or 
group consolidation. The factor of largeness of a few parties,~ 
however, merely promotes factional strife rather than serving ' 
as a hindrance to it. ~:~e may say that factions before the war : 
, -~vere represented by sm.all parties 'c;hereas today we find the fac ... 
tions as groups within a large party. No change, actually, has 
occurred, except for the appearance of a greater instability in, 
the Government. 
44. 
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jj 
and outside the Assembly as there were before the war. Aside li 
'I ;: from the many smaller local groupings whose local interests and !1 
JJ II 
1
1!
1
!, ideas must be blended into the larger parties program, the par- ;1 
ties huddle in the Assembly, cone to terms over possible coali- !l 
i: 'I 
!! tions, and a generally wide divergence of interests are dravm Jl: 
:! under one banner. As far as the electorate is concerned the 'I 
II 
coalitions prior to the election may have no meaning when the il 
r 
i! Assembly finally convenes, since the pre-election alliances are !I 
;; 
often devised under entirely different conditions than prompt t1e 
alligrunents within the Assembly itself, 2 •so that the voter who II 
ii ,, 
supported a candidate closely associated with the Socialists in 11 
il 
the campaign may find his allegiance right from center by the I: 
time the first bill comes to a vote after the parliaClentarians 
have assembled. \1 
!I 
!I Another confusing factor in the french political scene is 11 
II 
II 
I! 
· 2. Local politics are often fickle where the individual candida~'f 
is concerned. A strongly popular local figure in a natimnal el~ -
tion may command a much larger share of the popular vote in his 1 
1 district for himself and the other candidates appearing on l!is II· 
ii list than might othervdse have been the case. Pre-election al-~ 
:l·jlignments are made fo: th~ sake o~ obtaining the best possible ~oup­
,! ing of names and part1es 1n one l1st as can be accomplished. T ~n 
II another factor providiW:; stimulus tmvard this comes from the l~p 
li law on the election of members to the National Assembly (Law #4 I 
Ji 2151 of October 5, 1946, taken from Laing, et al., sourcebook i 
:! EuroRean Governments, 1950, p. 117.) which provides for tl:l'e"re- , 
!;. fund 1ng of the candidates cam.pa ign expenditures together with t~r 
! return of a 20,000 franc bond--he must post prior to the campaigp. 
: --if he is successful in getting at least 3% of the total vote l1 
cast in his district. The best example of this disparity betwe~r· 
pre-election and post-election allignments is in the history of ! 
the UDSR which was closely associated ·with the Socialists in 19~p 
and is now right-center. I! 
u ,, 
" 
II 
li 
li 
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II 
·· in the names the various parties have taken. In the United 
il Stntes an "independent" r.1ay be oriented in his thinking either Ji 
il to the right or the left, and in sor.1e localities he will usually 
ll 
li be progressive, but in France the name is usually associated 
the Right. Some of the terns the parties use have a definite 
purpose but they seldom mean what they purport. 
"It is sufficient to say of a french political 
group'that its name contains the adjective "left" 
to know immediately that it is either not left 
at all, or that only a fraction of its members 
vote left (or that the group is a breakoff from 
another group because the former could not go 
along with the more conservative thinking of the 
first, and denotes its more liberal or progressive 
tendencies from the former by inclusion of "left" 
in its title,); a group labeled "Democratic" is 
invariably Right as are most groups labeled 
"Republican"; "Liberal" equally invariably des-
cribes a conservative, as does the term "Progressist"; 
and if the group proclaims itself "Socialist" in any 
hyphenated title, such as "Radical-Socialist", 
"Republican-Socialist", "French-Socialist," then 
it is not the official Socialist party but one of 
the left groups in the parliament differing from 
the Socialist Party in certain respects." (Due to 
the changing political complexion of France there 
are even so~e groups oriented to the riGht3of center who hold this term in their title.) • 
There are a number of readily discernible reasons for much of 
the disparity in names. The appeal of the notion that France 
l 
is the product of 1789 in elections cannot be lightly dismissedit 
j: 
even today. Political traditionalism is very readily associatef 
with reaction, or merely with the absence of action, whereas II 
!i I• 
the Revolution is conceived of as essentially a movement toward$ 
j. This was written in 193? but is still applicable today, 
the two exceptions noted. Pickles, Op. Cit., p. 5·0. 
II 
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' 
a goal. The same observer4 • points this out that the names are \\ 
largely the device whereby the bogey of reaction or standstill 
lJ 
lj 
is ostensibly hidden from the electorate. A conservative partr 
in France must still pay lip-service to the Revolution and does 
so by labeling itself "Liberal," and the liberal parties feel 
obliged to provide some evidence of movement or progress and 
tack on the term "Socialist." As we shall see later, social 
justice plays a much larger part in french thinking than it doe~ 
il 
" in :nany other countries that have been more progressive in their 
!! 
industrialization and the parties are asked to heed this. 
There is still present the traditional break among the vari-
ous parties over the right and left thinking, though it is soe~ 
what obscured by the presence of the Third Force. Today the 
split is changed in character by the fact that the Socialists 
aad Communists have come out of the war in greater numbers tend,;. 
ing to shift the former traditionally left from. center groups 
closer to the center--even right from. center. The Radical-
socialists, formerly looked upon as leaning slightly ].eft, are ,: 
li 
now to the right of the :MRP, which has taken the former's place,: 
q 
,! 
; to some extent. However the positions are really more confusin$ 
'I 
il 
than this due to the heterogenous quality of the J.ffiP support anfl 
the emergence of the RPF onto the scene. In modern France, as II 
il 
in many other countries where the multi-party system exists, ::, 
I 
there is the tendency to swing away fro:n the confusion of smalll[ 
!i 
groups and into a system. of larger parties, due to the increasi~g 
!i 
4. Ibid., ~-. 61. 
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ll 
need in the world for more unified action than multiplicity nor~ 
mally permits. The rising tide of the Left and its more stern 
Jlethods of _party discipline, greater tendency toward strong na- 11 
I 
tional organization, tend to nullify the effects of the tradi-
tional ~ight outlook of individual political action opposed to 
the strict adherence to party policy. It leads toward the establ~h-,. 
I j; 
ment of large counter-active groups or parties though seldom dis-
:, 
playing spontaneous unity of purpose. This may not always be t~e 
i 
conscious movement on the part of many leaders concerned, but tpe 
:' 
natural exigencies of the over-all situation at home and abroad 
have brought about a closer allignment in larger groupings not 
previously known. 
Jn describing the political parties in France it will pay !: 
'! 
us to neglect, somewhat, the whole gamut of groupings and organi-
!! 
zational u~its we find there, and to pay instead closer attention 
!; 
,, 
to the major political organizations along with one or two of the 
,, 
smaller u:1its who command in themselves enough votes to make a : 
i 
difference one way or the other in the Assembly. ~he character~ 
·' istics of these larger groups should then be able to supply us 
I· 
with enough clues as to just where the other, smaller groups~le~d 
their allegiance at one time or another in the cases where thes~ 
I' 
alliances are important to the study and where the smaller grouws 
:l 
I· 
themselves achieve enough importance to merit giving them attenr 
II 
' tion. 
I• 
The first consideration is to define the party structure i~ 
' 
terms of the presently opposing forces at work. On the Right 
there is a mixed grouping extending from the classical Right 
to supporters oriented left from center in their thinking--all 
bound together in greater or l!esser degree of distaste for the 
form of the Fourth Republic, and the ideal of a unified France :i 
vvith strong executive leadership. This group is the Rassemble-!l 
ii 
ment du Peuple Francais, (RPF). On the extreme Left, and for 11 
II 
our purpose, the only representative of the true Left, we find 11 
II 
P the Communist Party o Then in the center, holding the reins of :! 
d 
li 
li 
II j! 
, 
H 
II 
government, is the Third Force, made up variously of several 
smaller center parties and the two larger groups, the Hove[llent 
Populaire Republicain, (:MRP), and the Socialist Party. The 
smaller groups are the Radical-Socialist Party and the Union 
de 
Democratique et Socialiste/Resistsnce, (TJDSR), which are but 
two largest of several smaller groups affiliated occasionally 
. 5. the Th1.rd Force. 
The RPF revolves around the national figure of General 
Charles de Gaulle, "i'lho still con1.•nands considerable prestige. 
After he resigned from the ·head o:e the government in 1946, de 
Gaullist followers sought the General out to lead them, which 
he did in August l946o They grouped themselves into the "Unionl
1
1 
time a rational political party as such I~ Gaulliste"--not at the 
!I 
II d 
il 
1: 
but merely a rally point for sympathizers with the General's, 
and other prominent associated leader's views. '.lith this 
5. The basic material in this chapter was drawn from Dorothy •i 
Pickles, Op. Cit o; Gordon 'Hright, The Reshaping of French [i 
Democracy;ogg and Zihk, Modern Foreign Governments; and Dorotb!r 
Pl.ckles, France 13etween the Republics, 1946. 1: 
ii 
banner the Union <vas able to poll 3.1% of the popular vote and 
gain 9 seats in the first National .Assembly, Later, April, 194~, ,, 
II 
the RPF was officially formed, but stressing the fact that it 'I 
wes not a political party but only a means of rallying the Fren;ch 
people around the cause of their country. De Gaulle had been 
'I 
denouncing publically the party system in France. along with thell 
tendency that political parties had in eeneral toward divertin~: 
i 
the needed functions of government into self-interest channels i 
I 
I 
to the detriment of the people's welfare, which would not permi~ 
! 
the RPF to call itself by a political name--until later. Then l\ 
I; 
the General maintained the group was only entering politics fo~; 
the interests of the people since they could not get them to he~~p 
,[ 
themselves any other way. The party became political in its ac~ 
l: 
II 
" tion soon afterward, however, as it dropped all pretense of non~ 
11 
political activity in the elections to the municipal council ofi! 
Paris later in the year. Pere it obtained a striking victory 
obtaining some 50 of the 90 council seats--the uayor of Paris 
is the General's brother, Pierre de Gaulle. By the su~~er of 
1947 the dues payers in the party were reported at well over 
one and a half million. 6 • 
The bulk of the followers come from the upper bourgeois, a:' 
,i 
December, 1948 Poll shovled that 49% of Gaullist voters were 
7 
wealthy, but at the same time 20% were from poor elements. • 
6. Geoffrey c. cook, De Gaulle and the RPF, Political Science 
QUarterly, Sept. l950-,-p~407 --- ---
7. Padover, Op. Cit., p. 131. 
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50. 
De Gaulle is today courting the classical Right and around him 
are flocking several semi-fascist groups while at the same time 
indications point to his drawing considerable support from the 
?/!RP and other near center groups along vvi th portions from the 
Left. The party itself is split up into several factions for 
this reason, thst differ widely <JS to the technical details of 
a co;:lt:lon program--but shov< ample signs of being able to cor:1e tod 
ready agree3ent should the need arise. 
The RPF is the one, fairly unified, strong party of the 
Right, holding by alliance many of the formerly active Right 
and canter groupings, but the Right is also represented to 
some extent in the parties of the Third Force, and its affili-
ates, particularly the Redical-:::1ocialists, the 1IDSR, 8nd the 
~mP. The first of these is one of the oldest parties in France:, 
prominent since 1885. It h~s been traditionally the party of 
liberalism--negation in ~rance~!and though classified at dif-
ferent tiues in different positions as to right or left, formed, 
'iNha t has often been described as representing the outlook of thli3 
typical frenchman. 
The Radical-Socialists are preeminently the party of the 
French Revolution, in the sense that up to the second :vorld ~.'Jar: 
I 
it was still their nain source of inspiration. They traditionatlY 
B. Negation in the economic sense, brought out earlier, and of 
course in the political sense. Liberalism has somewhat changed., 
with the times in other countries where its influence is or has 
been strong to a more progressive position. ~lis has not been , 
so near as strongly in France. 
C:::l (..• ,._ . 
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ji 
stood for t:-~e ec1uality of all ?rench citize'1S and were hostile !\ 
' to economic privilege in the form of trusts, monopolies, in-
edequate taxation of ·v;ealth, and in their sympathy for the 
workins classes where they supported old-ase assistance, socia~j 
_, 
security and the eight-hour day. !i ('rheir ~:ew Deal outlook dur- 1• il ,, 
il 
lj 
ii 
ing the inter-1.;,ar period gave them the m.~.ls. of a left fron 
center position.) There has a lvvays been a vdde divergence of 
il 
vievvs on financial measures and regarding the practical appli- H 
r 
,I 
cation of tlle party's p_rograms. The Left-wing finds itself a14~;gned 
':Vi th the Socialists at ti:nes while the Right-wing is often rie;h~ 
,I 
'I 
from center in its outlook. Sor:J.e answer to this internal in- i, 
:I 
consistency is seen in the wide cross-section of french opinion jl 
! 
I 
which the party espoused. For the small man, the peasant, the 11 
11 
tradesnan, the petty-bourgeois, extending from the lowest far ·· 
into the middle-class, whose emergence as a political force 
dates from the Revolution and the establishment of universal 
I! 
:: 
li 
i! 
li 
:I 
:I 
suffrage, all flocked to its banner alone; '•vi th ample saJ'J.plings !l 
I! 
of the poor clnd the wealthy. As long as ?renee retained its. t1a-
di tional outlook and rural emphasis together v:ith a lack of 1ni 
dustrial intensification, the Radicals were the real power in /I 
french politics. After tbe advent of the thirties and the j) 
,I 
brief period prior that began the french attempt at industrial~-
zation, the ~adical party began to decline in power. In 1932 il 
1,_~,-
t~ley held 160 seats in the Chamber, the sincle do''1inent grcup 
li 
II tt:ere, but ',,i th the introduction of the Popular Front govern- ' 
ment in 1936 they held but 111 seats to the Socialists 
9 149. • Shortly thereafter they began to lose heavily in local 
elections and in the first National Assembly under the "Fourth 
I Republic they polled only a little over 10% of the popular vote~ 
The fact that it retained so much of its former power up until ,/ 
I 
the second ;.·rorld-Har is probably due to a general inertia preselti.t 
,; 
in the economy and, indeed, the whole country, that not only 
resisted industrialization, but change in political thinking. 
Its ~reat loss in support seen by its mare in the Constituent 
end National Assemblies was in part due to the collaborationist 
stigma msny of its leaders gained during the vvar and also by it~ 
I' 
support of the 1875 Constitution in the referendu:n of 1945, but)! 
over and above that it had ceased to represent the portion of 
opinion in France it formerly had. 
It is increasing its strength today, holding now 45 seats 
in the Assembly--in the union with the l:JDSR--by adopting more 
dynamic policies closer in tune with present conditions. It 
:i 
still is well represented in local units 'iNhere it formerly ~ i\ helai! 
the bulk of its strength. Present indications are that it 
!\ 
is 1: jl 
draining support from the :.rrn) and even the Socialists, whose 
followers are not ple8sed with their present position but are 
not inc lined toward the TI.PF or corn..."'lunism. Edouard Ferriot, its :j 
'I ; 
jjresident, is a liberal in the best sense, and probably one of \1 
the most respected elder statesmen in France today. 
The alliance which brought the ~adical-Cocialists and the 
lTDSR together in the elections to the first national Assembly 
9. Finer, Op. Cit., p. 340 
!I 
!I 
.I 
il 
1: 
II 
~arked o s~ift in the former group fran a definitely leftist 
co~;1plexion to the center. rrhe un::_n, a union of severel srnall 
resistance organizations--closely connected with the ~aullists 
during the early days of liberation--had alligned itself with 
tje socialists during the election to the first Constituent 
Assenbly, but 'JVhen the latter showed signs of effecting a pos-
sible coalition with the Corrmunists for the purpose of construct-
ing a government, they drifted over to the ~edical-Socialists 
and have been closely associated with them ever since. 10 • 
The T.ffiF is at fir~~t glance the most heterogenous party in 
post-war ~ranee, but on a closer look it shows characteristics 
vd:ich r:1ake it not so ::mcl1 a ~)arty es it is 2 besket v,iherein all 
the groups ·;Jho had no other ho,:ce in the elections £'ell. ';vhether 
tr,ese v::trious .3::'oups ·,vill occupy their new llor1e tor an extendec<.. 
length C'f tir::e rer1ains to be seen, but the alr.lo~;t inpossible out-
look the party is expected to adopt gives rise to the notion that 
it does not have long to live in its present strength. ~rom 
the Catholic trade unions on the one side, it receives its support 
all the way over to tl'.e L[i?ht v;here many forGer groups losing 
face in the ••·ar came to this resistance movement v·:here they vvero~ as-
sured of sor•w voice in the elect ions. rrLe rnover::tent from '1<bich i. t 
v.as born :rt-;s, in its leaders, closely associsted ','ith de G-eulle' 
during the VicH, and ::1any of these are still syn_pa the tic with 
so~e of the General's views. It has both a strong ri~ht and a 
10. The Alliance was called. the Rassemblement des Gauches ne-
publicaines, holding in C.ifferent districts ot!.!er small c~roups. 
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left viing that oppose eech other in the majority of the parties\\' 
II I, 
The fact that the party !I 
!I 
co:lrni ttrnents on economic meosures. 
formed an agreement 'vd th the Socialists shortly after the Com-
munists '>'Jere renoved from the government in 1947 has been one 
of the causes of its losing much of its right-wing to both the 
RPF and to the other center parties so that the party has been 
forced into a cautious approach to policy in the hope that it 
might win back some of this lost support, and at the same time 
il q 
retain its progressive catholic support--which may be the preseht 
extent of its strength. 
:f 
The party gained considerable precedence in government due;i 
I' 
!i 
'I 
I to its striking successes in the three national elections. 
Georges Bidault, a prominent resistance leader, and Paurice 
Schu:nann are tvvo of its chief spokesmen and both have been pro-\! 
II 
minent in the government since thf' first cabinet under the new jJ 
~epublic. Its loss in strength in recent local elections is I! 
evidenced by the fact that several of its 160 members in the il 
I: 
Assembly have alligned themselves vdth the de Gaulle inter-grou~e 
li 
or ·Nith soo.e of the other center parties. ii 
The Socialist Party grew out of the union, in 1905, of I 
several Socialist groups, into what soon became ~ centralized 
party forming essentially what the party is today. In its his-
tory there have been many occasions of disunity within its 
ranks--schisms and breakaways. r~st of these have resulted fro 
the party's collaboration vvi th bourgeois governMents, still the·, 
major source of discord between the party and its supporters. 
55. 
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This factor had caused it to remain out of government during 
better )art of its history u9 until the first popular Front 
1! 
t:Hie 
~ 1 
i! 
government under its leader, the late Leon Blum. It has consiE1f-
l[ 
tently ~aintained itself as a revolutionary worker's party, 
aiwinG et the establishment of a collectivist state by class-
conscious action. This has been opposed by its parliamentary 
I 
action wherein it has had to co~e to terms with dominant group~l 
!\ 
less radical than itself.to achieve even a semblance of its proi~ 
" 
p ,, 
gram. The party owes its allegiance to the Harxian insoirationii 
- i' 
but has shied away from actively associating itself with the 
trade union movern.ent until the inter-war period for fear of thelJ 
[, 
added stigma it would receive. " 
In 1920, the Unified Socialist Party ;·:as the only workers 
" party and contained all the revolutionary c;roups that revolved i! 
il 
I' 
around the Marxian Doctrine and the :,Yorkers' International, hovv-i! 
·i 
ever, in this year a majority of the party rejected reformism a*d 
I 
all dee lings 'Ni th the bourgeoisie and adopted as their own the i: 
:j 
The party spllt 
ij 
II 
i' 
•' 
communist methods and more disciplined ideology. 
with two thirds becoming the French Secti.on of the Com.rn.unists' 
ii II il International, (S?IC), vvhat is novv the Communist Party and the I! 
1!1' 1,1, other third calling itself the French Section of the ~orkers' 
!I H 
I! International, (SFIO). Fror:1 then until 1934 the two operated 11'\ 
!I I 
!I separately ·with bitter rivalry between them. The whole trade 11 
II 
II 
!I I, 
:I 
union movement was at the saf'le t i~ne divided into the General 
Confederation of Labor, ( CGT), the syndicalist body whose mem-
bers were largely Socialists, and the equivalent body, the 
56. 
Confederation General du Trnvail Unitaire, (CGTU). 1Vhen the 
hostility between the two ~reat working class parties in Germanv 
,, 
created a parlianentary deadlock which ultimately enabled Pitle~ 
i: 
to co~e into power and set up the quasi-labor, T~tional-Sociali~t 
Party, it showed to what lengths a divided labor might take th~· 
,, 
movement and brought the two labor parties in France into accord. 
Opposed to fascism more than they opposed each other, they made 
definite proposals for an effective coalition between them, no~l 
!! 
only to present e unified front to fascism fro~ ',Jithout but to 
u~ite in the face of a less intense fascist threat from within. 
The tvw trade unions were age in united under one head shortly 
after the Populsr Front prosram got underway and became the 
CGT, as it is today. 
The Socialists heve tvio wings vying for power vdthin the 
organization at present--one of which is not as strongly agains~ 
possible coalition -;,;;ith the comr1unists as the party '.iOUld 'iiant 
li 
people to believe. The prominent statesmen in the party includ~ 
the President of the ~epublic, Vincent Auriol, Daniel !~yer, 
and Felix Gouin; :·Tayer havinp; been the source of :nany cabinet 
rifts since the war over the price-wage controversy. 
The Socialists sho•N signs of losing som.e of their trade 
union support, the Force Ouvriere, a break-off from the CGT, 
has not been able to enhance its original strength and neither 
have the bulk of the other Socialist dominated unions. This is 
probably due in large part to their continued support of the 
, Third Force governments that have been steedily drifting toward 
r,'7 
\__I r • 
the Hight in their policies. In 1948 their co::1position \:cs 
shown 2 s be i nrs ~23 ~'. ''or king people, 1 g·~ fa rr'1ers, 16'1• w:-d te-collf:f 
k - t 1 - s~ b · 11 • ';.,or .. ers c'<'lCi govcrnnen en9 oyee.s end , uslnessr1en. Their 
support froGl the :;ovcc;rn:.1ent e:Jployees hus been their one r:lEJln 
line of consistent enthusiasts. At present ttey bold 9J sests 
It .so 
0 -F' L ti1e vopult:.r vote in eny nstio~::: l 
election--and ia ti:ce JE.l.nic i ,,al e lee; tions of l 947 it ~;e: ined OV". r 
':old i ng seats, in total, in t~1e Assembly, it e:;:erc ises 
t~e most stri~ing exa~ple to the rest of the parlienentarians of 
what strict party discipline can do for an organization. ~hey 
consistently vote ::: s a ho.rnogenous unit on every issue coming to .. 
the floor. The party's internal or~anizetional structure is th' 
principle source of its pmver, coupled '.dth probably ;Jhut is t}~ie 
~ost effectively operating prope~~nda ~cchine in the country. 
It has been able to draw to its rsnks ~any intellectuals and ot~er 
people of SO~!:e note and its three pro:n.inent leaders, Eaurice rrh~rez 
--recently stepping dawn froo the head of the party due to ill 
health, Jacques Duclos, the present head, and Andre ~~rty, are 
not s::wll ~en in the::lselves. The latter is fai ttful to the Rus~ian 
influence to the point of devotion, but Duclos may renotely he of 
another turn of ~ind. 
11. Padover, 
li I, 
" II 
:I 
li 
ll 
il 
- 11 
'I 
The party controls the CGT, vvi th nearly three million mem-i\ 
bers snd up until the i:mnediate present showed signs of stesdilt 
absorbing the Socialist's support from among the labor forces. 11 
,, 
n 
i! 
li ,, 
'I 
II 
il 
il 
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ii 
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Chapter Three 
Post-war Political History 
Before viewing the political history of the Fourth 
Hepublic it might be well to indicate the severity of the 
situation in ~ranee produced by its present instability. 
We might say that the Fourth Republic is, indeed, on trial, 
not only on trial for the substantiation or renunciation of 
its own forms and institutions, but on trial for the denoue-
ment of republicanism itself. ~he French Revolution brought 
to the surface the bitter rivalry between the Right and Left. 
After the advent of the Third Republic the serious clashes be-
tween these forces subsided into the more mild form of govern-
mental crisis as we know it in France today. Throughout the 
history of the Third Republic there occured only infrequently, 
and never for extended lengths of time, the combination of 
external conditions pressuring the country such as we find 
today--so that cabinet crises had not nearly so devastating 
effect upon the nation as they certainly have today. 
II 
ii 
'i 
!J 
I' II 
,j 
# 
Revolutions and counter-revolutions, formerly a localized~ 
il 
relatively simple affair, have enlarged the scope of operations ii 
:I 
and have gone beyond the boundaries of single nations, vvho coul1 
I 
formerly nullify the effects of instability in a neighbor by 
;: resorting to their ovm internal mechanism of counteraction. 
A distorted economic structure prevailing could be offset by 
60. 
II 
\I 
il 
:I 
ol. 
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,, further lack of international cooperation, in fact, up to the 
last war the world had built for itself an immense structure of 
international individualism. Somehow this structure is now 
inadequate in the face of our present problems and the nations 
are finding only fear in continued individual action. The 
instability of a neighbor has taken on new connotation, and 
bears directly in an adverse way on the future of your own 
nation. :dhat nust be recognized is that a nation as iGl.portan t 
:: in resource and position as France must lool.;: to her external 
duties--new-fcand though they m.ay be--and attempt to affect in 
her institutions and their developillent, som.e semblo.nce of ac-
knowledged cognizance of this duty. France's instability has 
increased both in the economic and political scene. ~e can 
overen1phas ize the lack o-:: stability in the econoLly--grea t 
' strides :1ave been made in improving the situation both internaJJy:: 
,, 
and by help from without. 
d 
But the fact remains that world con- \! 
il 
di tions have becoG1e increasingly worse and their de:nands 
the 
econonies of nations heavier so tho.t/position of any one 
upon t~~ 
:I 
economy: 
in terms of health is relative. What remains a fact is that 
the French econowy is still not yet able to stand alone and 
!I 
shows no signs of being so able in the near future. Yet the ii 
:; government coalition goes on bound by the deterr::tination to re- II 
1
1, tain political power and at the same time realize three or four Jl 
:, I 
:l • I 
:oppos1ng programs. Crises have become mere breathing spells 
and a device to assure one group of adherents or another that 
il 
1: 
li 
II 
r 
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!\ 
il 
cabinet crisis, in continual appearance, is not a workable tool i1 
!! 
of world domination, nor for the repulse of an attempt at world !I 
do:nination. 
At any rate, after having viewed the internal construction:: 
of the First National Assembly in terms of its representative 
political units, some inciication of the task of republicanism 
il 
can be brought out in the following recapitulation of the post- i) 
:t 
I' 
war political history. The three opposing forces vying for con~i 
li 
:i trol of the government mark the radical cleavage between stab- !: 
ility and instability, and, in a sense, this is the essence of 
the battle for post-war France. 
The two Constituent Assemblies, granted legislative pow-
. ers to be exercised in the interim eetween the drafting and 
li acceptance of a new constitution, produced the coalition of 
"tripartism, "--the Cornr:mni.sts, Socia lists, and the r'ffi.P. It 
i, experienced difficulties from the start because of a wide range 
of aims--though all three groups were professedly Left or Left 
Center at the time--and ended, at least in spirit, vvith the elec~i 
d i! 
tion of the first National Assembly in 1946. The Communists andj: 
.I 
;, MRP had carried their conflicting views to the point of open 
:rivalry in that election, so that any effective coalition in-
!i 
li volving the two was out of the question. In the dead-lock in 
il 
!! 
I· 
1: 
II 
ll 
li 
il ll 
the new Assembly both Bidault and Thorez were given a chance to II 
ji 
L :form a cabinet and failed. Leon Blum, the Socialist's elder 
statesman, came out of retirement and offered to set up a single 
i, party cabinet if the other two parties vwuld sup port it, since 
., 
crisis in which a severe inflation was aggravated by the fact 
II 
that the provisional governraents had taken none of the necessar~~ 
steps to avert it. Production was down to 35% of the prewar 
level and labor was increasing its de:'lands for needed wage in-
:: creases--which would heve to be met, at least in part. These 
': conditions helped bring home to all the leaders recognition of 
the irillnediate need of a v1orking cabinet. (.Another impetus to 
~1 cooperation vms added by the fact that the new gover.mnent was 
i! 
11 experiencing its first trial and the three parties were forced 
1\ 
:t to give it the support the Constitution could not in itself 
Ele:nand.) Blum's cabinet froze wages and set prices back 5~s, 
and along with other compensatory measures, realized practical 
results in staving off further inflation and bringing the econ-
i 
: omy to a workable position. The other two parties evidently 
" 
i! 
I' 
.I 
::had had enough of their token effort 
" I 
and, due mostly to the factli 
li I. 
that they were receiving none of the glory for the successes of '. 
I! 
the Socialists, they forced the cabinet to fall in January, 194~ 
•' 
ll 
If the Socialists success had been allowed to go much fur-i) 
ther it might have resulted in damaging the support for the 
.other two parties, and at the same time, there was a right-wing 
li 
':element in the MRP that was not sympathetic with the Socialists 11 
II 
• methods of economic control. The only solution appeared to be !1 
I! 
' ii 
" 
a return to the tripartisme concept by a settlement of some of 
the differences between the Communists and the MRP. Paul 
! ~ 
i 
,:Ramadier, another Socialist, succeeded in this, and formed a 
I 
:cabinet on January 21, receiving a vote of confidence from the 
!! Assembly by the large majority of 344 to 47 •1 • 
On the heels of the Socialist experiment in the ecomomy, 
the parties had a much sounder national footing for government, 
and they maintained a high degree of unity for the first three 
· months in 1947. However, there was considerable pressure ex-
,I 
,, 
i! 
i! 
H 
,I 
erted in the ranks of the IvffiP, by the latter's right-wing, ag~! 
II 
:the directive economic measures introduced by Ramadier's govern-! 
II 
d 
I ment along with those measures from the former government that 
had been retained. A hesitancy in the whole cabinet developed 
to the detriment of the economy andprices began to rise again. 
:'In April, strikes broke out in the nationalized Renault motor 
~ works and the Communists were forced to reverse their cooperative\\ 
policy and support the wage demands against the better interes~ 
lj 
of the government, which widened the rift between them and the !r 
,, 
: HRP. Ramadier was forced to call a vote of conf' idence on his 
,price and wage policy, May 4, which he won, 360 to 186--the 
: Comrnu~~,ists voting solidly against the government of which they 
were a part--whereupon Ramadier ousted the Communists from the 
·cabinet. 
The surface indications were that the Communists were 
working against the unity of the government and the Socialist's 
,i 
1. Victor c. L. Chang, The Constitution of the Fourth Republic[ 
the general outline of events here have beenCferived prThcip811Yij 
from: Foreign Policy Reports, Jan. 15, 1949; News From France, i 
#13, 1947, #13-14, 1948, #14, 1950, Ambassade de France 11 
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II 
:i 
:: 
!I 
National Council, two days later, voted to reverse a former 
decision not to stay in any government in which the Communists 
were not a part--thereby destroying tripartisme. Ramadier 
formed a new government, May 9, from the Socialists and the 
MRP, with the inclusion of five Radical-Socialists, and two 
Right independents. This was the harbinger of the later Third 
Force, and also of the slow trend of french governments swing-
ing consistently toward the Right. The two Right Independents 
were originally chosen for their particular proficiency in the 
respective posts to which they were assigned, yet the need to 
look away from the extreme left for support for a cabinet left 
only center groups and the Right to choose from. V/hen the Com-.' 
munists left the government, the enmity between them and the 
other two parties was enhanced and for all practical purposes 
they were forever rejected from the cabinets. The Communist 
ouster, at the same time, was merely the exclusion of one in-
2. 
stable factor and the introduction of another. 
Whereas before it had been the I~ffiP that was hesitant in 
its actions in the cabinet, the introduction of liberalism into 
the government changed the Socialists position now to one of 
hesitancy, even though one of their own leaders headed the gov-
ernment. The second Ramadier cabinet vvas confronted with a 
tremendous decline in the value of fixed incomes, aggravated by 
11 
II 
2. There seems to be some controversy over whether the Commun~ 
were thrown out of the cabinet or merely left. And further, as ·1 
!' to just what the real reasons were if it was an ouster. How-
'" ~~~1 ~~VJ~9;,~~~~~l~i~_tr:;,~~C~~~~~B~~tlt~g~ {b_~t~~~~~ • the dis-.~,c~=-c-•--==••=,~c•=-· 
:I ,, 
i\ 
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il 
the mounting inflation of currency and deposits in circulation.!\ 
production had nowhere near been brought back to a workable 
level, and the exce3s of imports over exports ',·,:as draining the 
nation of dollars. ~he attempts to alleviate the situation 
were not adequate to meet the needs of workers and others se-
verely hurt by the price developments. The Communists, direct-:\ 
:i 
ing their attention against the ERP alledgedly, found it easy :1 
:! 
to organize a series of strikes in October, 1947, which furtheil 
!I 
disrupted the nations economy. The conditions precipitated a 
II 
crisis. The Socialists were not as unsympatl1etic toward the ,, 
II 
strikes as the other members of the coalition might have liked .;j 
i! But at the same time the RPF had experienced a startling suc-
l! 
cess in the october, 194? municipal elections, and as far as tht 
government parties were concerned it was a victory for the 
Right, so that now, with the Communists on the one side and 
de Gaulle on the other, it was time for an internal re-allign-
ment of what was now the Center. De Gaulle's victory was 
bound to have repercussions in the .A.ssembly vvhich called forth 
the need for all parties to take stock of the new allignments 
of support. The Third Force was given its first official 
!I 
'I 
;) 
il II 
!! 
ii I 
Social~stB 
1: 
breath of life when Blum created an alliance between the 
and the VfRP in which they declared themselves opposed to i[ dicta-\i 
torship by either the Communists or the Gaullists, and that 
they were determined to maintein coalition government in the 
face of this threat. The Rarnadier cabinet was reorganized a 
second time, October 22, 194?, and since their alliance with 
!i 
!I 
I' 
II 
I' 
I 
II 
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the MRP had actually ple.ced the Socialists in a poor bargain-
ing position, the LIRP vJes able to have Robert .SchuwanU~P) 
given the i'Iinistry of Finance, replacing Indre P:1:i.lip (Soc.) , 
further stimulating the trend from dirigisme toward econooic 
liberalism .. 
The alliance betv:een the T•n-nP and the Socialists supposedly 
assured parlia3entary support for the ~overnment. The support 
was short-lived, however, as the younger, left-wing of the 
Socialists was forcing the parties hand on the question of 
economic liberalism in the face of t.he needs and demands of 
labor. This, coupled with the growing and more forceful op-
' position from the Co:un.unists for the same reasons, 'NBS too 
much for the government to handle and the cabinet fell, Novem-
ber 19, 1947, less than a month old. 
The RPF's election successes prompted the many Gaullist 
!\ 
;j 
·' II 
ii 
'I 
:I 
sympathisers in the Assembly to form an inter-group, comprisinglj 
some 70 deputies. ·,lith the Socialists and the !.ffiP openly op- :' 
posing both the Gaullists and the Comr.mnists, the latter two 
had a common goal between them--oposition to the government, 
and they both, together with a number of other MRP deputies, 
i: 
ii 
:i 
•I 
i\ 
I' II 
and the right-center groups were able to defeat Blum's attempt :\ 
I 
II 
II 
I\ 
!: 
! 
to form a cabinet, November 21, The Socialists had been in-
strumental in the fall of the former cabinet and some of the 
I\ffiP supporters were not ready to allow them to try again--also 
because Blum's program had been only 8ildly proposed and oon-
tained indefinite clauses concerning what the covernment's 
sction would be in aiding the economy. 
~.'lith the RPF in the position of realizing that the time 
:[ 
~ 1 
!\ 
•I 
li 
1! 
!! 
either was not ripe for them to step in, or because they merel~i 
saw that a government had to be effected from the center 
eventually, they were not unreasonably antagonistic toward the 
Third Force. Yet, as many of their members were from the 
liberal school or from other, more conservative elements, a 
Third Force government, if it was to receive their support, 
must be oriented more toward the Center. '"rhe Center parties, 
at the same time, could not control their forces adequately 
with members liable to bolt tl1eir r3.nks when a crisis arose, 
so that an appeasement toward liberalism had to be nade. 
"Robert Schuman proposed to form a cabinet, "Tovember 22, 
11 
I' 
i! p 
" 
and received a vote of 412 to 184--the Gaullists supporting theli 
:nove and the communists solidly against it. ~he Communists 
had reason to with-hold their support from the government, 
which now assumed a more sharply defined liberalism v-Ii th the 
! appointment of Rene Itiayer, a Radical-Socialist and a business-
man, to the Iviinistry of Finance. 
The Socialists were in a trying position. If they sup-
ported the government they stood to lose cl considerable amount 
I· 
il 
of their labor support to the Communists. Their stnnd ' .. as eve11 
more delicate since the 1947 strikes had left the workers in ~ 
II 
·worse condition than they ·~vere in before 9.nd the Communist !i 
GGT hcd been split in half, \Vith nearly one and a half million 1, 
1\ 
vvorkers dis-associating themselves from unionisr.J. nltogether. i! 
,I 
•I 
GA. 
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CGT jl At the seme time a minority faction had separated from the 
and set itself up as the Force ouvriere, its leader 
,I 
li 
Leon Jcumut~l 
il 
:: a Socialist sympathizer. This union was attempting to entice 
the dis-associated unionists into its own ranks and the 
Socialists owed them a debt towards showing these workers the 
good effects of union-government cooperation. But the 
lj 
Socialists had the equally pressing responsibility to the gov- 1; 
ernment which it had to uphold or suffer perhaps worse conse-
quences if they did not. It was the beginning of a damaging 
dualism forced upon the Socialists between their thinking in 
the economic sphere and their contrary governmental action. 
During the last few days of 194? and the first few months 
of 1948, the economy was still wallowing in the depths of the 
mid-194? crisis. The Marshall Plan was still in its infancy 
and the immediate situation was acute. The Schuman government 
had introduced, end was pursuing the following financial 
measures: An anti-inflation levy and increased taxation to 
reduce excess spending power; regulated price increases so as 
to eliminate the necessity of subsidies and controls and to 
reduce further the inflationary gap between resources and de-
mand; lowered government spending; devaluation of the franc, 
together with the creation of a restricted free market in 
' 
!l 
II 
il 
All in I, 
ji 
gold. (That last one is a little hard to visualize) 
all, these measures were part of a long-term plan to meet the .1 
:! 
needs of the nation, and had none of the irw11ediately necessaryJj 
short range measures that would afford relief to the worker. 
-cit-~===--~==-= 
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The Socialists were following a policy of extreme caution vvhichJI 
'.I 
weakened the government disastrously. li The London Agreement of i! 
June 7, 1948, the Anglo-American plan to strengthen l.Vestern 
Germany and increase its productivity, was a strong bone of 
contention between the Socialists and lffiP, but measures the 
government thereafter took, the proposed budgetary economies, 
'• 
!i 
I[ 
such as reorganization of the nationalized industries to elimi-1! 
'I 
, nate deficits, and the reduction of the number of civil servan~~ 
ii 
were more vigorously opposed by the Socialists. I one of their ! 
'i main bodies of voter support lay in the civil service, and any 
ii 
li 
cut-back here meant disaster to them. At the same time the lJRP 
was asking state assistance for parochial schools--the MRP re-
ceived considerable support from catholic elements--but the 
On the Socialists held that proposed expenditure untenable. 
!j 
heels of this the prospective cantonal elections, to take place;[ 
in October, 1948, created the danger that as a consequence of II 
·i 
supporting liberal economic programs, many workers would switch 1 
from the Socialists to the cor1m.unists, while the ITRP was afraid 
that if it did not assume a more dynamic liberal program, it 
would lose voters to the RPF, already too strong for comfort. 
The conditions surrounding the Third Force, together with 
the frustrating positions of both the !.TRP and the socialists, 
li 
:I 
laid all the groundwork for the eventual throwing of government!! 
I; 
out the window and allowing petty considerations of self-intere~t 
!i ,, 
to dominate their thinking. It became a matter of trading ! 
little victories here and there, which soon took the place of 
_-;=_oc;·;c.-~--;.:o.=-==-"'=-·=c·o= =o.c.c-=:~=,~•=~=-=--=-,==--•-=--"="~~==~=--=o=-==.ooc~·-~·-------4----c-_:;-_,_, ·.:o.::.--= 
I' I[ 
II 
good government, to ease the mounting frustrations. Short-
range plans were needed desperately in the economy--where the 
long-range plans were needed was in the Third Force itself--
!1 i; toward effecting a workable solution of the social-political- 11 
rl 
ideological conflict and the introduction of sound, cooperative:! 
il 
government. 
The final breakdown came when the Schuman government pro-
posed to increase the military expenditures following the com-
mittments of the London Agreement. The Socialists sought a 
reduction of the appropriation, and had put an amendment to 
that effect into the bill when it came up for a vote in July 
1948. Schuman asked the Assembly to defeat the amendment. h i T e!l 
,, 
' socialist's :Executive committee in the meantime had instructed ', 
II 
its ministers to withdraw from the cabinet should the Socialist~s 
,, 
proposal be defeated. It was, they did, and the cabinet fell. 
The proposal for increased expenditures had come at a bad time 
for all concerned, since it had to take the place of other 
desperately needed internal expenditures in the budget--the 
national economy could not support, at the time, any over-all 
increase in expenditure. 
i! 
:: 
ji 
[i d 
II 
I; 
!i 
!I p 
il 
Each new crisis that arose was always apt to create a l1 
The mounting ten- II situation for which there were no answers. 
I' 
sion, the lack of common faith, made the majority of the leader~ 
i! 
pessimistic over the continued future of the Third Force, yet 
the alternatives waiting without called forth compromise after 
compromise, which all went to naught as the tension was tern-
1: 
II 
-I II ji 
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porarily relieved. The government to succeed Schuman, that of i1 
li Andre Marie (Rad. Soc.), who put Paul Renaud, a liberal econ- ll 
omist and an Independent :Republican (small Right-Center group) li 
in as Minister of Finance, took a more practical view of the 
scene. It had 3otten in on a vote of 352 to 190--only the 
Cornmunists OlJpOsing them--and asked i~:lmediately for the tem-
porary grant of emergency powers to implement Renaud's long-
range, "controlled-inflation" program. ~his was granted in 
principle by the Assembly in a draft bill which received a 386 
il I' 
il 
li 
I. 
ii 
'I 
\I 
' 
ii 
to 201 vote. A final bill vvas also passed--which left the nro- :
1
1 
- I I 
gram still to be fort'lulated by the cabinet--335 to 209, on I 1. 
!] 
August 17, 1948. The Communists were opposed in each instance Jl 
il 
II and the Socialists, though they supported it, were dubious 
,_ 
about the provisions of the program more than they ·were con-
3. 
cerned about the grant of powers. li They wanted the inclusion !I 
!i 
of immediate v<~age increases, a proposal which the MRP supported,jj 
il 
since both the FO and the CFTC (Catholic trade union of some \j 
consequence supporting the MRP) were currently on strike for li 
il 
higher wages. But this proposal would have wrecked Renaud's II !i 
'' 
11.-1 
_ over-all program by immediately aggravating inflation to a _ 
~~ 'I 'i point beyond where he would be able to control it--he wanted 1 
I ~ 
" 3. Though this must have been done in desperation by the Social~ 
ists, since they tied their own hands in agreeing. When the ! 
realities of the Third Force were considered, the grant was the;: 
only means of utilizing a unified program to cope with the econ-ti 
omy. At the same time, together with the ~mP, their support wa~ 
conditioned to the cabinets promise to pass a stay of election 11 
bill for the approaching cantonal elections--at least one gain. !! 
,, 
I 
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1 
to inflate the economy up to a certain point, essentially the 
same program l~yer, under the Sctuman government, had tried 
d 
li to effect. I-Te proposed a conprom.ise issue that would grant 
!I 
\! !i fa;:nily allowances and vvage increases to meet extreme hardship 
categories, but the Socialists would settle for nothing less 
than having wages brought to a level adjusted to the cost of 
!I 
II 
·I 
il II I 
living. The resultant split forced Marie to resign, August 28. j! 
il 
li 
tl 
: Cabinets were coming faster now. 
The coalition in the center '.las taking on ludicrous as-
pects, and all parties ~ere disgusted with the constant lack 
!1 !, 
li II 
iJ 
!j 
,, 
of ugreement or action. 'rhe Soc:i.alists were faced by an actuallj 
split in their own ranks. The right-wing, the elder members 11J 
!· 
by Blum, wanted the party to go on supporting the Third Force :; li 
govern:nents--regardless of the consequences. The left-wing, 
t1J.e younger members, de:nanded that the party insist on its 
major objectives and refuse to support a government which did 
not carry them out--even though it might entail working vvi th 
the Communists. In the end the left \von and the Socialists 
withdrew from. the Harie c2binet--the principle reason for its 
failure. Either way the Socialists were faced with the posi-
bility of wrecking the further chances of Third Force govern-
ment, and even the chances of democracy itself. If it sup-
ported the Renaud program as it was they might have lost some 
li 
!: 
r! II 
It 
'!i 
II 
!i 
1! q 
of their members to the CorJlD.unists, thereby losing to th 'Tlh. d j\ e J. 1r ii 
I, 
Force its majority, and on the other hand, by leaving the ii 
cabinet, tLey precipitated a crisis v1hich night in itself end 
the Third Force government. 
The other parties had the chance to blane the failure on 
the Socialists for their action, and when Ramadier--1vho had 
been the leading figure opposing the Renaud program--attempted 
to form a government, they defeated him. Robert Schuman then 
came up again ~ith an intermediate program between dirigisme 
and liberalism. He obtained only a narrow vote of confidence, 
332 to 185, the required vote being 311. 
Schu:nan intended to iuplement the Renaud program and in-
.sur,.lounto.ble c~if:~iculties were lilet VJhen tl-::e cabinet came to be 
Tl~e 00Cic;;lists '.;ere still denandin,.:c~ t]:J.e inclusion of 
j_nc:reases. 
some of their sur>port had shiftec1 to the R."PF they were left 
·,xith :'lOre :r:~u.~·<:;nce en their catholic trsde unions. This not 
of the c.::oc iali~ ts, since to be alligneci viii th the center and 
ri:~llt t;roups '.vi thout the Socialists v.·o'J.ld surely brand them 
riglltist. At the same time the UDSR, and to some extent the 
Bacl.icbl-3ocialists, vvould not p1r1rticipate in a government un-
less the cantonal elections would again be scheduled for their 
former G.ate, since they believed t~1at many voters 1:1ere tired 
of the tenlporizi~lg that vJss going novvhere in the "Phird Force 
and would turn their way. The Right parties, for the same 
reason, wanted the elections held immediately. 
These stalemates looked bad enough and Schuman tried to 
n .. 
self~ did not want to see the Third ~orce collapse just yet, 
and effected a compromise between the parties on the basis of 
s special cost of living bonus. Schuman then tried il once :nore li 
and formed a cabinet, but placing Christian Pineau, a Socialist~! 
,I 
in as Hinister of Finance. Since the cabinet still . t " d + I ln eno_e uO ii 
inplement the Reneud program, the Right vwuld not countenance 
anot~er minister being given the seat of control granted by 
ii 
lj 
II 
the emergency bill to Renaud, and together with some members // 
il 
of the center and the Co:r .. munists, who merely were opposed, they li 
,I 
lj 
succeeded in defeating a :notion to defer interpellations on the II 
composition of the cabinet by 6 votes. They were mainly sue-
cessful due to a ·split in the Radical-Socialist ranks--14 
voted against the motion and 19 for it--a defection wnich 
proved decisive. 
Things were Co!;dng to a head. It was not only a moment 
d 
II ,, 
li 
'I 
II 
!\ 
il 
H 
:! 
:; 
:! 
of crisis for the Third ?orce, but also for the country. The 11 
I! 
economy was in serious jeopardy, and 
, nstional comraittments heel to be met. 
ii both internal and externaH 
:1 
'I 
Despite the previous acti~n 
!, 
of the Radical-Socialists in defeating the government, their 
parliamentary leader, Henri Queuille was called in to form a 
coalition to nsave the franc:' The other parties of the Third 
Force were still not to the point where utter defeat was the 
" only thing left to them, but there was the realization that a 
period of relative harmony was the only thing that would give 
I' II 
•I 
ii 
them and the country continued life. They vvere 
': 
still rankling " 
under their former defeats and losses, and supported the I' 
1/ 
t l lj ilererr " r:ueuille cabinet with only a slight majority; 351 to 196, 
after, hmvever, the procecs of settling down again q_:::..ve the 
assurance of a longer life than its brothers had 
enjoyed • 
. ~ueuille kept the T'·~inistry of :lT'inance for hit1self, avoid-
ing that touchy q_uestion, and. introduced a number of merely 
nstalling 11 measures to control the economy, not designed to 
better conditions but rather to bring the structure into a 
!! 
II 
II 
il 
1: 
il 
ii 
'aorkahle position where further measures might later on be d il 
il 
" brought to bear to strengthen it. Fe balanced the budget and ![ 
II 
introduced a new tax hill--far advanced over former tax bills, ~~ 
and -che z,overnment '.·Jas able to successfully halt the inflation !I 
ij 
by taxing some or the excess funds out of the system. il il i! 
The Third :5'orce groups ,,:ere primarily deterl"lined to eo c:,19pg 
:: 
-.vi th ~ueuille, ns long as he did not attempt to bring pressure il 
\1 
:r 
to bear on the cabinet toward adopting one of the more contra- 11 
versial economic programs over another, but two distracting 
events occured early in the governments life thet did nearly 
precipitate a crisis. The first occured '.;hen the Comnmnists 
started a number of revolving work-stoppat~es in October, and 
a lengthy coal strike that cost the nation 5.5 million tons 
of coal which had to be obtained to the detriment of other 
needed expenditures by the govern~ent. The strikes were re-
portedly instigated in !~scow against the I~rshall Plan, and 
II 
II 
il [: 
II 
II 
lj 
I' 
I 
I 
n~ 
10. 
:I 
!I 
il 
11 l' •. d 
i 
., 
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ostensibly to ensure the ri~ht to work for those rniners ~ho 
chose to d.o ;::;o. fJ1he u,ove~nment's cction in the .strike ·:ms ~t :1 
'!I 
first clenCJunced by both the I.'fli.P an~ the ,socialists, since both I 
the FO and the CF'11C were striking, but the crisis was averted 
~hen the growing popular feeling against the stri~caused the 
latter two unions to ~ithdraw from participation in it. The 
·il 1' other event occured late in the same year when the Gaullists 
il_ 
achieved their victory in the elections to the council of the 
!I 
II 
ll 
II 
:I 
Republic. De Gaulle raised the cry that the Third ~orce no 
longer represented the will of the people. This threat vvas 
II greater bec&use the Assembly \'.IO.S on vacation and the govern:n.ent If 
II 
parties were not able to take immediate stock of thepossible re~ 
I! 
allignment in the national body on the heels of the RPF victory.!! 
I! 
':'/hen the Assembly finally re-convened, the government received ij li 
a vote of confidence of 316 to lG4--a narrow r!largin, but a 
victory since the large auount of abstentions indicated as yet 
!i ,, 
,, 
•! 
8. ::1esitancy on the pa1·t of nany deputies over the 'RPF victory. i. 
i• 
1l The Q,ueuille govcrnr:1ent was eble to go ahead on the same 
il li lines it had before, with the only stertling event being the 
11 introduction of a bill further increasing taxes--an almost un-
11 
,I q 
li 
I 
i; 
believable phenomena in France--but with no positive action 
taken to·ward improving the over-all structure of the nation's 
li economy. Their negative approach lasted for nearly a year, 
but the poor base on which it was founded was slowly creeping 
up on them in the form of a uounting reaction from the people 
~ost hurt by queuille's measures, and the ones nost likely to 
II 
II 
l\ ,, 
li 78. 
(1 
-- t 
11 benefit by releasing the inflationary pressures. II 
rhis \vas enhanced in the wage-price s i tuo. tion gettir:.~ out 
•I :f.' uontr•J~ :c:;.nully, late in 1949. The .:~ressures of inflation ,, 
:l 
t , h t , , . ' . t . d . li ·;Jere aggrava eCl somew a oy cone l sJ_ons ou s l e tne ,c~overnment' s 'II 
~ ' 
.! 
I! ia;neci ia te control--o. ~3evere clrou:;l: t ~hat su;nmer, end the Eng- 'II 
l li lish devaluation of the pound. Tte latter factor forced the I\ 
governr::tent to consider tte devcluation of the frc:nc \:hich vJould. il 
•I 
bring further inflation, and the cabinet was faced witt the \i 
ji sa~e issues that had brought previous cabinets down. In the 1! 
ll 
face of devaluation, Danial Mayer (Soc.), had asked cost of il 
II 
living bonuses for the workers, but Maurice Petsche (Rad. Soc. ),II 
the :Minister of Finance, maintained these would only result in 
aggravating the inflation. A comprooise was effected whereby 
everything was to wait until the results bf the devaluation 
became knovm, coupled ·.vith the introduction of the necessary 
II 
~I 
I! ): 
il 
I' institutions which would assure the workers prompt action Vl'hen il 
4. 
the time came. 
i! 
The unions, however, were not waiting for the :i 
II 
1 results to cor.1e, but ·;,;ere pressing ttteir wage der.J.ands ahead of 
time, forcing the labor parties to tighten their positions in 
ji 
" 
\i 
resard to the compromise. The cabinet agreed finally on a cost !I 
of living bonus for the lowest paid workers, but when .~ueuille I: II 
'I I. 
1·1 SOUP-.ht to 
·I -
arbitrate the an.ounts to be included in the bill, 
I! I:Tayer refused to support hi:n and ~::,ueuille 
4. Newsweek, Oct. 10, 1949. 
ll ,.-
'. 0. oct. 17, 1949. 
. d 5. re~:agne • 
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II 
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It seemed like a petty difference on which to bring the 
government down, but at this point the time limit set in the 
Constitution over the dissolution of the Assembly had been 
passed, and any crisis now might entail a new election. The 
parties ·,vere forced to watch more carefully their support on 
l· 
'• 
:: 
ii 
'I I! 
il 
II 
'l 
measures unpopular with the electorate, and adhere core fer-
vently to the tenents of the party's basic principles. At the ii 
H 
11 
sa:ne tL:J.e, the lack of cooperation in the government might me5.n :: 
thut large numbers of voters would flock either to the RPF or 
CoL!.ll:mnists, giving these two the che.nce they had been wai t-Il 
ll 
for. This latter consideration held the Third Force oartiei 
the 
ing 
~ " 
i 
together .in an attempt to reach a compromise. Jules Moch (Soc.), 
i' 
promised immediate wage bonuses to low-paid workers and receive* 
II 
but one more vote than was necessary to form a government. il 
:vhen he atteillpted to construct a cabinet the same bickerings 
6. broke out and he gave up in disgust. The National Asse('lbly 
g3ve first Rene ll.[ayer (Rad. Soc.) and then Georges Bidault 
( 7. ,. L'IRP) a chance. The latter was able to rnake a successful 
cabinet --&lmost identical with the former ~ueuille cabinet, 
'· .': i. th the exception thet I.Iayer stepped c1.own from the !Tinistry 
il 
of Lsbor in favor of Petsche, which soothed the Rightists, but ;\ 
;1!!' le.P1.·t +he 8 • ij' 
v Socialists holding the hag with their voters. 1 
' i] 
I, 
6. ~ewsweek, Oct. 24, 1949. 
7. Newsweek, Oct. 31, 1949. 
B. Newsweek, Nov. 7, 1949. 
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:i 
il 
I' li 
The facility v1i th which Bidaul t was able to gain support 
for his government came chiefly from the fact that both the 
ii ll MRP and the Socialists were more afraid of the possibility of 
,, 
I 
ii 
:i 
'I 
lr 
:I I !I 
', ,, 
H 
r :I p 
II il 
\\ 
il 
II 
I' 
either of the t'WO extreme parties winning a new election than 
'..'Jere the Radical-Socialists or the TIDSR., who still had good 
reason to believe they would stand as good a chance in the 
election e.s the De Gaul lists or the com.Emnists. This placed 
them in a better bargaining position in the controversy over 
wa~es and prices confronting the govern~ent, forcing the 
Socialists finally, to acquiesce to less radical demands. 
II 
" I' 
rl 
;I 
I 
',1 ,, 
il 
li 
,j 
II 
:: 
!I 
II 
!I 
'I ll 
Bidaul t got a vote of 367 to 183, with only the Corun.unists op- jl 
,I 
I' posing him, and the moderates lending considerably more supper~/ 
than their convictions would indicate. I' il 
'I li The wage price problem did not improve, however, as the 1
1 i: ' 
'i ii 
'' new year we.s reached, and the socialists, on orders from their \i 
National Executive committee, stepped out of the cabinet in 
February 1950. Increasing production was helping the peasant 
and the middle-classes, while the worker was being left out in 
lj 
ir 
!i 
!I 
•: 
:l I! 
[! the cold, and they were clamoring for relief from their so-li 
1\ 
" ii 
" II 
:I 
II !i 
called parliamentary representatives. Bidault reformed his 
cabinet on February 8, this time consisting principally of 
Center and Right groups, and received a vote of confidence of 
il J, 
:j 
), 
!.\ 
!l 
1! 225 to 185--mibre than 200 deputies abstaining, including the !I 
Socialists and the left-wing of the MRP, Bidaul t' s own party. 9 •!J 
!I 
9. Newsweek, Feb. 20, 1950. 
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The Socialists position of abstention rather than opposi- !I 
il tion was the last step they could take and still allow middle- il 
1: 
., 
lj 
I' II 
of-the-road government to continue and thereby keep the two 
extreme parties from power. This position was getting them 
nowhere, of course, and it seemed as if they were merely paus- il 
!J 
li 
!I I! ing to look the situation over. Governments were proceeding 
;I 
toward the Right with each new crisis, there were strong indi- !1 
cations that they were losing heavily in their voter strength, ij 
an election was impossible for theqJ., and yet they could enforce!j 
li 
!I 
:I 
no measures in the government that would win some of their 
l'i 
!j voters back. They remained abstaining until May, vvhen they 
! 
came forward VJith a program embodying the minimum of their ee-
mands which the government would have to meet or they would 
actively oppose i t--vvhich would bring it dmvn im.med ia tely. rrhel 
·- d 
II 
continuance of the Third Force was thus placed on the shouldersi' 
of the other governmental parties, since, if the cabinet re-
fused the Socialists demands, the resulting crisis might bring 
dissolution of the Assembly and place the government parties 
who might otherwise stand to gain from such an election, in a 
;! 
il 
more precarious position with their voters. II The MRP was split !I 
II 
II 
I' 
I! 
in half over the socialists requests, and the other parties, 
farther to the Right, were stiffening their positions in case 
there would be an election. Bidault could not at that time 
fully accept the Socialists' demands and he put the question 
squarely up to the Assembly in all its details so that all 
parties would have to take a stand before the public on the 
il 
" !l 
r 
·I I. 
li 
I' 
!/ 
(I R2. 
ii 
- ·~- --== 
\l 
!! issue and share the responsibility for the government's failur~l 
,I 
In the vote half his own party, the Socialists, and some .m.em- 'i l! 
II 
ll bers of the other government parties were arrayed against him, 
wfuich, together with the Communists and the RPF bloc, defeated 
the government and Bidault resigned June 24. 
The crisis did not resolve itself right away. After five 
attempts failed, Henri ~ueuille came back to try again. There lj 
II 
II was some enthusiasm born of his former success and it was 
largely hoped that he would succeed. 
I· 
He received a vote of 363!1 
!I !I I to 208 on his policy, but the cabinet he formed came with 
I' 
,I Socialist disaproval and it was only two days after it had as- ii 
!I sumed control that the latter alligned themselves with the 
10. 
Gaullists and the Communists to bring it down. 
The cabinet had been oriented to the Right and since the 
Socialists were still adamant on their minimum program they 
were charged with constructing a more modified version which 
II 
·I 
II II 
11 
II 
they would present to the various coalition groups in order to 1\ 
\i effect a compromise--the press and some international interests II 
)\ had gone so far as to ·accuse them of working for a foreign \\ 
II power, since they had brought the last four cabinets down. 1\ 
II 
II 
il 
The international situation was becoming more and more 
acute, the western nations were gearing their economies to a i 1! 
.J 
wartime basis, the M·arshall Plan had dropped all pretentious of Jl 
II 
being devoted merely to peaceful reconstruction and tanks were 11 
,. 
II 
\1 
:: 
10. Christian Century, July 19, 1950, p. 859. 
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• • • II arr1v1ng 1n France, the country was faced with the now demand- , 
ing necessity of either working collectively with the rest of jl 
.I j! 
Europe end sharing in the developments to their own enhancem.en tit 
:I 
I' or we1tching Germany being rebuilt and the other nations going :1 
j: 
n on without them and without tbe needed unity. In the govern- 11 
II 
e1ent, the Third Force WbS faced with the equally demanding il 
necessity of either governing or getting out. The previous 
Socialist manifesto had contained a number of specific and 
hard to meet demands--such as the demand for immediate wage 
increases for the civil service, which was the major point of 
contention destroying the last cabinet. The minimum program 
they conceived this time was r.1ore sane, end much easier to 
II 
,j 
II lj 
!i 
1! 
II il 
il 
i! 
meet by the other parties. It called for an easing of credit, il 
ll 
the establishment of a minimum wage, and the introduction of il 
'I II 
an electoral reform. The Radical-Socialists agreed to discuss il 
/! 
:I the plan, bu~ not the possibility of a socialist premier, and 
the rest of the groups more or less went along on this stand. 
After further compromise and finally acceptance by the 
II 
~I I~ 
II 
II 
I! 
coalition groups, Rene Plevan, (UDSR}, formed a government and 11 
11.11 
received a vote of 335 to 226, a poor majority but workable. I' 
! 
proposal for higher pen- I 
I, 
sions for veterans, and their request for an electoral reform, ~ 
thus assuring the government of the Socialist's support. At 1: 
He promised to consider a socialist 
\ 
Robert Schuman (MRP) in the [ the same time he was able to keep 
I !i 
II 
:i 11. Newsweek, July 24, 1.9AO. 
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II 
!i 
!i 
1 li 
:I 
II 
II 
seat of Foreign Minister, thus enabling proceedings 
12. 
to go ahead on the Schuman Plan. 
at leest 
Tr~e electoral reform, vmnted by the Radical-Socialists 
the Socialists, is a touchy question. The MRP, not having the 
' background nor presen.t degree of entrench:nent in the countless 
districts where the Socialists and Radical-Socialists hold 
sway by reason of traditionalistic inertia and long standing 
control, is loath to accept the return of the single member 
H 
'i district system in place of the current proportional represents~ 
•I 
i[ 
tion system--which they have good reason to believe is the one !1 ~ i! 
prominent source of their present standing in the Assecnbly. 
De ~aulle and the Co~nu~ists both are a;ainst the systems re-
turn, obviously, since it is designed to ldll their chances in li 
13 • ·r· t the next election, \vhich it vvill surely do. .ltll a large 
seg::nent of t::e IIIRP never totally loath to coalesce vdth the 
pl.J"'"" 
-"'· .r: anyway, there is a strong contention over the efficacy of 
the proposed bill, and not a little reason to believe that it 
ii 
i! 
II 
12. Loc. Cit. L 
:j 
II 13. Proportional H.epresentc.tion is the one prominent technical 'i 
source of l:ffi.P power. The party's nevmess added to its fieter- 11 
ogenei ty would place it in a weak position relative to the two i1 
other strong governoent parties, the Socialists and the Radica~~ 
Socialists, under the stress of !ilaking a choice between candi- 1'1 
dates and parties in the run-off elections for contested seats.;! 
( CF. Footnote §14, next page.) 11 
As to DeGaulle and the Communists their strength like tha I 
of the MRP would be reduced to departments and districts where ' 
they held a substantial majority--the Paris Red-Belt for the 
Communists, for example. All other votes they redeive strengt~ 
and seats from now under proportional representation would con~i 
ceivably be divided between the older established parties in il 
most instances. The RPF seems the one party best able to L'leet :I· 
this threat from among the three. ( cf. p. l2l ff.) i, 
'i II 
'I 
i! 
I' 
il il 
i ~ 
1) 
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is 8 bold atte;npt by the two r:wjor supporters of it to establis~ 
I' 
a ;nejori ty bet'.Jeen ther.1 in the next election ',vhereby the T'T.(P il 
vwuld no longer be needed in the -30vernment. That the 'l;ladicalJ 
-· ~ j! 
Socialists and the Socialists are somewhat removed froo each li li 
other ideolo:~ica lly does not discount the fact tl1a t both are II 
I 
old and ·well established parties and with the system of benefit!/ 
ii I, 
to both of them they can conceivably be vdlling to trust their !i 
L 
own respective lots in regard to their relative strength agains~ 
each other to the outcome of the election. 
il 
:i q I: 
ii 
Some of the other parties in the government, the moderates~~ 
and so@e independents, are at the sane ti~e anxious to put the ~e~ 
sure across because their fear of both De Gaulle and the Com- II 
;nunists is greater than their justifiable fear of losses througt1 
operation of the system. They ;nay be will to trust their ovm I! 
I, 
i' 
• • 11 14. position to what polltical deals they can make in the elect1on8.ii 
,I 
The result was that Pleven in February brought up the govern- ; 
f; 
ments proposal to return to the single member, two ballot syste~. 
15. i1 
It was hotly contested and Pleven was forced to resign. Afte~ 
severa 1 attempts by various leaders, Henri Q.ueuille was able toi! 
I 
14. Decades of actual experience have demonstrated serious de- il 
merits in the system of elections the French are asked to retur* 
to. Principally the fault is found in the second ballot--the 11 
,, run-off ballots--by 'Nhich the majority of candidates in France 
1
; 
vvere elected under the system as it stood in the Third Republic~ 
The respective positions of parties is falsified by deals and 
transactions where many party ideals and programs are wantonly 1
1
1 
sacrificed--unknovm to the voter. The voters thensel ves have 1, 
been openly dishonorable in utilizing the second ballot--votingll 
for one candidate solely to produce a second election--and othet 
times no~ voting conslst~n~ly in the. two_ elec~ions for r~asons lr 
of consc1ence versus pol1t1cal expecllency. :n'lner, 2.£• Glt. ,p. ~ 3. 
15. :soston lferald, ~_Fe'!:?. 22L 1951;_ March 2, 1951. I, 
!) II \, 
86. 
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form a "government of liquidation," preparing the country 
16. 
a general election--probably in .rune. What will come of 
i\ 
for 11 
the li 
electoral reform idea remains to be seen. The election pending/! 
will tighten the strings on every party in the Assembly so it II 
il 
appears that nothing of any kind will be done--either on that i; jl'Z issue or on anything else until after the new Assembly convene:j • 
!i 
li 
II 
I' 
i\ 
1: 
i\ 
\I 
I[ 
i! 
II 
II 
i: 
!i 
1'1 
,I 
16. Boston Globe, March 11, 1951. \\ 
17. It speaks ill of the depths to which French democracy has il 
fallen when it has to devise, through its merely temporary powe,, 
a noose to kill the other elements temporarily out of power. 
Here, we would make such a bill take effect sometL~1e after the !J 
time it would work to the betterment of detriment of existing 1, 
groups and interests--in France, their democracy has been reduc~d 
to a day to day existence, with a pettyness sometimes unprecede1ted 
in contemporary democracies. 'Nhen the various institutions of 
1
1 
democracy have to be shit'ted around periodically to afford the ;i 
power group the best possible.advantage at any one time it spea~s 
well of the ideology behind that democracy when democracy itsel~ 
ie used to co"lbat the forces opposing it--regressions into un- I! 
==-=·" ="·· -.... ;,.9:.~-J~~-c.ratic me'thods __ fQL.iiQVJer purposes are untenable. . . t===~= 
I 
i 
.I 
il 
li 
I' ;I 87. ;/ 
Before concluding the wo=r""""k=a===f=i=n=a=l=J.=.n=d=i=c=a=t=i=o=n=o=f=t=h=e==··=·· 11-~ 
il 
!I 
strength and support of the various political forces can be 
I! 
:; 
H 
gained by an analysis of the post-war elections--particularly 
the various local elections--in more detail. i! r: 
·I 
Some sign of what deu10cratic spirit there was in France \) 
d 
after the -v;ar is seen in the relatively high degree of partici-11 
pation in the three national elections--high considering the I 
fact that at least half the electorate had never been to the I 
i! 
polls before. At the same time the number of valid votes cast r 
I 
I in the Assembly elections was higher than those cast for the 1 
:i d . h h . . II 
i\ referen um J.n eac case. T ere are certaJ.n obvJ.ous reasons fO~i 
ll !! 
lj this. The fact :that many voters could not, or did not attempt li 
il '1 
!I to comprehend the document to the extent needed to come to a 
![ definite opinion on it, and though it was to be their basic ,, 
il !i 
ii law, there was not the stimulus present in the consideration of!i 
ii II 
'I a document of that sort over the like stimulus provided by a !r I: II 
il ii 
l
'i. required choice from among two or more campaigning candidates. !J 
11 Other reasons, not so readily discernible, must also be sought,!/ ii p 
I! however, to fully explain this discrepency. French history il 
II II, 
11 shows us a people with a constant regard given to fundamental ,
1 
li ll 
11 ·1 
ll doctrine over and above that accorded to any one individual as I, d i' 
I\ such--apart from doctrine. They have been prone to distrust !I 
il individuals when it came to the handling of governl!l.Bntal matter~ 
lj i! 
1: and it cannot, therefore, be put forth as a reason that the 
I! 
ii 
I 
people selected the individuals they wished to formulate their 
basic law and then forgot the issue. 
i! 
'I 
" ill\, 
!i 
II /~.~ 
l1 I 
eo. 
:i I. 
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The people were asked to make five major decisions within ![ 
'I 
the space of little over a year, which is probably an importantll 
jj factor. And at the same time the whole process whereby the 
1
\ 
!j 
li 
i! 
I' 
II 
1: 
II 
f! 
two draft constitutions were drawn up, with the constant lack 
of accord, had in it all the flavor of the prewar conditions w~ich 
had spelled the downfall of the Third Republic. But it does 
I' 
I' 
'i 
not explain why the people went back to the polls after rejec-1[ 
tion of the first draft constitution in greater numbers to ele~t 
if another assembly to go through the whole conflicting process 
li 
again. That it shows there was some hope in the french people~ 
:l !: 
each time is apparent but when some of the other factors above :1 
I 
are considered the participation might well have been the othe~ 
11 
way around. l! 
,, 
·I What is definitely a cause of the lower participation in : 
:i !I the referendums is the fact that in the first draft referendumii 
,, 
the parties were split nearly down the middle as to whether 
they ·.mnted their supporters to adopt the draft or not. In 
election for the second draft there was that same element of 
thell 
II 
\il 
:I 
:: 
•I indecision. The heights to which a political campaign can takel 
If 
a people just could not be reached in the referendum in France·\\ 
They were taken to the heights three times in the assembly ele~~ 
li 
tions but for the referendums the parties themselves lacked st~bng 
I' 
:1 
enough conviction concerning their own work to effect an enthusl~-
1 
astic drive either for or against it. This happened in the fi~ft 
il 
il 
I' ,I 
draft and when the second draft was put before the people and 
q 
there was almost unanimous support given it by the parties in-
···--#-:::·.:':':"':-::' ._ .. :~:::.-:.:·· 
'I 
1: 
I' d ,, 
:\ 
i: 
li 
I 
II 
:I 
r 
II 
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1: 
volved--except De Gaulle, and this might have been a more im- ! 
!i 
portent factor than vJe can readily see--the people still split !I 
,, 
ii in their acceptance. The Coa~unists gave their support to thi$ 
II 
" 'I 
second one only at the 1B st minute and some of the other par- lj 
ties, on the Right and in the center particularly, vlere openly li 
begrudging in their acceptance. 
ji 
'e'Jha t vvere the voters supposed i! 
it li 18. 
to do under those circumstances? i; :; 
I 
France presents a complicating picture to the student who\( 
1i 
tries to establish identical lines of development of movements !! 
!i 
common to other countries. This is particularly so in respect il 
:! 
to the support the Communists and Socialists traditionally re-i! 
I< 
ii 
ceived in contrast to this same sort of support in other count~ies 
,I 
where the two parties are strong. In pre-war France there was il 
il 
still the strong emphasis on peasantry and individual endeavor \1 
in farming, out of which was developed the strong tradition of il 
h 
individualism and the liberal concepts that have characterized II 
II 
!I j! 
french thinking and is still an important influence. The low- il 
!I 
est classes of peasants, however, as the economy became more !/ 
complex, were the victims of the same sort of economic oppress~bn 
as the industrial workers; not altogether happy with their lot,!! 
jl 
they came to allign themselves at tioes with the labor movemen~\· 
II They hoped to better themselves, perhaps in the long run, more\. 
!! 
I' 
!i 
18. 'Nomen were given the right to vote for the first ti.me in i\ 
these elections and the overall participation was a little mor~l 
than double that in 1956 which shows that the women came out i_ril 
good strength. It would be interesting to see just where the ', 
female vote ·went in the elections and referendums--though the li [: figures are not available, of course. : 
='-'"~"-'--cc=·--c_-c,it-=-'-=~c~-"'=~o. --=·=-=== !I --,4~-==·---=-= 
li 
!i 
!' 
li 
I 
out of the programs of this group than out of the policies of 
the bourgeois front, coming as it did to them from elements 
!I 
i) 90. 
that had widened the space between the two in terms of economi91 
.I 
advancement and who no longer represented their needs. 1: Yet, !I 
'I !· in m.any instances, the peasants in these lower classes held 
some property--at least considerably more than did the indus-
trial workers--and to some extent their thinking was still 
i! li 
II 
ll 
·I 
alligned with the more traditional outlook of liberal parties, II 
II so that the peasants have a tendency to vaccilate between the 
:! 
center and the left according to the nations economic position.!! 
Socialism was strongest in the center of Franc~, a region of il 
small towns, partly industrial, and partly rural. In center I! 'I 
II 
urban areas, the Paris suburbs in particular, both t~e ~ocialis~s 
and the Communists '.".ere strong, but a 1 tho'.lgh the Co:-:1munlsts I\ 
poll 'in:.s strong in the Paris "red-belt," and the industrial 
:1 re,::;ions of the ~Tortheast, it was just as heavy in Southern 
I. 
II I· 
,j 
II 
lj Provence, which, outside !Jarseilles and Toulon, is largely i! 
jl 
II 
a.griculturel; in the center departments of Allier and Cher; andji 
il 
is strongest in the purely agricultural department of Lot-et-Ga~.:onne 
19. II 
in the south-west. This division of support is essentially t*e 
I' 
same today, and, of course, no significont changes in the Char-\ 
acter of the regions has taken place. 
The traditional Rightist strongholds, like the rich agri-
cultural snd •nine-growing departments Cote-d' or and "!"onne, the 
traditionally nationalist Vosges, and the historical Rightist 
19. D. Pickles, 2£• Cit., p. 91. 
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11 
ii 
!i 
,I 
ii 
I! 
:i 
·=t 
stronghold, the Vendee, were still solidly Rightist in the eled~ 
ii 20. 1: 
tions immediately following the war. The only significant 
Rightist vote leaving the ranks went to support the HRP where 
they were probably seeking temporary shelter. 
ij 
After the war the increase in support for the Left brought\ 
with it a more complex composition for the parties. The sig-
11 
i; nificant shift in the composition of the Socialist and Communisi\t 
,, 
\1 parties show the f&rmer gaining considerably at the expense of , 
the Radical-Socialists who were coalesced with the Socialists 
during part of the prewar period. This was due to a more def-
inite leftward trend following the war, and the fact that the 
former had lost prestige during the VJar. At any rate, the 
Socialists becE:oe entrc~nched in many more predoninantly rural 
;I 
and s:rJ.all-tovm tJ.reas, especially in the South-vv'est, ·while in !I 
!i ii t!:le urban srees they rePwined elnost stationary, ·.'dth the pos- :1 
sible exce}tion of Paris. Host of the v:~orking class iJCte went 
to the Comnmnists, vJhich is in part explained by the fact that 
they lled co:ae out of the 'Nar in control of the CGT. In many 
industrial regions, especially in the north, only the left-wing 
of the ~mP was able to compete successfully 1.··i th the r;o;nmnnists 
for the labor vote. '11hen the Cor:E'lunists obtained an incree2e 
in their scattered rural vote, especially \' a_ mong the share-cropp~rs, 
. \1 
io.bor--and Gost \1 
II 
;:na ll lenc'led proprietors and a"",r :l.cul tural 
' 20. (Anony:rrous) Op. Ci_!., p. 10. 
91. 
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,I 
11 
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li noticably in the southestern districts. 21 " The Rightist's 
propaganda that the Conmunist party would expropriate even 
the smallest proprietor has not seemed to deter 2n increasing I' 
'I 
percentse,e of egricultural population from voting Communist 
22. 
• ij ln 1: 
the regions mentioned. 
The Radical-Socialists ~ade such a poor showing in the 
post-,,var elections that their count is insignificsnt in the 
besin~!ng. They have steadily gained, however, and largely in 
the smell locc;l units the:1 formerly held for decades. The 
geographical analysis of the ~ERP support shows that this party 
too, along with nearly all the others, bit into the former's 
,, 
II 
il But the latter party shows up considerably more in :1 
:. 
adherents. 
the areas traditionally conservative. 
and Brittany, the Eo.st, in Champersne, 
The ',[est, in Norc:tandy 
the Jural 0nd Al~sace, 
\j 
li 
ii I! 
ii 
II 
the extreme north, &nd a fev1 southern depsrtments. II In most of ii 
'I I· 
the above there was present some clerical influence which help~~ 
II 
to orient the support toward the l.r:tP, but at the same time at II 
·I 
:r least a third of the IviRP support vJas dravm from regions which 
'I I, 
1 
were neither traditionally conservative nor strongly clerical, ~ 
li I 
/J and the party received consideraThle support from so.all crafts- !j 
1
1 1· !i men and shopkeepers belonging only in part to the former "/adical~-
\l j, 
;! 
l\ 
21. December 1950, the Central Committee of the Cor.1rnunist party1i, 
{meeting .:nentioned eurlier) ackr:owledged th8t in recent poli ti-ll 
cal cnnpo.igns they haC: lost particularly in the depcrtments of il 
,. ··,ne ··=r,r,-o '· .. T rbl"l~rn "el· ""-···"'"'r· , ... ,..;, Dr·" ·l·ec· ., n· ·~ 1~lu , J . ..:. =l~, ! ,O l.LD , u . n~-J_l .·. • ... lE.t.Lc e, •< ccC 1 ....,-CU-ngone, :• 
Alpes-~.·:ori times, ·.vhere their influence '.Vas :'or:nerly predc:-,Iiner:til· 
{i'..~::tba?sade ·5o :?rc.d!.ce, Feb. 27, 1951.) 1! 
) 
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. 1" . 23. SOClB lSt Unlts. The secule.r attitude of Glany forrn.er 
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"I(adical~ 
Socialist adherents made the ~JRP somewhat disk:steful to them 
which 8an account in part for their shift clear over to the 
secular Socialists. 
il ;i 
I, 
il II 
I' !i 
'I 
:I 
ll 
:: 
II 
Giving a note to the geographical cor!lposition of the vari-ii 
ous parties' support r!lakes it easier to recognize one of the 
importc::nt factors making for the seemingly greater amount of 
jl !: 
II 
il 
'i 
:i 
II 
disunity in the government since the war. The fact that three \I 
large parties dominated the scene meant that their support was 
coming from bread cross-sections of the electorate. This ~' pres- 1: 
! 
:i 
ses any party toward e greater element of conservatism in their;! 
;I 
i! 
I 
own stand on certain issues, which breeds the very basis of dis~ 
1\ 
unity. 
Much has already been said about the elections to the three 
:! ,, 
asse:nblies after the war and the m.ajori ty of the points signifi~ 
l! 
cant to the problems considered here can best be brought out inJ\ 
contrasts v;ith the succeeding local elections. After the elec-11 
It 
tions to the first national .Assembly, the french people have II 
not agcin had the chance to exoress their opinions in a nationa~ 
24. . . ji 
election. 'rhe first two locel elections \vere 1nconclus1ve, /! 
:1 ,, 
partly due to the fact that the various parties had not yet beet 
able to organize their local units sufficiently to hold out to ~ 
the electorete distinguishable platforms. They both revealed a\ 
il 
.83. Foreign Policy '1eport, ,o\pril 15, 1946 (Op. Cit.) p. 31. 
24. 'rhese '•\'ere the municipal elections of April 29 to Hay 13, 
1945, and the cantonal elections of September 20-30, 1945. 
il' !: 
picture similar to the one seen in the national elections. 
\1 
Tt 11 
- :, 
is not until we cone to the municipal elections of october 19-dio 
"1! 
1947, that ~e are given any real indication of a contrast 
preceeding elections. 
In these, the significant feature ir:l!nediately is the 
able trend toward the Right. In 1946 the entire opposition of 
the Right could poll only 15.6% of the votes cast, 25 "yet in 
1947 de Gaulle's lists won 38% of the votes cast, taking most 
of his support from elements in the bourgeois center parties, 
especially the tffiP whose percentage shrank from 23 .8~ to 10.2, 
and the Radical-Socialist--TJDSR combination, whose percentage 
shrank from 10.1 to 4.4. 26 "This definite rightward swing can bJJ 
i\ 
partially explained by the fact that the old conservative ele- 1! 
ments were finally cooing out into the open and taking a stand 
at the polls that a few rn.onths before '."Jas unthinkable in terms 
of the exertion of :)r•::ctic•c:l political pov.rer. The Right ~roups:i 
were realizing that some of their stig~m had vanished and that 
·~ raore of' the for.11er support could now be rallied around the old 
ce.use and 'Tlake it mean sor.1ething in numbers. 
The left also suffered percentage shrinkage with the 
il Comr.mnists dropping frotn 32.4 to 29.327 find the Socialists from ~~~~ 
!I !i 25. American Fersoective, Dec. 1947, p. 452. (Finer, Op. Cit., 11 
:: p. 336, puts t!J.is total slightly higher--around 18~. )- 11 
:I 
!I 26. Loc. Cit. 
27. These figures are for total vote received. The Com.mu:1ists l\ 
suffered far greater in the actual nuEJ.ber of seats gained v;hich~! is 
9leced e.t only 6~; or 30,503 out of 466,209--and only 2000 Commu~ists 
rrrayors out of a total of 37,930. Ambassade de France, Feb. 27, t951. 
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:5owever, it is hard to assess from where, ex-11 
It 
actly, de Gaulle got his support, when we consider the RPF in II 
H 
:! 
the light of its professed aims and to whom de Gaulle looks fo~: li 
support in the electorate--which is everywhere. In the Paris II 
Municipal Council, for example, De Gaulle got some 50 of the 
90 seats and the Communists were able to retain 27 out of more 
" !: 
29 i: 
than 30 they held previously. ·The possible indication is tha11 
,I 
De Gaulle got the bulk of his support from the old Right parti~~ 
II 
and center groups, but at the same time must have received som~l 
j: 
Support from the Left, i.e., some of the purely vvorker vote. 11 
II 
out of De Gaulle's gains in all the municipal elections in 194~\, 
one observer believes30 •that the moderates, 
H 
the Radicals and t~~ 
1: 
" L'fRP, accounted for 32'~ (i.e., frora De Gaulle's 38~--stated as I' ,j 
!I 
38.6 by this observer.) and he asks: INhere did the remaining 
5 .4}'i cone from? (actually some l4S~ of De Gaulle's vote). The 
Co.··wmnists and Socialists lost together that much exactly and 
coald have been a dual transfer from the Cor.JJnunists to the 
Socialists and froo there to the :RrF. (conceivably including 
:JRP in the chain) But he says that many former Communist voterqi 
li ii 
r::.specially in Paris--·::hich happened in fact in the suburbs-- 1: 
I! 
i I 
28. ~merican Perspective, Op. Cit., (Finer, Op. Cit.,again con11j flicts with these f1gures by giVIng the SFio-r7.~in the 1946 1 
national election. The disparity exists with the observer in tllhe 
American Perspective since he used only Metropolitan France to~lals 
while Finer included all departments.) II 
il 
29. Jacques Fauvet in, Une Semaine Dans le Mende, Oct. 28, 194~/, 
quoted from G. G. Cook, Op. Cit., p~l-.- il 
30. Ibid. p. 341-342~ 
l! 
;; 
,. 
··t'l -=-~~-== 
' 
I 
turned their vote directly to the RPF--as did a few Socialists.!l 
This might be explained by the old traditional outlooks coming il 
I 
forward belately after the war to dominate some worker's thinkJ 
I' I, 
ing, but their over-all lot would make this consideration neces~ 
il 
sarily be coupled with a strong feeling of doubt in the worker'~ 
'I 
mind as to the position of the Cornmunists in the country, easilf 
brought about by then, perhaps, since the propaganda of every 
other party was directed against the Communists, and a feeling 
that the RPF would live up to its vague promises of a type of 
government involving a semblance of social justice. At the 
same tiwe the worker, in many areas, was in a state of despair 
to the point of accepting a strong government, one that would 
t 
i: 
relieve him of many of his worries--perhaps take the matter comr 
ii 
pletely out of his hands--enough to bring him to follow de Gauli~e 
,I 
,, 
for a time--just to see -vvhere it would lead him if nothing elsef~ 
!I 
What actually came out of these elections was a new, stro' 
Rightist block with 38~,0 of the voters supporting it, a Left sh~nk j, 
1 • • b % 31. d . 'II to 29;;1 and a center, ln power, Wl th ut 33 o. An l t can be 
1 
!I 
'I 
I il 
31. American Perspective, (Op. Cit.) p. 453. Fauvet comes closel~ 
to the actual plcture, I beiTeve;-by distributing some of the :1 
present NIRP support to both the Right and the Left and sistri- ll 
buting some of the center party support to the Right, to off-sel\t 
technical disparities in the election itself ond to further acc1bunt 
for the existing trend, and comes up with the Right ha'ving 43.~%, 
'the Cor:1munists still v;i th 29. 3jj and leaving the center 'iii th onljy 
28.7% of the popular support. This is far more to reality due 11 
to the fact that the extremely heterogenous nature of the MR.P ,I 
makes its political life dependent upon external conditions be-j 
ing favorable and is not a strong, unified group in the accept~~ 
sense of the word. The other figures were quoted however, sinde 
we cannot adequately qualify Fauvet's. 
96. 
• 
too easy to over-emphasize de Gaulle' 3 st:ren2.itll .Jhen we realize 
tho.t the majority of his support was gained through the media 
of coalition lists, ·wherein many candidates owed both the RPF 
and some other party allegiance. 
The strength of the over-all shift in french thinking to-
vvard the right is shown in the municipal elections of october, 
1948, and here we are given a better indication of the official 
support of tLe RPF. De Gaulle announced prior to these elections 
that his party ·would run candidates on a straight RPF ticket--for 
the first such occasion since the party was for~ed--and he won 
but 13?~ of the seats. Independents, hovievcr, won 47';~, many of 
.ii:.ich ':;ere Gaullist sympathizers, but it is si-mificant tLc. t no 
:1o:re u id sllign thelllsel ves c1 irectly with -t~L e 'Rl'F. At the same 
ti:;~e, the :..mP obtained, only 9:0 of tJ1e seats and the Couwm.nists 
32. 
only 10~·;. It nay also be a facd:lor worth considering that the 
Right groups '.Jere still couing out to feel their depth, and not 
yet able to re-group the fort•ler ps:rties, but still these indepein6-
ents ~ere Right, many of them, in their thinking, and surely so 
in the mints of their supporters, and winning their seats along 
the old traditionallines may or may not actually place them be-; 
hind de Gaulle. But the trend toward the Right remainso 
·,vi thout over-emphasizing the lack of stability in our fig-, 
ures, it is advisable to remember that local elections are not 
as indicative of trends as they might be in France. 1i!hen. they 
32. G. C. Cook, Op. Cit., p. 343. 
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I' 
are as well-defined as the ones appearing so far have been, then;; 
,. 
i 
the indications are somewhat clearer so that assumptions can be;i 
,I 
drawn without too much difficulty. In the election to the 
Council of the Republic, November 7, 1948, there is some dif-
ference in the over-all reliability of the figures. De Gaulle 
33. 
won more than 40% of the seats open to be filled. But the 
seats were gained through different circumstances than in regu~i 
lar elections in that the municipal councils served as a basis 
for selection and these had been elected a year prior. If the 
local leaders in the municipal councils take cognizance of the 
current trends in public opinion in their selection then the 
victory for the Gaullists is sharply defined. 
The other parties had been watching de Gaulle's advances, 
and not without some alarm. The center and left forces in par-
ticular had been worried about the general shift toward the 
Right. In the elections for the departmental councils of half 
the french departments in March 20 and 27, 1949, the parties 
had their last chance to take stock of their support before the 
next national election for the Assembly--scheduled for November 
1951. It, of course, produced an all-out effort on the part of 
all the groups to co~~and the most votes possible. Many of the 
departments concerned were in the former strong-holds of the 
Radical-Socialists, and this party was able to regain r!luch of 
its former support from these units and bring the government 
33. Foreign Policy Report, January 15, 1949, p. 211. 
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;· II 
\\ Jl,· r c i! ' .. ~. 
II parties over-all popular sup port to over 40;;. The RPF, enter- ~~~~~--o- " ~--7= 
:1 
li ing cantonal elections for the first tiDe, obtoined aporoxiaete, y 
l,!i • •I I' half as many sE,ats as the coalition part ins comb ined--!"lore thanjl; 
·' I I! any other single party received. :I 
li II 
II Tl-:e e lee tion did result in some significant cl:2nges, os- ~~~ 
ii tensibly, in public opinion. It 'vvns a victory for the govern- i 
ment and, at least, a clef eo t for one of the opposing forces in 
I! 
1: 
li 
the asse~1bly, the Conmunists. The election came right after li 
the announce"ent of the Atlantic Pact, v1hich the Com;nunists '!ler~ 
forcefully opposing. The~r put up cendidetes in all the cantonslr 
1. 
ond by an a 11-out effort, ,Jere able to nt oll 20·-:j of the oonular 11 
"" J; !I 
i[ 
vote, but beccuse an absolute c.1a j ori ty ·;;2s neeC:: ed in each case 11 
I' 
to obti:i in a sP.a t, thP.y lost [i large nu;aber of their forr:wr lj[ 
34. I 
positions. 'llhe fact that their over-all percentage dropped 1J 
II 
from their perennial figure of over twenty;.;;fi ve yJas due in partil 
II to the nature of the departments in which the elections were I! 
!i 
held, and the practical conclusion is that they did not lose an\f 
• • II 
of their actual support but rather, did a good job of rrlalntaln-IJ 
'I I, 
ing them.selves--vvi th, however, the loss of several influential 
positions. 
I 
li 
:1 
II 
For the second ruund of voting for the contested seats, ·; 
I! 
( 783 out of the tota 1 of 1507) the governme1,1t block parties com-.[j 
bined b~fore the voting to choose a candidate aost likely to de~ 
feat a communist or Gaullist, and succeeded in getting 544 of ~re 
!; 
I' 
I' 
34. Only 37 Co~nmunist or Communist-affiliated General Councill9~s 
'i:ere elected. Arn~assade de France, ;reb. 27, 1951. r 
li 
:i 
ij 
I: 
iJ 
'· fr 
I' 
I', 
100. 
il II 
11 783. 
tt~· -=:=.c·: ... :c ..... 
j, 
il 'rhe Som_rnunists suffered their worst defeats here and got i! 
! ~ only 20 of the contested seats. II The Gaullists, however, got th~ 
II. 
recl8 ining ~~19' and de ri-aulle heralded it as a victory against li 
i! 35. !J 
an all-out effort against him. il 
.. -·----=== 
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II ]! Chapter Four 
The Pattern of Political 
Forces in Contemporary France 
·I I, 
II 
II 
II 
!I 
1: 
II 
'I II 
From the developments of the political history of the i\ 
,, 
Fourth :"tepublic some do::1inant trends reveal themselves distincti~y 
I in the battle for power. A marked trend toward the Right, as- I. 
- ~ li 
I 
sur'ling :uore and rnore importance at the polls, indicates clearlyj! 
I! 
the revivnl into political activity again of the once important!\ 
,, ,, 
conservative segment of french opinion. A second trend revealsij 
!i 
itself in the relatively stetionary, though recently declining,i[ 
'i 
position of the Communists throughout, indicating that they 
il 
probably have obtsined the extent of the Left thinking they wil'jl.. I d 
ever receive, under current abnor~.1al conc1 i tions. It also reveails 
tLat so.cne of the conditions prof'lpting the adoption of Communis~~ 
I' 
a~ong the workers have not yet been alleviated appreciably. ~~~ 
! 
1949 cantonal elections indicated that the Richt 30vement nay b~ 
!! 
leveling off, ~ith only a different set of conditions being ab~~ 
to s tiLmla te further rise. The fr,ct that the coalition pnrt ies1\ 
~ere able to obtain considerable support in that election give~~ 
rise to the belief that t~e french are settling back again intJ 
! 
tl:..eir older, rJore custonary positions in political thinking--sp!fl-
ling a more felt sense· of security for the lenders in the t;ove~~-
~1 
~ent coalition. 
The conditions surrounding that election, however, do not 
add all the force to the conclusions sufficient to dispel con-
I! 
il 
cern i'or the existing conditions t:1et can destroy the picture ;I 
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I 
I 
I 
people are still without the extent of social justice they feell 
they are entitled to. You cannot destroy a political fjrouping,
1 
'i 
li 
:1 that by the sheer force of nu:nbers controls nearly 30% of the II ~~ so a ts in the Assembly, w 1 thou t first giving to the voters sup- li 
1\ porting the party some better place to go. Merely because the I\ 
II Left is effectively divided today does not destroy the general Ill 
1'
1
 movement, nor the impetus of their demands. I 
11 
The three forces at work may only be beginning the real 1\ 
1: 
struggle for post-war France. The Third Force represents a 
line of traditional thinking, which is perhaps in the majority 
;I 
i' 
within their groups, that is alien to both the Right and the !I 
extreo.e Left. They have been able to remain in P?Wer this long\J 
d 
largely by dint of the relative slowness of the Right's abili tyl\ 
to regroup themselves, and that when they finally did they werel 
I 
not of sufficient strength to combine vd th the Co::ununists to c.et 
feat the coalition parties and then wage war vd th the Left to 11 
see ,,,ho would govern. The fact that the Third Force must rely 11 
upon the Socialists for part of their support, or upon moderate\\ 
I 
Right elements, if we turn the picture around, gives it all the! 
requisites for unsuccessful government; government which has I 
only been achieved so far by an antipathy toward forces without! 
I' 
At the same time noneil 
II 
1 of the groups has been presented yet with the opportunity to II 
.:nake the drive tovwrd swinging tbe bulk of the electorate one 11 
being greater than the antipathy within. 
II 
II 
II 
~~T-=,== 
way or the other, needed, for one of the groups to be able to 
-- - - ============ 
substantially strengthen its position. This p~entiality has 
;I 
-11 
II li 
il 
IJ 
been effectively staved off by the government so far, but whilei! !I 
acco~plishing the feat they have left themselves no like op-
portunity, and have not been able to produce enough stability 
I II 
i! 
within the government to warrant their own concerted electoral 
car.1paign. 
!! 
In trying not to make the problems confronting ~ranee appe~r 
!I 
wore serious than they really are it is hard not to realize tha~ 
II 
in the whole structure of Europe and ?ranee in particular therel! 
!I 
is an increasing amount of turmoil, amplified by the present 11 
I< 
world situation, that is working against some of the traditiona~ 
forms of government we ere accustomed to, and against represent~­
tive government itself. In appraising the strength of the thre~ 
:! 
political forces in France, and their relative abilities to ef-!i 
I fectively solve, not only their own internal problems, but thos!¢ 
:! 
entering from without that need their own immediate solutions, ihe 
forces must be considered in their own particular segment of th~ 
thinking and conditions prompting that thinking as that goes 
i: 
,I 
ij 
to'i 
make up the structure of their larger society. The three force$ 
must be given a chance, subjectively, to show what they can, orll 
li 
could, perform in the government of France not only in terms ofll 
the whole french people, but also in terms of what they propose11 
i( 
as answers to ~ranee's problems. ?or the sake of our own clari~y 
il 
of interpretation, if for no other, the Socialists will from :l 
li 
here on be considered in terms of the social revolution, to whi/ph 
:\ 
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it belongs more than to the Third Force to which it owes but -=~-~~~~-~~--~-~-cc.=.cc==~ 
II 
!I 
:t 
li 
II 
II 
II 
II 
li 
I' II 
·I 
H ,, 
li 
i 
" 1: 
i! 
!I 
., 
~ \ 
;· 
temporary allegiance. Its relative ability to maintain itself !i ,, 
!I 
as a Third Force party will, of course, be given due considera~i 
tion. 
The social revolution, its force and momentum, has been I !i ;J 
·I 
H 
stimulated in France by the present condition of the economy an~ 
the general condition of Europe affecting the economy. It was 
104. 
\' II I' deterred by the unique balance present in France between the ii 
:1 : 
l' 
•! 
1: 
rural and industrial elements before the last war. This deter-!! 
tment has been steadily threatened by circumstance during the 
last twenty to thirty years and is now all but gone. The 
'I ~ of Europe has suffered under a wide proletarianization of its 
il 
middle-class struct4re due to the seemingly unending pressures 
of inflation and the unduly pronounced rise in stature of the 
upper-class in terms of wealth. Her population has tripled in 
the last hundred years and the results of countless years of 
poor social tilanagement by the upper-classes have embittered theii 
! 
people against any form of reaction or maintainance of the stAt~s-
quo. 
'Ve have already viewed so:ne of the nore distinct causes in•: 
I( 
Europe and France, and it is sufficient to realize that the ma-: 
jority of opinion today iS Left in France. The :novement takes 
on greater meaning as the forces aggravating its rise are seen 
to be increasing. Contrary to our own nature, there is a stigmf 
attached to the terms "capital ism" and "free-enterprise" in l1 
France. The leaders of french business have not been the dynamts 
of imagination and energy that they have been in the United States, 
==== ··.c=.==.:c==·-"c= .. ·.cc·io=-'"7".....c=--'-'-' 
I' [I 
!i 
II 
I 
I 
and for the most part they have maintained conditions in indus ry 
I 
detrir:J.ental to the worker. This factor has been stimulated by II 
I 
the fact that the French did not need to give to proletarian II :t II 
jl 
elements the certain fixed portion of the national income that 11 
would only keep the economy healthy, because there has not bee~! 
a sufficiently large portion of the people so indisposed to maJ~ 
It 
that a difference. Enterprise has, with a few notable excepti~~s, 
1. :1 neither been very free nor very enterprising. This history 1 
leaves the capitalism of the frenchman out of bounds of his i\ 
II thinking in tert!!B of its being desirable or worth keeping. It ~~ 
·I 
11 has led many people through all classes of french society towar 
,, the concepts of socialistic planning, white-collar workers, civ~l 
servants, many elements that are somewhat right of center in ~ 
1
, American thinking. At the same time VJhen economic crises arisel
1 I 
I' [L !!~ it has been customary for the ruling class to crush the r estlesw-
,1 il 
1
• ness of the people rather than to get out and help get the carti! up 
li the hill by a nation-wide effort toward better managemen\:nd II 
efficiency--and they have so far been largely successful. li 
The l.eft movement in France could well have been a unified)! 
" d 
105. 
and highly effective cor:1rnon front against reaction had it not \\ 
been for the split in its ranks. After liberation it could aga~n 
have been cemented into a dominant force if de Gaulle had conse#ted 
II 
to lead the :novernent--as it was hoped he would in nany quarters~ 
II 
1. Harpers Magazine, .April 1948, p. 317. 
2. Ibid., p. 318. 
;I 
il 
II 
it ,, 
:i 
'I 
it II 
II il 
II 11 
:; \1 
~ t 
1
:1, and kept up ~ith his ~artime promises. Pe did not and the ~ir~~ 
I runs of goverru~nt vere largely detrimental to the workers wel~ 
ll fare to the extent tb.Ei t the Oonmunists mac_e deen inroads into !I 
i! ~ II 
I! the Left movement. Today there is little poss ibjLi ty of the !I 
li '1 il Socialists regaining their lost vwrker support unless they leavj~ 
:: ii II :1 i' the government entirely and form a dual opposition against the ~~ 
I! :1 
Iii a.overnment and the Gaullists vvi th the Communists. ~hey have !1 
,I ~ II 
1
1
·1· made repeated efforts to entice some of the CGT workers into t~~ 
'I il I It 
11 ranks of the FO but without any success whatsoever. The :!"0 11· 
li li. 
1: 11 evidently does not offer to the worker the sane sort of dyns.mic'i 
I !! approach to the worker's problems ths.t the CGT is able to give I' 
I ,I 
them. The FO remains decadent in its policies and its organize~ 
3. !1, 
tional outlook. ii 
il The trend in government toward the Right has had serious II 
q 
consequences within the Socialist party. Tt has lost t'ltlch of 'I 
- II 
the zeal it formerly had, it has become depressed in the out- II 
li 
look for its own future, and has degenerated in its governments~ 
!
1 
action to the shame of its leaders and the utter irresponsibili~y 
j, of its role in the ~overnment. This factor alone has been re- 1·1· 
I! - I' 
il sponsible for many overwhelming crises that could have been 11 1~1 II 
II . 
!I 3. The power strike throughout France, November 1949, saw the /J 
~' Communist's workers standing firmly in beck of the action while~ 
the FO forces were as likely to show up for work as not--in facl 
m.ore went to work than adhered to the strike. (Newsweek, Dec. 5~ 
1949.) This has largely been the case in the majority of strikef 
in the country where most of the unions have been involved. Itii 
is due primarily to the fact that a strike for the French involves 
a tremendous expense and the bulk of the unions lack sufficient!! 
funds to meet it, and it tekes a strong organization to supplan~ · 
the individual lack of FiCtion. li 
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l[ I II 
I' 
!l 
!! 
I! 
il. 
I! 
avoided with less pettiness. 4 • It holds tenaciously to its phil~s-
b q 
ophy in the faint hope ttat it will be able to command some ves~ige 
li 
of its dwindling support in the next National election--and at ihe 
• \! 
same time its part in the government has become a source of d1si 
content and loss of voter support for the parties that have to ~ 
join them in the government. The Socialist's contrary action h~s, 
1: lj 
1i of course, cone at the times of worst crisis in the economy and !1 
il il II !i have therefore been of a more harrassing nature than if the act~on 
were ~erely insti~nted by the party's discontent. At present t~ey 
II 
sre enhancing the trend toward the Right rather than hindering tl 
I, ,, 
ii it since their actions only serve to entrench the moderate part~.·.~,'.es ii li ![ 
II 
!j 
i' 
'I j, 
" II 
more firmly in their own resolves and 
duction of more stable Right elements 
'I force the continued introi 
'I in to the government. The !1 
: ~
n Socialists must assume a more dynamic approach to their tenentsll 
'I 
today or face ultimate defeat at the next election, which in th~ir 
II 
present state of mind, is impossible due to the lengths they wi~l 
I 
1
i have to go in realizing that dynamic policy. [1 ~~ I' !I 
Jl 4. For example, in Q.ueuille's cabinet in August, 1949, the Soc-, 
ialistt3 minister of labor, Daniel Mayer, without consulting thei1 
other ministers, quietly granted the 50,000 employees of the so.·-
ial Security Administration a vacation bonus of 5,000 francs. 
(a little less than $16 a piece now, and at that time around te 
freezing wages in an attempt to bring prices dovm and the Right [ 
complained that it was a blow to the government's stability in 
that the action would precipitate a whole new demand for wage i -
creases. Queuille was forced to back up Mayer, lest the other i' 
Socialist ministers bolt the cabinet--creating a real crisis--a~d 
he a~ked for a vote of confidence on the action, which he n~rro.ly 
recelved--289 to286. Newsweek, August 8, 1949. (The conmun1stsil 
had voted against the government while at the same time heraldi~g 
the move as the opportunity they had been waiting for to ask fof 
a new round of wage increases, which they did.) ;i ,, 
?he ::::o,-1munists present a sL::~1le ~lioturA to describe. Thei:)j' 
over-all structure, organization and ttinking is not fuce~ with 
the co~19lications the Socialists have to bear. ~he ·,/estern 
world is not traditionally able to accept the party's aggressiv~ 
tactics, its strict internal discipline, nor its obvious con-
necticn -,, i th ~roscov.;. our Left revolution is still bound up wi tb. 
myths of poli ticel action that ore alien to the Cormunist' s ::aovf~!-
ment, but a-c the sa:ne time, internal conditions, such as \J'/e finq 
in T<'r~mce, are of suet e counteracting force as to com.pel large 
1
1 
blocks of citizens a~ay fro~ trPditional outlooks. Even then it 
take~ a lot of zeal on t~e )Brt of ysrty lea~ers to instill in 
the frencL 1..orker a belief in tte )Brty' s tenets ond the 'Jon1"mn~st' s 
have displ~yed just that. 
l'Le \,orkers in "'rc~1ce sr-e not as b<::d of:' in contrr~st to their 
O'.m history es are ·,;orkers in sone other countries, yet they needed 
so:1e imuediate ussista::1ce after the -,var which did not cone, and: 
the fact that they are not in what ~e could call a good positio4 
relative to the economy, their physic~l position being bearable~ 
their inentel cone! it ion is not. And tJ1is is V•i~le!'e the Co::1rnun:ist$ 
;: 
have ~aQe their ~reatest advances through their highly effectiv~ 
propagunda ~achine, which is the one important factor keeping the 
worker- in the state of mind belie~ing his lot is perhaps worse· 
' than it is. Despite the obvious allegiance to the .~st, the 
constant effo!'ts of all the other parties on the scene directed · 
'I 
agaiQst them, despite ~CA end the Atlantic Pact, and contrary t~ 
the maJ·ority of popular feeling being against them, the Comrn.uni$tR 
\i 
j1 
1\ 
il 109. 
- - \1 
are still a strong force in the country. 5 • It owes this ~~reng~h 
II 
partly to the fact that it is the only party in France that, a~ 
\'i 
far as the worker is concerned, seems consistently to champion!i 
il 
his cause--regardless of the other alternatives presented to t1e 
li 
party. And it owes much of tllis strength to the fact that the 11 
bulk of the action coming from the government has been slipsho~i 
; 
I' 
and ineffective in alleviating the adverse pressures in the ec9r-
ll 
omy. v'ihat advances, economically the country has nade has beeji 
in the same pattern where the worker stood to lose from econom~~ 
' ,, 
\) 
advancement. The Commu~ist unions hold out naterial gain for ~re 
" ;: 
·worker when it is a time of his feeling more concern about suchl: 
I 
things--and less about how he gets it. This, we believe, is tn~ 
reason the Comraunist unions have been steadily gaining at the 
expense of the unions under the Socialist's banner. 6 " 
ll 
\I 
!I 
5. There are evidences of weakne~s readily apparent, however, f: r 
exa:nole there has been a decline in the circulation of r,' Humani' e 
and Ce Soir--the two major Communist Ne-vvspapers. (Ambassade de "renee, 
Service~Presse et D'Information, Feb., 27, 1951 --! 
L'Eur1anite (daiTY)---r-§47:380,000 Ce Soir 1947: 400,000 :i 
1948:270,000 "[Weekly) 1948: 270,000 !i 
1949:230,000 1949: 210,000 
1950:230,000 1950: 210,000 
II 
i! ;: 
II II 
L'~umanite Dimanche (weekly) 1947: 550,000 
1948: 500,000 
1949: 480,000 
1950: 480,000 
(It will be noted the trend seems to have leveled off--it 
~ore interesting to view the figures for the current year 
trast.) 
IVill ~e 
in cot-
, 
ii 
I! 
6. U. r;. ·,;orld, April 1950, p. 19. This is based on rather inc~n-
clusive ev1dence--that the Communists &ro quietly gaining at th~ 
exoense of the socialists: In the Oct. 1949 elections in the Pa~ de 
calais coal mines where the workers voted to elect 6 members to l! 
their unions arbitration comraittee, the CGT won 5 seats v;ith 71~6~~ 
~-b"-.-=Ci-=-'~-~ 
J! i! 
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II '.·Vhether they are actually gaining or not remains to be seeft .• 
11 t II ~~ The growing consequence of the struggle between the East and th~ 
1l iiest has ClBde it all too apparent to the Communists that their II 
j[ life is short-lived, as far as the continued devotion of' a larg1 
il part of their supporters is concerned, and as far as their con~ 
II tinued legality is concerned. '!'he latter factor is presently o! 
ji prime concern to the party since the government has been taking j 
il steps to legally and publically harrass them as much as possibl 
I! I 
j
1 
--hampering their activities more than if' they were forced unde~-
:11/ ground. 7 • The former, however, has been rather effectively met, I/ 
, I• 
11 li 
·I !I 
I, of' the vote, while the Socialist union got one seat with 17% of' ~~he 
!! vote--a loss of' 2.5% over the same sort of' an election the year 1 e-)\ fore, while the Communists gained about that much. n1his is pur-1 
11 portedly largely the case in other union elections and in two c~~-
11 tonal elections in Decem. ber 1949, the Cor:1munists defeated the !~1· i! Socialists badly. ~he figures, of course, support the view, bu~ 
\1 the size of' the figures in themselves, in the union elections, d~uld 
If vvell point only to the fact that since the Communists control '· 
\·the plant, at least 2~ of' the indifferent workers could conceiv ly 
:i swing over to the domi-nant group for sheer naterial ge in. And e 
I· cantonal elections, merely two of them at that, are hard ite~s 
: find trends in. (In certain southeastern departments Co~1unist 
ii strength is declining: T,farseille 28%; Arles 17%; TTartigues-T'ort 
p. 30~·~ •• Ambassade de France, Feb. 27, 1951. I' 
q -.- I 
ion 
Bouc 
l! !! 
\j7. In Hay, 1950, the Bidault cabinet launched a four-pronged dri~e to 
j1 "s"urengthen national security and to stop Communist sabotage." H~ 
!if'ired Dr. Frederick Joliet-Curie, an outright Red, as high Commi sioner 
li of' atomic energy. The national Assembly defeated a Communist rno, ion to 
!i make all d.eputies imemne from regular legal processes of' le':J anecll passed 
~instead, a government motion calling for prosecution of two Bret~n 
II co~'lmunist deputies v;ho had been arrested and jailed for incitin~ 
il Communist militents to riot in Brest. The Biclault government th~n de-
·:cided to purge the nationalized gas and electricity services of~ . 
\• Cor::L.nunists who, ever since liberation ostensibly, have been tor ent-
1 l.·ng the public by turning do~n the gas snd shutting off the elec ricity. 
I' ·rhen "'1c,dio Diffusion Fran;:;ais sacked t\vO :ted coo...rn.entators. "Sida lt 
11 saic.'-. t::at the governGent ',.;oulc. not outlaw the party but wculd ::1a~ntain 
/' :'ree speech und liberty. ( e:~cept in one of t!1e wports.nt :nedia ofl\ com-
1; raunica tion) Newsweek, :~ay 2, 1050. !1 
\! 'rhe governm-ent sore recently has prosecuted several Communi t 
li newsoaoers ~uilty of "imoedi_ng_!'ational defense" v;hich resulted n 
.:~c=-·'-"-'"'"'··:o.·f"·"=: .. ·-··· .... . 
i: 
i! i! 
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n 
'I I! 
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I! or so the party claims. 'Jhat appears to add sor.J.e strength to 1
1
/
1
,-
[1 
!I the contention t!1at they e1ight be gaining Clore union r1embers is lithe 
It party's attempt, chiefly through the CG'l', toward "unity of acti~nn 
II !i I! in the entire labor force, -vvh ich is precis ely what unionism in 
ii 
\i il 
1: 
Frunce needs--and what ~any workers want. ':Jhat new merJ.bers to 
'I 
, II unionis~ that ~ight be drawn by this action, are not there str1~tly 
I; II 
il,'
11 
because t~1ey syr:1pathize vvith the Com..rnunist's cause, hovJever, an~ 
h 
I
I may only be returning to unionism hec~:use the Comr.mnists he ve r~-
moved u21.ionisn fron the harsh workings of the _party's politics. !1 
II q 
II li il At any rate they began their drive early in 1949 end asked all "tt.he 
1l :J !! IJ ii unions to co~~le together, regardless of political affiliations, 4or 
II their common good. It represents a complete reversal of their '! 
j] former union policy, partfy line political action gave way ter>p~r-
1/ arily to strictly trade-unionism and the CGT instigated the set4-
ll 
II I~ 
' 
" ing up of union comrnittees in the various industries where seve~al 
'I 
unions night be operating, and larger com..rnittees to be set un b'-
tween the different unions themselves so that together they :ouid 
!I 
r:1ore pressure on managenent in the interests of the workef· 
II 
It has effectively bettered the organization of the non-corrL•nuni~t 
. d . t tb h 1 t . t 8 • 1:1 u:1.2.ons an ,gl ven o ~e vJ.~o e movem.en a new lf.lDe us. 1 
The ·whole aura of ill-feeling from. the pub~ic and the gove~n-
1 
ment has started rumors of another move in the party, a ~itoistl 
defection, that might be able to bring the bulk of the party in~o 
II 
111. 
heavy fines and forced 19 of these 
l<J50 •. The recent governr:1ents have 
Cof:lmunist Organizations. Ambassade 
\I 
papers to suspend publicatio1 in 
also dissolved some interaat~onal 
De France, Feb., 27, 1951. II 
!1 Reporter J!-11-.Y_ 5 .L_l94_9 L pp 32-34. ============='---='-·-+c:cc~•-·'-'~--""~----·--
!i 
1: il its sphere of influence should it cor:te about. r.li th r::'horez out 
I' l~ f th ~ o ~ e way temporarily it is hard to imafjine vvhere the :-aove ni t 
co~1e from--Time feels that Duclos does not have the au1bi tion, 9 ·i 
'i 
but it L1B y be tl1a t the move will have to cor,1e from him. Before:1 
the 1951 elections, if the pressure becomes greater against 
·' 
and it surely will--we ~ight see the thinkins of Yrenchmen part; 
! 
adherents prevailing a~ainst t~e st least un-french thinking 
:~scow line. To save the force of the crove~ent in ~ranee in 
face of the threat fros the eovernment to revert back to the s 
tem of .single r.:J.em.ber district constituencies for the purposes of 
the 1951 election, 1vhich would stifle the Communists' strength II 
in the /iSSembly, there will no doubt have to 
the L:oscow line. Aside fror'l Duclos, there is 
be a defection fror 
Auguste Lecoeur, t~e 
'I 10. 
"rising man of 1951," who nay be the one man who can bring :i 
French Com...rnunis::J. around to a more v,hole-hearted T.i'rench point of\\ 
!! 
I, I 
view. After the shock Ite lian Co:y:.m.unis::l received recentl v vJi thil 
v !r 
~ \ 
its more than :ninor leadership defection there will be greater [ 
- !! 
stir:mlus in French party rnnks toward looking to the henefi t or!\ tl:e 
i\ individual movef!lent and not so devotedly tovvard the "directed" :i 
1: !' 
n ·' 
llP.. 
1: zwvement. At the same time one of the "big fiveH Cornm.unisi/.Lead~rs, 
!i :! 11. 
Benoit 2.J""ranchon, CGT head, is one of the smartest end most actite; 
11 
he holds considerable power in the party in France by dint of hls 
of if 
being the recognized head of the greatest block/non-card holdinf 
9 m• 
0 -~' Jan. 2, 1950. 
10. Life, Jan. 29, 1951, p. 102. 
11. Lo c • C it • 
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II 
·I 
1: 
II 
I• 
J! Communist ~~p~ort. The fact ;hati~ is ~h<io~;o;k"e~~o.~di~~~~~~n~ 
I[ I' 
I; with their present lot being the chief reason for the present 1\ 
i! strength of Communism in France it mAy \Nell be tho t from Franch~n 
li 'I 
i! could coLle the move to break vvi th :roscow--the only cleterent to \1 
II I[ 
113. 
II t'·is is the extreme a:nount of internal C.iscipline ancl obediencell 
11 
d.e.·/1anded by the party--something not easily overcone and \';l~ ich ~akes 
defections outside the high political circles in the party e&si~y 
12. 
uncovered in.their early stages. II 
The next step in succession is concerned with counter- II, 
revolution. :hen a segment from within one of these large cro~as 
ce.lled societies achieve for themselves a certain amount of aa1erial 
I· 
wealth, or social position, they-naturally tend to favor the s~stem 
that made their acquisition possible and vvant to preserve the s\jtatus-
r 
quo. As long as a sufficient nunber of others in their particti\lar 
i.>Ooiety are g_iven the in):O<":ssion t:-.c.t they too, though they ·ni~~t 
not novv, hsve an eq:w.l c:1ance to acquire these riches then the 1
1
.,\. 
li I 
1: status-quo is assured. At the same ti::1e, by heving the reins J·r· 
,I 
1: government in their ha::J.ds gives this favored seg.:-nent a strange 
·I 
ii hold over the lives of the society's other people than sometimJF 
II is consistent with the difference in their actual numbers at t1f 
polls. ''ihen this latter situation arises it r:1any times n.e rely 
accompanies the fact that too many people have lost the notion 
i 
II 
12. In Decenber, 1950, the Central Cor:1rni ttee of the COr:lt'Tlunist II 
?art~ ~eeting in a plenary session, acknowledged its weakness i~ 
this field: "In the struggle against diversionists, Trotskyi tes
1 
and Ti toists ·who undermine the ~uthori ty of :"oscm'l are particul rly 
active a::,1ong the intellectuals. (Ambassede de :!"ranee, Feb. 27,\1 
~~-~~ ~r-1:~"~· "--~~----- ~r-~~--
1 
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li 
I! that they actually have a chance to :_set ahead. 
ll 
!~an is not of 
nature to thro'1J w:.r:.y a r~ooc tting v;hen he even 
but ~hen anything B]pears to be ~orkin3 toward 
he has a voice in the deternination of things, 
\i 
to staJd by while the situation merely t "l 1 't'' ge s 'NOrse. ,e ~ave E:l -'1ler 
,I 
I 
:::;ivcn the Lles:.:>es too ·1uc~l voice j_n tl1eir o\.:n affairs or '.;e have 11 
1: 
I 
not ~ive!l ther:1 enough l1en it ,JC!S needed the ,:1ost. 11 
~he thought of losing ~hut you hove been n~le to obt2in, w~et~er 
throu~h your mm efi,ort cr not, is diffjcult to reconcile, eSIJedj::.c:l:v 
,j 
\.jen you u~e about to lose it at the hands of an indiscri~inate~y 
or Gc:>i"eQ, [,a tred-:uoved '"ob of' have-nots, an<\ it colls forth mo~~e 
strict :neasures in t~1e settlement of society's disputes than ij 
!I 
would orcineril:1 be thought of. nut ':~hen that mob is effectiveily 
or:_:;cH1ized and is a smoothly v·;orking unit, as soc ia ted '.Ji th a vast il 
lj 
seg~ent of the populace, then Ell the ~round~ork is laid for th~l 
il 
i' 
entronce of s success~ul dictator, to handle the situation unti~ 
!j 
order, which i3 usually the st3tus-quo, is again restored--if h1 
il 
can then be unseated without resorting to another one to merely li 
take l:..is place. II l! 
I, 
counter-revolution is the whole gamut of ection by the hav4/s 
against the encroach~ent of the have-nots, and only assumes its I: 
i! 
more repraachful forms in times of extreme emergency. As \Je haiJe 
II 
seen, however, these "emergencies~ are assuming huge prooortion1 
~.vi th wore frequent occurance. They hcJVe beg'.1n to occur for cou~t­
il 
less other and ~'lore co!'lplicated reo sons, than fornerly existec1 11 
for this purpose ::.n less conplex circur1Stunces, snd hc:vc beco'n.e lla 
I; 
il 
----------+,=="' 
I' 
! 
tC>ol for agression anc_ i::rperialistic Ci o~·lina tion fror:J. both s io esi. 
:; 
'I q 
It is not intended here to 30 into an expose on the problems o~ 
I, 
hu:'l8nity, but this m.essive strue,gle going on in the ~~orld hes il 
I 
serious o nd important i;:tplic8 tions in the politic a 1 c\ eveloonentl 
- 'I 
., 
of Frsnce. 'Jhen 30-s of the notion's lawmakers c1evote their ti~:i!e 
to stalling and cor1plicating the governaent machinery ( 'T'he 
'i /i COL'lt::tunis t' s record in the J\sse::lbly is alinost fantastic on the il 
II 
available evidence, they have never voted for the government o~i 
1: 
any vote of confidence or motion to defer interpellstions sinc~j 
'I 
ti_eir ouster in 1947, and their votes heve been consistently li 
up in the l80's, ~ith one exeeption, when it wes down to 160 o~i 
a relatively. unimportant issue.) so that ony defection in the 
sovernaent' s rc:Eks m.eans defe&t, anc: 'vhen cnother party is buil~­q 
I' 
ins-to i~portant stature on tLe thesis of ne8r dictctorial po~e~ 
ii 
!i 
115. 
to be exercised in the govern·'lent to re9lnce the present :mchinery, 
'I 
i then this larze problem of humanity cannot be cast aside. 1 
1! 
Dictatorship can etta in one of t'dO c.istinctions: It ccn c~;:'le 
by res son of t1-1e exh;ting syster1 :r;.ot beL:.r: oble to COlJB • •. i th tJ1~ 
e~=terct of u s;iven problem Bnc1. need a strong, centrally C:.irectin$ 
" force to temporarily sssu-~ control. (0ur represent[·tive ;;~overn} 
. :\ 
~::ent is still not geared to the exigencies to which existing 
circumstances compel prompt, unified action, and until they ~:re)i 
i 
so o;e,.:reci, the con( i tion of the y, orld \Jill not per:n.i t of cl o ing ;: 
· .. itlwut c>ictotorship.) 'i'l!is form is not as liable to succo·1b t~ 
tbe force.s of tJ:1e pursuasive position in i'l·ich it finds ·H-self 1\ 
as there ore still the reasonably effecti;~ checks prese:: ~o "I 
:-::::"_-=-___;:~,.;__:_ . .:.;;_:_._..:: _ _;_:;;_.tt;-=:::: .. _.__- :~_.:_. __ .:.,__::_:::.-~:. :::.: ::;::__';...--__-~;;_'=-::.":.::::_~~~-::..::::-:.._ --~-- ;_· --~ --~:.:~--~--- t \: I' 1: 
·i 
II 
'I 
II 
\I 
....... -· H 
deter its natural course. The other kind, the kind possibly J' 
arising in France, co:nes into pmver by reason of the nation ne ~­
i ing e dictator, but with its people in the majority rejecting II 
i\ the thought. This dictatorship must assume control by all the 11 
!i methods which go into breaking down the existing structures of II 
il ! 
'i control of dictatorship. It must adopt the coercive propaganda.l1 
1
1 I II measures that made I'::ational-Socia lism ir:1portant in Germany--an 
II 
il 
II 
it must also change, organically, the existing structures 
ernment so that by the plebiscite, or by merely holding s 
116. 
ii of power, it can maintain itself • 
II 
.!hen it finally ?ets into pover 
\i it has that power to such an extent that the cu::ml& ti ve forces ~f 
It II I its pes i tion r:1ay come to doninc.1 te the :noveaent. In ;;'ranee, the ll
II thinking of the najority of the people oay continue to reject twe 
!J concept of strong centralization up to the last moment when it ~~~~ 
II 
!i finally becomes no longer a question of whether it is to be or ~;: ot. 
II 
·II·. For not only is there tr_e dissident threat of Communism from wi
1 
hin 
II li France itself, but the threat from without is even more der.1andi~g on 
li. the present institutions within. II 
1j The nachinery for this reaction is already present in the 11 
I 
I 
,j 
II 
;\ 
i; 
forra of the REF, and de Gaulle. vnlen t~e latter was beginning 
sway a considerable portion of opinion to the tenets of the RPF 
he made re?eated speeches indicating the possib~ necessity for 
the party to step in, "under the impact of events,n to assume 
control in the interests of the people. 13 • 
I' ,I 
il 
'I 
0 
13. Recently, hm.vever, he has dropped the idea of the "insurrec,ion 
conditionelle" and is calling instead for new elections, where e 
feels he will win anyway. Nation, Aug., 26, 1950, p. 180. 
i' 
! ~ 
II 
II 
II 1 117 • 
II .··~ .. · 
The RP~ itself is not readily described. To nake it a fo~ce 
of reaction in the v;;ay it has been often described, VJe must be :II 
able to include within its ranks the logical elements of react~on, 
II 
and thio, to some extent, io readily discernible, At times th1 
party seems to revolve around the fiwre and personality of De\\ 
II !] q Gaulle, and at others to be merely the resting place for the 
,, 
powers of reaction--the movers of the counter-revolution. And ll 
then, at other times it appears just as feasible to interpret ~e 
II c'lOVe~nent as a staunch attempt by a group of patriotic people tcl\ 
bring France out of the poor condition the government and the II 
!I 
economy are in by changing, substantially, the institutions th~r 
H 
are partly res9onsible for those conditions. There is also th~l 
fact that 8any of its supporters are from an element in the so~~ety 
'I 
'Nho merely wish to stamp out the Communist movement and believ~j 
,, 
,I 
de Gaulle to be the only sure method of realizing this. That ~r 
is a combination of these facets is obvious, but to determine ~~ 
•I 
which force is dominant in the party can, as yet, only be dete1~ 
mined by o. resort to logic. I, 
d 
!i 
De Gaulle sor:1eti~n.es, by his O'v.'n action, makes the movement!) 
;, seem ludricrous. He is either a fish out of v1ater when it co:nej il 
;; the 
il to "compro::lise" politics, or else he is/blandly used tool, of aJ 
I\ simple sort of structure mentally, for the promotion of reactio~ 
!1. l but whose place in the minds of the people nake recognition by ~ 
the toolraakers of the stature of the man at all tines importantlr 
It is hard to connect ~hat is sometimes the sheer political nai~ete 
ill of de Gaulle ·. i th the shrewd thinking of business and pov1er in 
11 
"'·==~c ... =-"·==--~== 
il 
I! 
I~ 
,I ,, 
' j: 
:1 
jl 
ii 
the HPIP. 
De ~aulle does not have Hitler's Qagnetism, but he 
has the background endearing 
to offset the discrepency. 
ii 
him to the heerts of many frenchm1/n 
il 
\ • fl At t11e same t1:-~.e, he does not ahvaJ{1s 
:l 
lack the political acuity that has marked sone of his thinking.!! 
ii 
During the war we have seen that he stressed the social justic~ 
ii 
of the new France to the utmost, the planned economy for and b~ 
II 
the workers, and this at a time when disgusted frenchmen digeslrd 
this sort of talk with gusto. He was able to give the people ' 
then just what they wanted, and built a solid structure out of 
an otherwise impossible set of conditions. But his ideas do ncfu, 
b 
:; 
always bear up under close scrutiny concerning his solutions t~i 
!i 
:I 
llR. 
the nation's problems, and lack a consistent logic to them at d~her 
il 
times peculiar, and at the sane time intimating that his posit~~n 
in the party is relatively an independent one and not dominate41 
by the strong lea~ership elements associated with it--such as ~~e 
i' 
I! sound thinking of I'falraux, from vvho SOL'le of de Gaulle's ideas " 
II 
could not possibly have come--unless the General is a poor read~r. 
li 
His recent speeches do impart some logic, however, in dealing [i 
i.i ·~•vi th the political problems of the country, but :nostly they in-11 
lj 
l! part a lot of patriotism, at times as though he assumed this 11 
myth to be the lo8ical solution to the bulk of Frances problems~4 • 
I 
14. An interesting character sketch depicts him as a puritan i~la 
land of epicureans, a chilly individual in a land of animation,!! a 
c'lystic in the midst of a people of logic and hard sense. ue isj] 
aloof, listens to an inner voice, austere, a devout Catholic, a:l 
grest patriot end splen~id orator. (Padover, Op. Cit., p. 30.) Ji 
;\ ,, 
II Ill I! 
II ! ll ' .~ II 
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1) II :I ~)e Gaulle is the nost openly anta,gonistic o.enber of the 
ji ~ I! party continually denouncing :;ommunism. Fe is violently oppose~ 
11
1
·,·· rl 
to its continuance in France end is deterwined to see it stampe~ 
11 out so that France can rise to a stature in the military and ii 
economic sphere where it con take its rightful place in :r<;urope !j 
He is largely the II 
,, 
in the resistance of Communist aggression. 
spokesman for the rest of the party, ho•sever, in this idea, forjl 
the whole movement is at least consistent in its adherence to t~e 
II 
denouncement of Communism as the chief cuuse of Frf;nce' s troub\ s 
and that de:rrocratic r.1achinery is incapable of coping with it, VJ ich 
coupled with the see!llingly common distaste for the present gove n-
ment within the party, spells so:-ne sort of change, politicallyj 
II 15. !r 
should the party come into power. " 
There is not the sar:1e degree of consistency within the pa4y 
on other :natters. Aside from a number of small factions common ~o 
all parties, the RPF is roughly divided into three LJ.ore or lessi\ 
!I 
distinct groups. The first group, conprising the inter-group !1 
[, 
;,,ithin the "'~sse::.1bly ;,;ith Paul Giacobbi ot their head, and novi a~d. 
tl1en Hene Pleven (until he beca:-'18 prer.1ier), is prir:J.arily intere~ted 
,I 
II 
in kee;;>ing the present porliamentary nachinery, but vvi th sorne ir-
portant changes. They intend to abolish proportional represent -
i' 15. The party is forever trying to hide the reactionary stigrm 
\1 attached to it. '.Ihen the party's seats were assigned to it on he 
i: right in the Council of the Republic after the 194? elections, he 
1: HPF der:1anded to be placed between the Socialists and the HRP. 1 he 
! De Gaulle declared tl~at this represented the wish of his follo'N rs 
119. 
!: problem was finally solved by placing the party in a group of s~ats 
\1 in the rear of the chamber extending from rigf>t· to left of cent r. 
11 to "keeep their eyes on large horizons" as contrasted with thos 
. ~ ~~~i::.i~~~t~. l~~n~er5: 19l9~:eM~out in the swamps... "~~r:. .~c~~ 
II 
I! 
il ' 
II 
li 
I! 
II 
i: 
li 
i 
q jj 
li 
!! 
'I II 
i! li 
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II 
ih·-
II 
tion and adopt the single-member district system, 16 ·which they 
II 
believe would reduce the number of Communists in the 1'!ational I II 
,, 
!I 
Assembly to less than twenty, and a dominant anti-communist ma-ii 
il 
jority ~aight even be able to do avmy vvith the party altogether.)\ 
The second group is centered around !'Ealraux, V.fallon, l? ·andil 
!i to some· extent Soustelle, and is decidedly revolutionary. Its ii 
i! 
leaders deny being revolutionary and are looking for new ways it 
!I 
which capital and labor can achieve cooperation. Their concept~ 
,, 
of this assume sone of the flavor of corporativism, and proport~onate 
!I 
I' wa~;es with management, labor and the public all thrown togetheril in 
running the nations industry and economy. 
ll 
Their contention is :1 
'I 
that the problems of the economy are bound up in the fact that ~o 
:! 
far those three elements have not been reconciled in their sena,-
~ il 
r rate interests vvi th ea'ch other. 11 11 
I! 
li 'The third group are the Catholic and socially progressive w11 ~ le-I' d I; i! 
·i! ments that might bring a defunct lffiP into the RPF. Its social we-
i: form is not far from Malraux' but shuns the corporate idea of tte 
state. It is not opposed to outlawing the Communists but wants\\ 
[! 
first to outbid them for the workers' support. An important fiF-
ure in this group is Thierry d'Argentieu, a wartime admiral now~ 
in a monastery. :ruch of the support for this ,;roup comes from 1\ 
18 ,1,1' elements in the ilmP. • 
I! 
16. They have since changed their tune on proportional representa-
tion when it became evident to them that the governm~nt coaliti~n par-
ties intended to use it to the detriment of the ::lPF as well as ~he 
Colllillunis ts. ( cf. p. 121 ff. ) l1 
",'fallon seems to switch now and then to Communism and ba!Bk tw tht~ RPF age in, and it is hard to place hi:;1 at any one tirw. :1 
ii 't·=~~= 
jl 
~eporter, L)ril 26, 1949, pp. 30-32. lB. 
I 
II 
!! 
li 
\: II 121. 
~~ ---- ------ -- ll .. 
il · t H 
1
. In the structure of the party, the 1n er-groupe appears to
1
: 
li ,-,I 
j/ be the least reliable, possibly for its lack of zeal, while thelj 
, other two are better organized. So!'le :nembers of the inter-groufe, 
at the saae ti:'le, belong to the other parties in the .Asser1bly, !: 
li 
pr inc ipa lly to the !tTRP and UDSR .19 • ~~ 
ii 
As to the desire by some members of the party--the inter- I, 
II 
il groupe faction--to have the electoral system returned to single~ 
!! 
me~ber district constituencies, there is some question as to th~ 
e:'f icacy of supporting the r.1ove. If such an electoral reform II 
:I 
were introduced, naturally, it would come from the coalition pa~ties 
:I 
i1 
' and would so come with the tacit agreernent between these [!,roupsli in 
,, 
i! 
the government to combine their forces in· the election to presept 
:I 
! 
in as many departments as possible the best list of candidates ~o 
beat not only the CoCl.Dlunists but also the de Gaullists. In thei! 
ji 
face of such a combination it is inconceivable that the RPF wou~d 
fare much better than the Conmunists themselves, who stand by t~e 
process to lose heavily in the number of seats obtained in the !1 ji 
I! 
• I! 
new Assembly. Only if the system were 1ntroduced by the governlf 
// .11ent with the express purpose of stultifying the Communism' li 
il il 
\/ strength, only, and not that of the RPF too, vvould there now beli 
Ji any sort of accord on the part of the RPF with the bill. At tlh
11 
Ill . sa;ne tL1e the I:1J1p would stand to suffer from such a process, b 
:I 
It 'I' L 1· reason of its being a relatively new party on the sdene and not~ 
therefore, as well established in local areas as the older Soci~lists 
i! . 
and Radical-Socialists. This faqtor would leave to nembers of ~he 
.I 
!I 
19. Loc. Cit. 
jl IIi II 
,, r 
I ,j 
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1
1 
needed (which is the co se in the majority of districts in Franc~) 
li due to their being firmly entrenched in local areas and their lj 
11· leaders there more favored. It would mean for the JffiF that to 11 
li achieve the desired results of the move in the overall sense--tf 
11 excornmunicate the Comr.mnists or both they and t~e Gaullists--th~1 :1 II ji I·:RP vwuld be bound to cede to these older parties the right tbf 11 
:: way in the second ballot decls and thus would arrive in the newll 
I· Assembly vJith considerably less numbers than they now enjoy. ,1 
il This would, for all practical purposes destroy ther.1 as a party ~nd 
I any pro:nise of t:1eir being able to continue in the r:;overnment '.)luld 
1: so to naught due to treir not being able to supply the neded nJ ber 
(
1 
of deputies to :~1ake either their position felt in the governm.en1 
11 or to :.1ake it ·worth the trouble for the c~her Government part iel 
I d 
II to admit them. 
At present, Henri 0,ueuille is struggling ·with the questionjl of 
I 
electoral reforo which brought the Pleven cabinet down and whic 
20. 
made Bidault unable to form a government between Pleven and Que ille. 
20. Boston Perald, Feb. 22, 1951; and r~arch 2, 1951; and The Bo ton 
Globe, :MarcniT-;-1951. In the debate over the proposed ere'Ct1o 
reform bill the l·T2P sought to have it defeated and >Nhen the conf ict 
1
• ca~ne to a vote of confidence, Pleven' s govern:~ent ·,ion, but by ~l 
11 ;:o:"'lall end umJOrkable najority. ':!hen nidault, ~"RP, tried to fo fl a 
ri ce.binet he sought to form it on the basis of a "~rational TTnion·•~· 
I! comp. roM. ising every party outs ide the Corr .... ':lunis ts, but the. ?ioc ia1-· sts 
'i ·.;Jould not coalesce ':·Jith the I:.PT' and his atte:mt failed. The 
Socialists stood to in by the election bill- <:me~ the T''l"E? c'lid pt, 
;:; o no c"eal ~v2s effected. il' 
• ! ;, 
I' 
li 
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I· 
-rhe TG?T'' s e,rly s.ccord '.':i th the :;roposed electorR.l reforn \j 
" '! 
~as probsbly due to its belief that it could ~oin as oany seat~\ 
li 
• • i! in the "',_sse~:lbly '.;i th or \Ji thout t}1e new system. Fowevor, lnc~ lcip-
\i 
ticns )oint to their ulti:~ate defeat b:r the ::-1ethod because of tre 
" sharp de~:;ire by the r~overnment oarties--at leest the Socislists:: 
'· - II 
II 
and the Radical Socialists--who will probably count for the nos~ 
i! 
123. 
in run-off elections--to defeat both Cor:ununis ts end n-auJ.lists a~ike. 
Sene polls taken b:t the .Service de Sondages et StatistiqueW, 
the french ;:-,allup polls, indicete thst in 1948 to the follor;ing
1
i 
·I 
years end, the people v:ere '.".sning in their interest in the :r:r:, !I 
Fov:ever, f:::~ced ,:;i th the ~1sked coice betvveen de Gculle nne, 8m1rmbism 
II 
43~ would choose de Gaulle. It is interesting to note that as #he 
!! 
figures decreased in sympathy ;Ji th the RPF, they rose in the "d~ 
~ ; 
i! 
nothingn hracket, ~o'Jhile the people who vvere opposed to de GElullt 
returning to power re01ained com:; tantly around 45%, anc:. 
~ith the naked choice a quarter of the people would still do 
21. 
nothing. 
I 
The party is interested in enticing sor:1e of the ;:;overnr;J.ent I 
I 
parties into t1"Jeir ranks, ·which is conceivable where the ~~r is 1
1 
concerned and the TJDSR--both have been close to de n.aulle since \1 
ii the first c,ays of the vJar. Bidnult, in so.qie of the trying days l)or 
II I 
I! the Republic in 1948, in tina ted he v.as rer::d y to "rnlly around t.lW
1
e 
II II 
; ]rodigious na::w o:f General J:te Gaulle." Pleven of the 'TTD:3:?. lws 11 
i: ii 
been close to the -qpr a nunber of tines, and the '.";~ole movement ii 
II 
\I 
centered in the UDSTI. YJaS closely &SSOCioted With the :i-eneral in i! 
!1 
21. Padover, Op. Cit., p. 23. 
I! 
i! 
il 
!' 
i 
1\ 
:I 
il li 
!! 
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124. 
li the early post-war ays. But the extent of.the willingness 1~· m-
q il manly felt in these parties tmvard such a coalition rer1eins obsl urPed 
II /! li --except at such ti:nes when the 'RP:P stock is currently quotec~ rlf'.ther 
i I, 
!i high, then no bones ".'!hatsoever are picked over. II 
ii 
il The intimation just lh;ted ~:::s to niclault's vvillingness to [i 
,I 
'! 
~)ossibly merge his group 'i'iith the G-eneral, accm1panied a minor II 
q 
scandal VJhich seemingly uncovered a se~ret deal between the 13e1rral 
end ~iC: e.ult over the latters forcing dissolution of the Asser:c1b~V 
., 
should hi_s goverm:wnt--'•··hich \,'&S just stc::rtin{:; ot the time--be ii 
il ,, 
defestecl 8t any time, and then the :'1.P:F' and r:q-p 1ilould co;1bine thibir 
ii 
I' 
forces in the election in the hopes thct they could Gain the su~-
23. !i )Ort of a :.18 jori ty of the electorate. ~hey both C enied it, or 
il 
course, >1ith c~e Gaulle the more vituperative. ~,he event ocoure!a 
II late in l9L19 end early in 1950 de '}aulle, in a Slleech to "' "18. csi; 
"e e t inr; e t the 'Te lof,ro'"e d 'l!i ver in Per is , made it clear :h: t "i 
)! 
·,;Jas prerx-ued to enter into consultations • .. i th rep res enta t i ves of 
I' 
'I 
the present regine on how to bring about elections, but that h~i. 
H q 
vvs.s not prepared to enter into any coalition that would :-1erely il 
!i 
1 1.- t . 24. pro ong tl1e presen reg1me. 
1\ 
By his st·1tements be ·::aintained. his stand that the :?.!>? helMJ-
!i 
:\ 
the present governMental syste~ in contempt and could not tolerJrte 
I, 
ii 
resorting to political deals ·which vvould only give the institut;~ons 
!: 
a shot in the arm. Uhether the RPF will ever enter into a 
22. Tic1e, ~-;ov. 21, 1949. 
23. Loc. Git. 
24. The :.:anchester Guardion ''eekly, Feb. 16, 1950, p. 15. 
I! 
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/I 
I' 
bination vvith the MRP or not --acceptable to both--remains to b~J 
seen. JJ 
As to labor, the bulk of the ~PF's leaders are anxious fo~ 
de fi.aulle to begin the clri ve for the '.vorkers' suooort in the \\ 
co~ins election, es9ecially so is r~lraux and some of the progJes-
' !j 
s i ve Catholic elements. T~Te has not :-Jade a concerted effort al1ng 
these lines yet, but if the Cor.1111unists show signs of o.aintnini1g 
their position and their unity of action program becomes too v~­
brant, even the S-eneral hio.self v;ill be spurred to action in tl~is 
II 
li 
quarter. Up to now he has shown a lassitude toward arbitraril~~ 
adoptinr.~ ~olicies desiRned to attract labor due to his firm co ~ 
·- - ,~ :I 
• li 
viction that politics should not be a process merely of offerl~P 
n something to people to vJin their vote. Sugport of this kind, JL 
I
ll·, -lf 
I! feels, is merely selfish and not the kind that will maintain ijf' 
il allegiance when the fair days are past, or interrupte~·d for at' J.e. 
I'· i! li He is nore interested in the solution of problems co~J.rn.on to al~,, 
li after ll'lhich he feels the individual probleCJ.s 'dlo.lfltsrooluvbelethf. eomr, setf~e~~· 
I Eis independence of action may spell a degree ~ 
1 party, but at any time it is conceivable that extenuating circ1r-
l stances ~ight easily weld the different elements found in it i1fa 
!l1. a strongly unified group which could effectively conduct itselfll 
I; 
I 
I p 
1:. 
in a campaign with a constant program. 
[! 
The last force to consider is the ~hird Force, democracy, li 
liberalism, and fear of the other two. Third Force government II 
'I is still no more than a sham and a simple ruse to allow the 
[i 25. Geoffrey c. Cook, Op. Cit., p. ,~_345; Padover, 
"~~~~'"+''~8~-~eporter-,-April 26"; i£49, pp. 30-32. 
pe ow:J_e 
II 
Op. Cit., pp. ~6-
\: 
!i 
l' 
to hide from the possibility of a strong authority 
control over their lives--which may be out of the 
and their lee.der~ conscious comprehension, as far 
exercising tl~~ 
sphere of thE:j~rs 
I 
as the actua~ 
form such authority would t3ke under the hands of de n-aulle. i1 I, 
!' 
They have been forced before into experiences of power and str~ g 
authority of the most obnoxious sort, and cannot, therefore, col.e 
to any ter:a.s \·jith themselves over co~.1promising vvith any force II. 
s:-:wlling but faintly of the ''Ancien Regi~1e." 1/ 
:Sut the parti< s of the governnent are i:·~possibly throvm t~~ 
!! 
126. 
.;_;ether under concH tions brou~ht about by ~r~e lc.t~:;t ~Tational eleclr 
tion -,ihich are hard to reconcile i!1to D \·,orkable system. I.ibe~~lis['l 
die_ not '.dn enough seats to make their unsl:~akable atte:.1pt to c~r-
i! trol the levers of govern:nental action defensible. The Soc ialiJ~ts 
'! il 
il 
got too raany seats, but are not alligned in their concepts of 11 
ii governr:1ent vd th any other party but the Cot:rlnunists--which leave113 
'I 
II 
them out in the cold as far as their being able to effect goveljfl-
li 
j[ mental action themselves, but ·which leaves tb.em constantly at Ji 
odds vvith the liberal philosophy that they effectively block eajfh 
i! I' 
,, chance they get. ?he Socialists, ·at tree same time, are the on]Jiv 
i[ !t 
ll party in the government of France which can lay claim to repre~ 
II 
il 
II 
!I 
II 
;\ 
senting the majority of the people's opinion. 
at heart and so are the raajority of the people, and the 
ment is mostly liberal in its views and its action. 
Social~ 
govern-! 
!i 
II ii 
Just such a condition as that cannot long endure the test 
ti~e without collapsing in some way or the other. Traditionsl 
outlooks are continually at war with the requisites to securityi ,, 
II 
tic 
------------------------------~ 
lj 
!I 
1/ 
ij· . I! ~ 
II ar1d internal development. The divergencies o:Co~~~~on in tlle i 
!I Third Yorce have led only to a lack of action ~md nec;r stationjr! y 
it '1 
II and ineffective solutions to L1portant problerJ.s. nueuille' s i 
1
.1 v I 
1
i lo.rl,:S reign was ,,lade possible becrmse his govern.'1lent' s action w~!s 
i1 t:1e least controversial and, therefore, the least effective ( b~~-
iJ • t l t -'- • " -f' ) "TT • • ~~~ 
:r r_. lng 11e e.xa t..lon aavcjnces, o ... course • · lS co~:mromlses '.vere 1 li . " I' 
" !: 
il il 
,j 
II 
lr 
I 
1/ ,. 
il 
II 
i 
ii 
i' 
,! 
•I 
!i !! 
!I 
ii 
!I 
merely the enJ:-ianced version of the bulk of compror·1ises to dete II 
" 
t'.1et effect Cieintenance of power :nore t 11an t.hey effect governctelr~: 
•I 
!I 
\I 
!I 
J! 
1\ I I 
'I 
II 
!/ 
H !i 
II 
!j 
q 
II 
il 
li 
'I il 
'I I: 
l,i 
I! 
,I , 
. II 
i/ 
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26. ~his picture is sonev1hc:1t exeg.::;erated Gince, at the :1o:-1ent, ~Je 
2 j 1 8 critic i:J il1-?: t:r:o ""rench l:overnrr:ten t in terms of s orrJ.e rc. tr.er i~~­
practicsl concepts o:' the enos end ::lC:ws of "good 1' govern:1ent. i.l; 
In terms of what could be proctically effected in ~ranee, unde~ 
the present institutions, ~he his~ory of the Third·Force is sti~l 
not reac ily co:nmendable. They seen to acc?:.l!)lish •mucJ: nore by 1: 
the way of the constant stimulus of need flnally gett1ng a grud~-
ing, resfugned reaction to it. :1 
r 
11 I· 
II 
12?. 
i: 
I; 
" It [' \\ 
Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
;! 
!I 
i' 
tl 
n 
I II 
il !I-
Ii 
lj 
II 
ii 
I! 
!l 
il 
I' 
'I I, ]l 
tl 
'J:lhe conditions that rJust prompt our rational selection of Ji 
II 
il 
one or ~ore of the various possibilities that might develop oub1 
!I 
of the battle for pmver in France are of course dependent upon II 
the relative strength and position of the various conditions w1 
have already described at the time the power contest comes int~j 
being. The ·,oorld situation denands a centralization of author+y 
in all important countries as well as in France. France needs \1 
I' 
a single purpose governing the levers of mobilization and de-
velo9raent. 1/lhether this vJill come as a semi-dictatorship, or 
il 
I! 
!I 1: 
i! I! 
as a form of Fascism itself, depends upon the immediate future II 
[i 
action of the governr:1ent and vvhe:ther it is able to offset the ii 
deleterious aspects of the countless forces ~orking against it.~ 
II 
:Si tller circumstances vvill lead Fronce into a bald authoritarian~ 
I: 
L:;r:J., or the goverm1ent ''ldll be able to produce a consistently !! 
j: 
effective order a,d a revitalization of its people's treditionai 
I 
outlook to effectively tlw12rt the purpose Elnd need for authori-11 
~ tarianism. ~~~~ 
ll ' 
1: ,.,!:le french governr1ent in the forms of the ~hird Dnc_ Fourth!\ 
I?.epublics may no longer ::-:wan enough to the people to per;11i t thet 
to be stir:1ulc:ted to the point of trying to preserve it. The [i 
·I governnent parties rely on what stigma they can att1:1ch to the li 
:I 
!j t;,vo e::,;:tre::nes -.'.,8 i ting vJi thout to vJin sun port for their efforts il 
I! 
128. 
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11 and the devotion of their adherents, vvhile the lJeople seern not ii 
1
11
1
. ,I 
so positive in their clenouncer:1ent of these t\'iO e:ctrenes. ~his\\ 
'[1
1 
leads to a retrenchment in the coalition srou)G further deter-it 
:1 
II, il !! ring com)ctent governc:J.ent. n 
I'll ~1 This has been one of the rna j or rea sons for l',rsnc e' s inab i-1!-\ !I 
\ ity to reconstruct herself to a needed level. France needs ani] 
j internal over-hauling economically ancl this is literally imposl I sible in the face of the customs and attitudes of the people •1o 
1: 1 · h · t 1 • rrh · f t f · f th il must accomp lS l • ~ lS ac or, o course, lS one o e ~~ gravest elements of weakness in Europe. France must succeed i~-
1
!',1 ternally or it will mean disaster to a large part of the contiJ-
'11:,, 11'·,,\, 
ent that depends for its own stability upon the stability of 
li li 
I\ France. i 
\i On top of the successes France has been able. to achieve i1 
!i her economy, the 'des tern nations are now asking her to increas,\ 
\lj military expenditures vvhich are already too hi~h. She cannot :
1
'1
1
, 
1,, - '-' 11 
maintain an acceptable standard of living for her \\:orkers in t~b 
li face of it. On top of this, the black market dissolves any hop~~ 
il II il of bringing stability to the price and VJage picture. The tens \1i'. 
t! 
1: 
11 
of thousands of middlemen, of VJhich the black marketeers ere 11 
li I 
II 
I' 
\i d [: 
I' il 
!I 
:\ 
.. 
i 
1. Frenchmen, due to a corr~on lack of faith in their nation and 
its government, now keep more than 4 hillion dollars in private y 
owned gold outside the country. (Newsweek, Jan. 2, 1950.) This\ 
amount could do wonders for the internar-Gevelooment of the . 
country--and its return would promote renewed c~nfidence from t. 
others. But the attitude that keeps this money out of the coun ry 
is not merely a phenomena of the upper-class, but the general 
o tti tude of far too many frenchmen in all walks of life who no 1 
longer share a co;'lffi.On regard or faith in the future. \' 
I 
1\i, II ~ II 
i i,'l 
Ji 
1! 11/ H 
II but a part, produced by the occupation and the p~:=;~b~ratic~n ~~-
1
1_ .. ·~~ ~ I s,~ortas;es il.::tve r10t been ersc~ icated snc~ L1pose a trenendous bnr-L 
I' il 
1\ c.e11 on ".:;;1s consLner tlw t a:.19lifies the ·.;hole 1,'v<J.;e-price contro-l\ 
li II 
\i V'~l~S'J, but "the ~overnc:J.ent hc::s not s:·~o-,m tl'e force necessr::ry to \1 
\i cope with the problem. Political stability in Frsnce might we~~ I be able to ask for •nd !ecaive the voluntory austerity that th~ 
J: :Snglish g::Jve to Cripps,""· but the present instability of the !I 
li, ~ 
11 
;:;overm1ent aerely increases the french tendency to distrust anytl·~. 
\I 
,I 
!\ 
thing the government sugsestsi let alone do what they might ask~ 
11 II 
The French may not have the heri t2ge tl:cc1t allovvs austerity in the 
;i 
'i 
II first place. They ~oubt ~hether order can be arbitrarily im-
I !I 
Dosed on economic nature--of course, they have not been able toll 
impose much order anyvJhere since the vwr. 
il 
'"2he thinking of the i; 
H it 
people prompts t~1e government to relax controls and banish a us- !J 
\i 
terity wherever possible, which they have been successful in do4 
II 
ing everywhere except in their inclustrisl populc1 tion, where its\\ 
banishment to so~e extent is probably needed most. 
li 
:( 
!i 
:I 
:!:iut ·,;hatever t~~s ccuse of these little I~ailures of the nrc~ ~ ~II 
.sent :~;cvern::a::: nt 23 f<:;:e c:.s E'~{trc:rnsl coEc' i tions ere concerned, t};.~ 
1\ 
peo9le's u •• n reaction to the ~)rohlems :.1dce tl:e entire situation 
i\ II 
!I ,, 
The lack of inceTitive to succeed any more 
·-------
i\ 2. In the ·;Jeek following the Ernnouncer1.ent of the new o.rna:nents 11 
program in 1950, the french ~orker found the price of bread ha~ : 
gone up a franc, and other prices had skyrocketed in Paris, in 1! 
August, a time ',\'hen Paris is half empty and prices are usually (i 
falling. (~ation, Sept. 2, 1950, pl 204.) After devaluation of~ 
the pound, by contrast, the british experienced a mild inflatio~ 
where three months after the action prices had not yet reached -~ 
130. 
the,,e~p:ct~~ _5:~ increase. t~~,~~~ 
II 
I 
I 
;; 
I 
I. 
J, 
'I I 
tl1e country, C:L1.d 1 it -s 1 e ' 08 c-: one to better 
I• . i! the s.ttitucieD on a 
ii 
j! 
·I )r 
/I 
!J 
r c 7 ··· ~ '1 .,_ 1 • e .; r 1 "' ·1-
..._ ... ~_,u ..L.t · v ..... L --~...i.. Ow l.J 
ever rcs~inins it 
s;-:;.ort range basis. ?he french have yet to 
presth;e i.::1 :r":urope, sEJe little hope for 
under present conditions, but the govern~ent 
the fol'c~es on populace that ~ould produce s 
sc:.:cb lDnce. of c~ icc i)line in tl·.e )eople 's re21e. ining inc: i vidue.l.is, 
!1 they could entice fron theL1 e. ~rea ter public spirit, and some 
self-confidence. 
As it stands now there has been injected into the french 
realisn a cynical defeatism that is hard to conbat in the wide-
spreat form it has assuned. It will take a lot of cooperative 
j1 effort to .make an army out of J.en of resistance a€~8 in. Eany 
1: 
1\ :?renchmen ~>till feel that it is just as profitable to lose a wo. 
II 
i! 
I: 
rl 
I' ,, 
li 
II 
II 
\! 
li 
I 
i 
I 
II, 
!! 
I! 
j ~ 
as to vJin one, end the attitude th::Jt prot:1pted tr~e vvife of a 
french d iplome t a year e;;o to say, "'.fe would rather live 150 
years cd th the Russians tl::.an hove the soil of Frnnce seared by 
C_.( 
an atomic liberation," has not c3 isappeared. u • Ask a ~renchm.an 
";vhu t l-.:.e v;ill do to defend his country and he will usually say, 
lt Join tlw The :uGsians coulC:. occupy :r:urope 
3. ~~ewsvveek, ""'ec. 6, 1949. At that time the '01rench :'eneral 
':Jtc:iff was asking permission to have its ermy cross Spain enroute 
to ~orhh Africa at the outbreak of the war. The pitiful condi-
tion Europe's ar~ies ~ere in hns not been appreciably bettered 
to date, which pro~pted tte action. 
131. 
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i\ 4. The Ststesrnan and the !~ation, Sept. 16, 1950, ). 272. Indi 
tionS""Bre the.t enlistments-into the french army have been negli !i 
;:ible. ~'aets ere scarce on the European defense nechanisn, but 'r n 
5eptenber, 1949, the 'Ji'rench had but 150,000 regul.cr troops in !i 
France proper, with a total regular arny of 470,000. Yrance ma~b 
the co:nmi ttment in that year to supply five divisions--three in.JI 
fantry and two armored--for the defense of Europe. (Newsweek, S~~t. 
~c=-"'c= '·'-' .;,_,J,fi~--"J.~4_9__.._) _That=~~EJ,.=-JJ,as__as_yet, not been rea clJed. (De Gan lle 4t=~=-,====.:= 
:I 
i) 
'\ 
\. 
,I 
li 
II 
)i 
\( 
.. ··. ~ c 
I, li toc:torrov: if they Yiished, :;nc<. the peo_ple e:'e a·,,ere of it, but o~ 
I 
II II tbe sa~e tie1e the ?rench leaders are aware that this attitude il ~~~~ 11 I; 
, must be cLsnged. . 11 
I! ,, 
1! To be eble to as;_;uue the lJJole in Europe tl1e ')estern natior1!,s 
I' -n 
il d 
1 feel Frence must, has brought forth repea.ted efforts to get th~i 
11 li 
i! people thinlting as frenchmen a:::_:ain, but all they have been sue~\ 
cessfu1: in doing is lessening public sentinent against some of 1! 
' 5 • ' 
the obvious practi.calities they must face. As a consequence t~b 
'I 
idea· of ''!estern Union is gaining· steadily in the people's e1ind,l· 
Fowever, the leaders tl-.:.emselves are ::'J.ore in.bued with the reali~p-
,j 
tion of vJhat the attitude of the people means for ?ranee. "Thd
1
\ 
federal parliaments And courts, councils, etc., for which frena~ 
I 
leaC:ers pl.ead, ~1ay be a mee.ns of escaping from t~:e hard tasks t\p-at 
];'ranee and all 'ivestern netions must un6ertske. The? r:1ay el~JO il 
Ji i1 
1: jh 'i fors t:~e only framevvork ·~~i thin ·which ?rs.~nce ce.n 2chieve the Yiilj.L 
I: !1 1 11~ to master these tasks. ,,s · · fi th the circu:'lstences over\Jhelming i' \I 
ii . - :1 
,
1 
•• vsnts ::'ranee to supply 15 divisions ond 5,000 planes -vvithin t:1r~e 
11 years'ti~e. Nation, Aug. 28, 1950, p. 180.) As to how efficien~ 
!' or hmv vdlled to flght, the frPnch ormy is ot present, ho _purelW 
ii conjectare. 
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5. ':'he v2rious allied atte::1pts to achieve unity in ::':\<rope faile c:.s 
fs.r c;s tLe frEJUh 1JUblic vJas concer.o.ed. .An opinion )oll in ·:;e)t .:-:ber 
1947, sho~ed that only 18~ said the ~~rshall Plan was a sincerei de-
sire to aid Europe--47;; said it was the result of the United st'.tes 
needing more foreign markets. Another poll in 1949 showed t bat: 
only four out of every hundred gave the I~arshall Plan credit fori 
Ji ·,Jhat recovery France had made. In the spring of 1949, two poll' were 
~ taken on the question of the north Atlantic Pact. ~he first re. ealed 
tl1at 23% had never heard of it, 395; favored signing it and 38~ i1ere 
opposed or opinionless. In the second, 26c~ considered it a Qen ce 
to peace, 10% thought it would prevent war andthe rest or ~ore 
1
han 
64; h:':ld never heard of it or rejected it. Pedover, Op. Cit., p.i!6l. 
6. Hew Republic, Sept. 18, 1950, p. 15. - II 
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' her, France may not be able to make out any longer as a nation~ 
1 .state, until such time as order is a15ain restored to the world.
1
11 
rl 
I' 
1
: At any rate, for obvious reasons to them, french statesmen hBV, 
I finally come around to western thinking in terms of requisites 
1: 
I. 
It 
it 
I' 
i 
!; 
to security. After a long struggle they have consented to the ~ 
II rearmacaent of Germany--but vlith the Gchunan Plan imposed as a 
'I I, 
last effort to bring their own ecomomy out of its doldruss end lj 
appec;se public Elenti;aent. Obvious necessity was probably the !1 
only factor that finally nemoved this strong bone of allied con~ 
I• 
li ,, . 7. tentlon. 
~.lith ~llese serious i'opediments that reotrict a conclusion,~~ 
t:1ere rena ins but tvw or t.llree possible roads future !JOli tical il 
II 
?irst, for de 0aulle to co~e to 
I,( 
develppments in ~ranee can tske. 
po~er, certain requisites will have to be 8et. '"':'he fact that il 
de .i-aulle l::.a.s alreec"y sllu.m so•.1e of his true colors 
Jlete l2ck of utt ntion to his 
1 ;~rd for the ':-:r:? to •);c.;in :c .. mbstantial s~.1ounts of the 
stronser inplicstions of just 
'I jl 
to the '.:ork~ rs 
j, 
':.Gr b~r c. coif-
11 
II ,, 
lE: bor vote. j\ 
e:xectly '.iha~ 
it 
7. /.fte:r tvvo disasterous debacles, the r1ajority of the people c.,e 
still not rec:dy to ollov·l re-industrializstion of 'i-er.r:mny, let a 
lone rca1':;1a::nent, snd tLis tenC:Ls to conflict in the ,::,overrnent , 
ci1~c1es .. itt: t'-~eir profe;:;,scd )Olicies. ?he nttituc~e h:;s result c. 
h1 ;::ersistent o.elay in ::::ettinc)~ ug c centrclized sovern:nent in t e 
trench zone (v:!:"lich the "?otsdDD Aisree;lent envisa.':;ed, but which T'rn" ce 
did not sign). The 7rench openly incorporated into the french II 
zone the Saar region ~.: i th their setting up b etvveen tl1e two zone$J a 
customs frontier in !lee. 1946, followed later by a binding cust~'r;E 
union, both of v;hich \'Jere flagrantly against allied r)olicy. ?l1·~r 
followed this action by the introduction of a separate .';ear cur' 
rency in June 1947. "J. Freidr.lann, Allied ~"ilitarz. Government £.t 
; Ger:nany, 1947, pp 27-30. \i 
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11 tlw party intends to C.o for the >~orker end less emphasis place~~ 
II. on tLe "rally" concept. ~~Dlraux, it seems, is all too avvare ol 
. this a:1d has devoted the bulk of his tir:1e to developin~ his co4 
pora t i vis::-1 philosophy--and probably devoted a like aatatlt of ti~, 
I 
11 
atteupting to sell the idea to de Gaulle. A.t the sa:ne tir1e ~-he!' ·e 
il is a certain eler:1ent cvithin all the coalition rJarties that vnlli i1 - I 
li I i1 never follmv tile ir psrty in to a coalition \ii tp the TIFF. ".:'hese 
il [i voters end leaders will ei tller introduce e new party collecti v, y, 
:: or assw·1e group relationships around indei;endents--'Nhich is un~J 
li I li feasible under the circu::lStances--or they will go to either the\\ 
il 1!\ II Socialists or the Radical-Socialists. ~he extent of these ele~ 
li 11 m.ents in numbers is impossible to estimate, yet there is rea so I 
il 
II to believe tlHJ t they ere at least an import2.nt rninori ty, which ii 
jj would give both the Socialists and the Radical-.soc ialists re- li 
\! neweci vigor, tending to give an impetus to the second possibililfy 
1
' of a Radical-Socialist, Socialist coalition to effect govern~e9f 
I! under the same principles, modified, of the Third ,,,orce. That I 
ii would be an independent party coalescence as opposed to the ~~ 
\1
1 
I 
1 pro baby near homogenous murger that the ~PF vvould Eltte:-n.pt. If I 
11 
inc'iications point towerd this pos~3ibili ty, then these two parti\l s 
li will be able between them to reduce de Gaulle's labor vote to 
L 
/I 
'I 
I! 
\\ 
:I 
a rlinLmm, v;i th the indirect help of the Communists in tr~is are 
so that even \"Jith en "S."P:P victory nt tr1e polls it would not corae 
sbout under the necesnary terms for the realization of de c:.aull/~! s 
aims. I 
11 
':rhese last two possibilities assu.21e a condition vJhereby thiF 
~1~~~ t~~~~ 
II I 
il 'I 
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[J nation is confronted with an insoluble crisis that would bring 11 
an ..:\ssem.bly dissolution, or that the world and internal situ- 1! 
!, 
I' ation VJas such by the time of the scheduled elections in Nove:n.9er 
t.:-:;,a t the HRP and the UDS:::t had lost hope of further Third :rorce I 
II 
government to meet those situations Dnd would make terms iNi th J[ 
,, 
de Gaulle for purposes of the campaign--the impetus of which :1' 
II 
:aight bring in other minor groups on the Right and center. Bu~ 
~ i :j 
!I in the event there is no such A 11-consuming crisis confronting ~~-~ 
il 
1: !I 
11 t:-:.e n:_:tiun, then the tl1ird poGsibiJ_ity ::Jris<-;s, thet of a po:c•li~l~~­
:1 
" !j .:1'3:ltc.:ry s::mthesis of the :RPP jnto the sovernr1e nt un<'\er less ob-jl 
!I I 
'i rw=cious terns. 'llhis poss :Lb ili ty is probccb ly u~e ~'108 t c~es irab li'l 
!I 
ii e.s :·ar LS the sovernmental parties are concerned. ~o reduce !I 
n II !I -
:1 t 1le daullist tLreat effectively by r•1erging hin '.Jith the other • 
il inde~en<ient Group" in the c;:anber would nullify the n1ore viole+ 
objectives of the :rtP:? and give rise to on adequately centraliz~f 
., 
regi~:le in "!'T'rc:;nce thst v-:ould retcin its f~mdamenteil reprAsentc::t~lv~ e 
, · - · 
8 
• · ~ ~ · b d t · t f i' CDarecterlStlCS. 'Jnet,1er t1ns can e one or no ln cr:rw o :. 
the 'lPF' s tightly held position with respect to any coalition 1\ 
is :::1ostly relegsted to the best possible cor:1bination of circumJ
1
1 
:I 
li stances, largely outside our comprehension. '"::he RPF VJould ::1or~l 
it i,\ 
11 than likely ret::.1 in its position outside the government, and if \\ 
I/ it were to sain appreciably in the election, would do all in :itsl1!_ 
rl 
I! ,[ 
1, power to precipitate a lasting parliamentary crisis--which, if ~ !\ 
i[ 
II 
'! the Comnunist~ maintained at leat3t 15 to 18~ of the seats, 
8. J.e: Iidault's recent :::~.tte;~lpt to for."l a mrational Tjnionn Cab:Uhet 
3fter the electoral r6for~ crisis brought Pleven's cabinet dow~. 
~ !I (Boston FeralO., T :arch 2, 1951.) 
again ~rovide the stole~ete to the cover~aent's action. (Of 
course, s return co tl;e single-::J.enber district syster:1, vJhich 
many of the govern:--~ent ~.larties favor, ',JOuld lHcely result in a ii 1: 
tre~1enc1ous loss of sec.:ts to tr,e 2o:Jinunists r 
:i ve Third Force govc~rn:nen t favor in the voters' eyes.) 
J\S for the Comr:mnis ts, the ;,vorld v; ill not have Pnother 
depression, )robably, of any consequence for i"Clany yeers to cor'lE!l. 
·;ith sll the industrial outlets su]plied by the next few yenrs 
~obilization to absorb the causes for a depression, this pre-
su:aably '~Jill nullify the )OS~"libility tl"ce Co:-:'lf:J.unists ~izht have 
~1c;,cL to reclize further ~;o.in;;; in .,.,runce. ?heir number of seats 
·.:ill probably not totc:l :nuch ;1ore thon 10~ tn t~J.e ne::=t ;c..ssc:-r1bly. 
The possibility of a coalition of the t~o left ]urties is 
out of t~:e 1uestion, not only due to the nctural antipathy on 
i 
both .:ndes to tl~e evc,nt, but due elsa to the increasing pressure 
fro~n the entire ';lest ag:=1 ins t Co:ar:mnisL'l. 
A lest pos2 ib ili ty '18 y co'.·1e about if the ,..,hird "'orce cen 
effectively settle, for 
.. ~ote c1ecrr::ts-loi3 ~:,ov rn:1e:::1t in tr,e ~1orc importnnt spheres of 
c3Ctivity neeCiin.:::; it. c~Cl efi'icie.c.tl:r ef:~:"?ct c~oo<i ',overn:1e~t in I 
Un I:' to t~e elections, sould rcise the 
stoct of ell tl:e c;overnnent 1;rou:)s. ;'ut thii:3 lePVAs tY"ce 'nhole 
r~uestion up to hov,• tl1e v,orke:i:' -.vill be t:re2ted in the ''r:;ood" 
governoent, if he realizAs little gsin for hi~self snd there is 
no electoral reform, then the :::o:Emn:i.sts could gain ;.)Q to 2:.5·'"1· 
., r-~- ~ 
.tUD o 
l( 
II 
of the chamber~ seats in :rover.:1ber, Emd thereby destroy the nex 
I 
Third ~orce. The workers in l'rcmce oay not be as deeply co~- il 
cerned <:;bout the future of the lvorld nor the future of the :est 
u:; trJey ~:re conofor:1e6. co~cut the::Iselves. ,hey \i3nt a sociclize~ 
~U~)ort the )Grty ther:l t~:.o t 
:I 
)rouise. In a rmlti-l)srty systeu1, especially -,·;here tv:o of the iJ 
I' parties, the big ones, are obviously and )rofessedly scainst 
1
[ 
tJ:o e::'~i~~tine ol--cler ~::'lcl. irl~2ll0_ to c11c..n:~e it at t!·lf:ir fiT'St on- i\ ~~ 1! 
~:or-s·_lnity, ~~:e 0:' er~) ;,·~ ve beE:l'l feel e li~lf: of 9I'.) :L;os ~·nc~ V•inl~-
" :: 
!j 
'I 
!I 
cf:;>3r8 t;;,e.: tlle :w:;t i.n the ~)olitic<-~1 conflicts. •::c.ere ·~re to9 
,( 
::12ny· c;ltEc nutives to c'~oo~)f: f~:-:;::1, too ·c,····~! •)rUiYlf'<cnci;r,eo :Jln·asel" 
.!..>.,.< j_.J...) .,!..: l '-- -:..:: (__ - _/.._ LJ . _:_ - ·I ... ,) 
il 
to counterr::ct eacll ot'1er, Cclrld too nuch chance of o fickle su9- ,1 
!i 
~Jort desertints its forner l)2 rty e.ff ilia tions. Such a co:·1b ine:' t ~on 
!I 
of (~vc nts would nullif:,r the cowb ined '.·res tern C:l ttenpts to clE: str~iy 
II' I' t~·lc perty in the vvorkers' :tirds. . 
!I 
':::'he po~;s ib ili ty of "gooc'·'' '~overn 1e.:1t io 2lr:1o;:;t ruled out ~~y 
t.:1e cos:)osition of the ~11 1ird "'orce. 'l1he fnct tl:ct any euthori~J 
'I 
• , !i, tDtive .K<.Jures t~'e': · .. oulci t:·ke in the ::.ntt:rests of -c,ne n~ t.ion il 
,, 
· .. 'O' .. ~lc; :tore t:mn li\:ely be too ·.1ec·k to sti:mL te the ~1el9ful Lctj1ior: 
of o:,e )eople, ancl the peOIJle• s attitude \,oulc1 continue to pla~ 
its ci8rla:::,in:·~ role in -: 1te econor•1y. ·,':-:_at ll'rance needs is a wholei 
• ii 
ne·.:v set of idee,s Ctround ·,>Jhich she cen again ccnstruct the natloih's 
ii 
people into a ·.-;elded :-1ovinc und active force. This kind of tl1ilpk-
i~lG :1iE_~ht only co·1e from the 'RT'J". 
!i 
It 'v\ill h:::ve to be exclusive:! 
., 
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of nori:,Cil purty considero.ticns E<nct 
:i 
81!8rt frof:'l iJ.UCh of the indiVJ.rdHal 
========== +==:=-== 
tl ji 
il 
:I il 
il 
il 
!I ,, 
,, 
st in )oli t.io:· l 
wro tional-:Joc ialisun 
e, the 
ll 7~n.:.tc:< '".:.etcs, cleec1 f'or :wr·e coo)erc-::.j_on :"ro·';_ t' e contine:1t t:,:~n 
:'Jo ,·:mln;J:.~ c• n not be s:te.sheC: L·~-l .l1Q";;. 
'I 
ii 
.., ____ >•e-_. re "111''' +- n 1 <' 0 0 0 ''18 '" r-.,)lt the "'l:ird ::>orce. 
- L.._~.Jv w_,_--? '· · c ........ ..J~ 
,., 11 .,, -.-~c.: p ··e '"t b• E,+-,.,,8 en vr- .,, ,, n e .,-, '1d ,.., n r····any :·:n' i c" ~ ,,. 'lnll "..,.. r'i ~ ,... .-.. , 11] lP 
._..._ ::...L __ L '- '-'<.1.1. .!..J.. -' lJ •> -" · L~ _! - ._.l.J..\; J (.. . .T'-- L• . .l · ) ,;~ _._ J__;_' ...1.....'_ ~ . tV..L l....t,.c; 1 r(_,._ L1J __ ..__.' 
!I IW~llc~ brin,z in ::.~o.11e cf the other nationalistic units on the co~-
tinent--sufferins under the s&oe social revolutionary co~itio~s 
=~,r~once is--tlwt v.oulc'l soon develop into o potent r::DC}J.ine for tl~e 
c~lrt<_. il:~ent of so ;r:J.uni:c3t c;r.lv~lnoes. It -,.;oulcl thon be a force tlr t 
•,oulo. be o~" 00:1e u0e to •·;cstccrn thinking. -:e \'Wuld not 1 H:e tell 
il 
foce ~>ucl-:. en eltn~'n8tive OLlr~>elves, but it lS ·;_uite ecr.."<7 to ::.>eE1i 
t:.e neecl ·;,:,_e:-1 it occurs elsev1here e,,Jc1 e 4-e··;( +-o '1e lt" C' ~"'" 11 
JC:.. ;~:-l~'=t ic '·• itt -;:,Le c l;:·L:;eq uenc es ;"en t1-,_~y ~r~-~~-'- s<: f;,r l'e,a:vc0: 1~u~n-·t~erc~111, us. ?h:::::t :1cy ell be )recL;cl;/ ·.:ha.t }:'ranee neeC:is---::;Le I]~ 
:revolu.tion .. cnJ.C_ -.. in E~~~-E1in, ~;nc1 pf->.::''-·:.ps -::.:":.i:::: ~;i:-;,e ~ . .-:.nc~ej: ,_ ~itt:tb 
II set of con.(_iticr~s. 
1~ ~i:'ls1 )O~)sihiJ_i~.:<,r fc1'i -t~~:e ~o.··,L,llJ·;.iuJs:.~ r~rl~no or~t of tll(': 
s t }~' CJ l1f:.~ left -.iin~ 
,, 
·!'I' 
i' I I, 
)urt::. It is not n t n ll i:1Conoe i Ve:Jb le to thi::1k tl~ey '.Jould chol e 
neither of t:1e tvio rood~:; but r;o instesd to t::e ;o'l:'1Unists. ··ntH~ 
only resson such e decision ~auld crisc ~ould be under t~~ strJ~s 
<:)::::' a ru~1-c::,;&y inflc:~tion or ot~_c r econo-:cic crisin ',.l.ere t'J.e II 
I .~ocLJlists--c.;s ·.,e no';-' CJ~))T:"Jc.cb t!1e nc~t nc::tionr:-1 elr-:cticn--sto~~~ 
Co lose hecvily cine to their not being able to effect any ac~~~~, 
II 
-==·ccc=c· __ r;-occc--~--=' '-:f c-=:-c.==-====--=-=~-==--"'-
11 in the govern::1ent in the interests of 
II 
the worker. Solving the l1 
- li 
II 
li 
crisis would lead to an early election and the necessary thougli\ts 
<I It is, hovjever, no uore than ql 
H 
about coalition with de ~aulle. 
rl rec::Lote possibility. i! 
!! 
,, 
:I 
il 
il 
l ~ 
likely l1&y)en .ve fine_ t~·:at it sl,oulcl so sor1ething like this: 
:I 
The ]eople are undergoing a transition in FrulCe--m:ay froo !i 
il 
11 Third R.epublic' 1 concepts to a certain extent, but yet not quit~j 
" !I over to 'lie r-.,.aulle" concepts--yet the fact that vie believe that 1, 
II 
the people ,,ere sufficiently sick of the T'hird ~epublic--see :j 
,, 
1- j! 
nothing but its corpse in the present governr1ent, and that t.tle :~:! 
d 
•I 
are :f.' eel inc; an acute sense of their ovm country's insecurity il 
!I 
li --t~w ir mm personal insecurity; there vvill more than likely !! 
II 
be a substantial increase in t:r ... e number of popular RP:F' support~p:'s 
:I 
!i 
in this coming election. As to what effects it ~ill have on t~b 
d 
" nevv Assembly v:ill depend upon \vhether the nevJ electoral reforn il 
fi i: goes through--thereby cutting down, conceivahly, the effect of :1 
i! 
the :J.PF' s increase in popular support in terms of sctue.l nuabe~l 
,, 
of seats gained in the Asse:~lbly. If the reform bill doesn't II 
~ 1\ pass in ti:J.e, t::en de G-aulle r:1ic',ht have as much as f"~Oco of the I[ 
total seats--or o.ore, depending upon the type of crisis bringir~F 
6n the election, if it doesn't come naturally. il H 
![ 
, ..._ . . , 1 t 1 .Co tt '"' .• .J.. [tl At tne suu1e u:i.:;le, vvltn. no e ec or::l re1.or;:1, _le vO~lL'lUnls uS! 
!I 
"' • il s:~o~J.lcl, as · .. e have 3<:.: lc1, drop to so::1ewhere belovv 15.:!--less, 1n j! 
terms of Assembly seats. J:'here are a sufficient number of vote)~s 
suppo1•ting the Communists that have by now seen the handwri tin~~ 
130. 
q 
the wall and realize they will have no voice at all in ~he -l=-=.,..==== 
d deter:nining of political action if they stick vllith the naughtyll 
party, and they will '-jO elsewhere--AND riiS vve think, is the II 
!l 
one large block of labor support that could go to de Gaulle, d 
i\ 
Depending solely up-lj 
II 
should the latter entice t~1e labor vote. 
on the government's future immediate action, the Conrmnists II il 
il 
will lose sup)ort accordingly. That they will lose anyway re-1! 
11 
g<Hdless of V·Jhet:jer action is tsken or not, seems inevitable. [! 
II 
But the fact then remains that even if the Conmunists onl~ 
get 10~ of the seats, de 0eulle ~:1ip;ht be sble to nake up the q 
il 40'~ block of continually resistant I· 
sknds now. ! 
~b1s opposition when coupled with the nctural opposition from ihe 
c:ony extre:ce liberol elec>ents untogo'listic to semi-dirigiste 11 
government will make the coalition pcrties' position intolercbl~ 
difference of at least a 
opposition to the governnent--:1uch as the picture 
! 
and :1ecsuresbly less steble than it is today. '!i th this pro- I 
I 
spect--not be iac; eble to make a c,overnnent 1:i thout the S~c ialLtts 
any :1ore after the electlon t':an before Slnce t};.e ':oclcllsts. I 
;::;ttL1C~ to 3c:.in, if cnything, at the 0olls--tce other p2rties ll1 
11 
I 
t:.e cooli tion will be given strong sti:nulus to thruw their lot !I 
I 
in with de Gaulle and hope that there will be a suffic:Bnt amou~t 
of liberal and democratio elements in the then larger RPF or i 
a simple coalition effecting the so.r.1e purpose to offset the 
r,10narchist ond nationalist elements there now which frightens 
them. The government is ~oing to get less stability 
I 
!I 
after the II 
next election and the tiw.es end conditions are going to requir~~ 
Tiithin the next five yesrs the obvious result Tiill be 
,, 
i\ 
II 
,I 
140. 
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!I 
il 
r 
I 
il 
il 
:I 
II 
i 
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II i; II 
:I 
il 
!I 
![ 
II 
II li 
ti 
i'l-
! 
I! 
!I ~ I 
!i 
!I 
'i 
!I 
II 
li II ,, 
ii 
il 
i' 
II 
II 
l' d 
!I p 
,, 
II 
next election if the people here given the proper opportunity 
,, 
:1 q 
to realize their situation in the full 
ii 
light of needs and prac~i-
0 t 0 f 1 t 0 1 d 11 call les. As -· evJ e ectore es ere ever stu.1u ate anyway to mt:J,, 
tile real uecision involved in the power contests--then it ·will li 
il 
II :9robo b ly co;:r:Le some tir.1e aftervmrd, particularly curing a period 
of extre::1e world tension, 1fjhich in itself, ~:ve must confess, ::..s 
Gore predictable to the future in the next five years than is 
anything de Gaulle ci3ht or could do during the same period. 
of representative -;overnment, tLen, SE:erns to lie ul-
tLr1u te ly in the hands of de rraulle. ~/Jha t lt ind of l1ands are 
il 
1i 
!I 
\1 
II II 
II 
'· 
i 
tLose and vJill they treat t'Jeir charge ~~ently, or nerely anihi~:te 
I 
it, is the question of the yec.r for r.1any frenchDen. II 
II 
De Gaulle has no more of a consistent objf,ctive policy to I! 
il 
put forth then c1id the ~To.tional Socioli.sts in Derlin. r~~~c.re a~le 
1\ elec~J:::~·1ts ssoe:cie:.tci~ "'"it1~ tile ~.r~ t:~~~t uJ-·e 1c11o"f:J11 for tl~.eir'\ 0011- 1 
; 
I 
ten:.Jt for de:;wor:;c~r c t'l(' po,;;nl:H' so7erei:~·nt,y, but little is ltncwf\ 
of their actual influence in the affairs of the RPF. ~hat a g~~dly 
~m .. lbc~r of the lt:-aL1el'S of the ?PF cere ef:] ni~ilistic in tl::.eir ap-j 
- I 
oroech as tl:ere Vi ere in Germany 3l1d Italy is Vii thout a doubt--1 t 
a~ain, as to the extent of their influence over de Gaulle, it 1·l 
hard to say. That all these conditions inevitably lead to , 
rase isms is, of course, not supportable..- -regardless of hov1 mu1r 
a c) a triot de (}<:;ulle is--nor how ideal is tic. I: 
II 
" II ,, 
de;::10cro.tic r.1achinery--the types France does not ~sve the 
il 
ii tl"wreof--neccssc:.;ry 
II 
to support democracy itself in the face of 
II 
t~~ 
I 
il 
--t-
\1 
,, 
!i !j i! j, 
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:1 ~ '! the crises she is no•.v experiencing--and r.ill continue to exoer'-
'.1 - I J ence. ::.e:aocracy, under the stress of these circu.nstances, mey !\ 
!J I! 
ii fall once ~:1ore in France. :England has a v:orkint; government sn4! 
!; 'i 
II il 
11 ll.c:iS been able to deet :1cr p:roblens--t'··e cr :.1.r:.e~1t;:3 in ~~ngls~lC'', 'I 
I ll'i ij 
1: 'I 
!i c.:cc ~wt ever ~)olic::r--havc:; :wt been si;1c~" t 1F: orld 3ituotioE !i II - -
!.1 ::1 li bee:.::: 1e acute--their :~.r ~~~;:.ents c.re over \·,::..o '.Jill :;.:l)lE; Y nt GL 
1
. 
II , .::.,-:::,~;::.lL>.'-::ed :)olicy. ::::n :::Oronce it is the rever:..;e--·.:itl1 t':.-;e ·I 
jl I, 
\\ ;:olicy sicte of 0i.te picture erusec~. ::'hey have no policy, only :
1
,1 
li )o.vcr contests. At the ssr1e tbe the "ranch hove a sr,iri t of :I 
(1
1
1 indi.vidualis:.1 .:::.nd liberoli ty that 1dll possibly deter the ii 
I! q 
!I de Gaullist uove:nent from becor:1ing the leviathan its counterpeJt 
I, II 
'I I! 
\l\1 developed into in roeroany and Italy--and is presently in Spain1l 
.. This one factor holds out the one strong hope for '<'renee's be- !1 
j - - li 
j ing able to synthesize her dictatorship with existing ideology~ 
:; 
ij 
I 
i\ 
I 
ii 
1i 
II !, 
ii',i' 
\ 
I~ !, 
n 
l 
The French are suffering u~der the effects of a confusion of 
,, 
ij 
I' I 
ideolo3ic2l inte:r:·ests r'laking lllhemselves felt in the governr;lent i 
I 
toclay, but this sane confusion is the only buhvark against the t! 
complete destruction of democracy. i! HmJ much have those ideals ,1\ 
'I 
tJ-,eir basis, been shattered by recent events is a netter of 11 
II 
conjecture. That they have been destroyed sufficiently to per~l 
- \1 
\I 
rait the inroads of a general attitude of thi.s nihilism, is be-
yond a doubt a fact--though here too, the extent of such an 
influx is pure conjecture. That it exists sufficiently for us 
to predict the introduction ulti;nately, during the next five 
years, of some kind of de Gaullist rE-.::gL1e we have already testil~ 
I 
il 
:! 
i[ j, 
-~=--=c.--co====-~ 
I, 
:: 
!i 
1\ 
il 
" l 
i! 
\1 
ij 
for e conclusion as to the irunediate future, we . 
II_  
can see good re:1son to believe thst tl:e n_:hird :rcorce can come II I. 
out of the pending nstional elections victorious, i.e., again il' I, 
:; 
in the sec;_t of control. ":'here also is neason to believe that ii 
I• 
tl1e r:1ajori ty they ::re able to derive fron this election depend~ 
!j 
vvholly upon the trend of events betvveen novJ and the election. \\ 
It is not too hDrd to intLJ.ate the nrobDble drift in con-11 
- I 
:j 
versation betvveen President Auriol and so~ae of our nation's to:gj 
i' 
!,1 ' leaders during the former's recent visit to this country. Thel!e 
!I '\ II h8ire been a mutual reGord by all the leaders in such converse-!. 
1\ tions of the alr:1ost inevitable results that vJOuld occur in 3ur9jpe 
i;l and especially :France, should the United States enter an all o1jt 
[! ·.-.-ar ·,~i th Com.rnunis t Cllina. The near panic in France might well \1 ~' :I 
Jj bring de Gaulle to power at tl~e polls i.d thout him. having to vva !i 
!i until afte:c the election to engineer a political coup. 11 
'I - 11 I !i 
President Auriol prob8bly plec:H1ed for the life of c.etlOCTaci~r 
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